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PREFACE

What follows is not typical of modern American
sociology*.-

References to standard authorities in the field

of social change will be scarce; primary and secondary data
will originate in historical, political, popular and
intuition!stic sources by design.

This scheme makes

m ssit.'x *3 a tsynthesis of the disparate contributions to
l^ocial change- .and "futurologyt? of, inter alia, Richard T«
4j£aF±ere, Marion Yanfossen, Alvin Toffler and myself.
..Departing from the accepted thesis format is necessary to
the task, that is, to predict where post-modern culture is
--j^eaded by using common and, whenever useful, uncommon
Sociological indicators and theorists.
-•
'

Probably a shocking and discomforting aspect of

the enterprise., for readers of "journal sociology”, is the
lack of attention paid to many discipline champions.

For

example, Michael Harrington1s newest book, Socialism, is
genuinely fascinating to read and study, particularly his
15reinterpretation5V of the "real" Marx.

It is written with

the appropriate liberating sentiment and- intellectual
sophistication one would expect from a professional
American

revolutionary” and social scientist.

However,

the book is involved in an academic game for which there

is no time in the course of this thesis:

it is in the lay

sense "scholarly”, i.e. totally, inexorably out of touch
with social reality.

Harrington is carrying on in the

noble radical tradition, trying to effect social change by
writing a normatively powerful tract.

That there is little

empirical evidence to support his main contention - a
revolutionary potential about to erupt within the American
labor organization - does not actually impune the quality
of the book.

Reading it is like reading The City of God:

it has to do with relatively little in the real world, but
as, literature, human thought and normative suggestion, it
■,is quite good.
f .

This distinction, then, between scholarly game-

playing and accurate, empirically "sensible51 analysis will
u.remain central throughout the following.

While several

^-especially useful books will be given intensive treatment,
point of the thesis will not be to display scholastic
■fireworks, although writing in that style is great fun and
sometimes even of sociological use.

Put in simplest terms,

although it would be personally satisfying to write some
thing along the lines of "The Epistemological Roots of
Wissenssoyiologie" or "The Revolutionary Content of Marx",
the following work is a. more pedestrian, Yeblen-Mills style
scholarship, aimed at speaking simply and directly about
the readily perceivable, the sociologically accurate, about
the "real worldM and of nothing extraneous to it*

However., there is inherent in this a central paradox
which may seem to contradict the above*

What the following

does not promise is simplistic solutions to the question of
social change*..

In each part of the world, a different type

of change will 'probably obtain, and at different rates, with
different actors.

Even within the limits of any given

sector, there will exist easily perceived diversity,,

This

thesis will study and prognosticate about change of major
and thoroughgoing proportions within, essentially, the
United .States and 3.ike areas of the m o d e m world*

What

-will, be described is the genesis of a new definition, of
phs-elf", of the social actor, along with concomitant,
^.o-gically necessary adjustments of the socio-political
'world both, as.cause and effect of these revised self-views.
>:
?;To step,’
-slightly ahead, a theory which hopes to avoid
inadequate linear projection must concern itself with an.
appropriate range and diversity of personality types,especially those most likely to instigate or adopt alter
ations in social processes, structures, and/or values,.
Therefore, economic and political realities will be to
some degree deemphasized (as opposed to their usual
primary position in studies of change) in favor of
social-psychological, valuational factors.

This is not

however a fabricated, academic position of preference so
much as a reflection of necessities in the study of change
as I think it will occur in the future*

ABSTRACT

This study was undertaken in the belief that current
theories of social change, -especially those espoused and
utilized by sociologists, are inadequate as explanatory tools
regarding certain types of social change in the. future.
One unorthodox theory of change, that of Richard T.
LaPiere 7 was found to be of inore use than others. This theory
was radically -modified to .better- •facilitate- the analysis of
the latest manifest ations of'.social change.
A survey of social change in Western history from the
middle ages to the present day was performed in order to
stzrate the efficacy of haPieref s theory plus the attendant
Modifications proposed by the author«
*:i
'Finally, the societal problems which may well evolve
i&lorg with the new form of change were examined* Some minor
■suggestions for mitigating the impact of these problems were
made•

A THEORY OF FUTURE SOCIAL CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

The following is an attempt at what has come to be
termed "grand theory".

Although Mills years ago attacked

entrenched theorists by using the term pejoratively, some
of his admirers have recently hqen theorizing on the
macroscopic level, it might seem, in spite of his admon
ishment •

However, the motive behind their writing has not

sen,.as in the case of the writers Mills examined, to aid
|.rr.hhe legitimation of a- social order under the slogan
Rvalue-free" social, science.

Rather, men like I. !•«

Horowitz,- N.« Bimbaum, the quasi-Marxists of Britain, and
an,?;amorphous Continental contingent who combine critical
philosophy with sociology (including the Frankfurt
school), work at producing large-scale critiques of the
traditional systems In which they operate.

Gonldner•s

Coming Cxdsis,in'Western Sociology, although demonstrably
-shoddy in other respects, puts succinctly the problem of
a social science enamored more of a safe, antiseptic
"predictive" role than that of partisan.

It should be

obvious then that this thesis has been crafted In the
increasingly accepted belief that sociology, diluted In
its normative character, becomes dangerously neutral
academic chatter.

The sociology of knowledge has
p

3
conclusively demonstrated that social scientists* perhaps
more than other, scholars, are by definition* from the first
moment of their research, inextricably embroiled in
evaluat ive concerns.
As a prelude to this project, and in the hope of
resolving major methodological questions* I made a study of
the relatively new "sociology of sociology*1.

The small but

potent literature in this blossoming subfield has become
radical in both methodological -and substantive suggestion.
s('l)

("Radical7* in. this sense connotes an attitude of

^•persistant critical intensity, aimed at investigating, and,
'ftt warranted, debunking standard ideologies offered by
-

who seek to maintain unnecessarily inegalitarian
..social organization and structure.)

It was felt that a

study of social change ought first to be informed of
valent sociological "domain assumptions" (2) and
£Oitsequent blind spots common to the discipl.ine itself.
While this may seem of excessively peripheral interest, the
brief,; study nevertheless pi*ovided a general!25ed legitimation
fox’ the historically maligned radical position, and thus
served in supporting and corroborating the suspicion,
harbored by younger practitioners, that sociology has been
hiding from the more flammable* less funded areas of
research*

The reasons for this avoidance behavior on the

part of most researchers is easily documented by commonsense evaluations (professional aspirations, fund procure
ment, etc.), and by more sophisticated ideological analyses*

estrange itself from the ignominious near-homonym *
socialism)*- but that given the current sentiment and
interest in social policy* such 'behavior still persists
(especially in the most statistically oriented universities
and research settings)*
In subscribing to this radical position* the
younger researchers concern themselves less with quanti
fiable precision than with the overall legitimacy and
rmeaning of any given project* and moreover* with content
ijftprjocess and. values) and not so much with the historical
pubberfuge of conservatives * form (structure )•

It has been

pointed out. since antiquity that dichotomous descriptions
.of reality* these included* are usually highly interdepenlt#3at in the "real" world* so that in fact we cannot deal
:^th,only process* only values or only content* no more
than exclusively with structure, form or "patterned
variables"*

Among the many reasons for this* the most

cogent ‘is.that these terms are not mutually exclusive :
they are complementary analytic/descriptive tools*
However, as the post-Mills generation is quick to point
out, in the past those sociologists concerned for the most
part with structure and form have arrived (and/or begun)
a t .conservative theoretical positions and promulgated upon
their sociological audience a great many suggestions for
research to support their reactionary contentions*

By

eschewing "abstracted empiricism11, the modern theorist risks
being labeled npolemicist”, "pamphleteer” and "popularize!*"
by his computerized colleagues.

However, he may well

produce, with sufficient attention to qualitative and
historical methodology, hard-hitting, sociologically
sensible work, as evidenced' by many of Mills* followers
end others of his ilk who wrote before him®
The present work is not a "review of the literature”,
a "replication study”, or a. test of the validity c-f a former
theory:

it is an attempt at an -’original" theory of future

social change*

Obviously, however, there has been incurred

heavy intellectual debt to earlier thinkers who pointed
;in the direction taken here®
nihilo theorizing*

Shis is- certainly not ab

These precursors are considered by

many to be extremely gifted sociologists, and to extend
their insights somewhat is an "advocate1s" role rather than
of the "innovator" *

This thesis will utilise pre

dominantly sociological, and historical sources in describ
ing and analyzing with broad strokes the history of social
change {of a certain specifiable type) in the m o d e m world®
Building on that analysis, I will propose a theory of
rationalized, consciously perpetrated change which claims
fox- itself strong predictive power regarding the future of
particular areas of the world*

(This is done with high

regard, for the critical legacy of Mills, and the spirit; he
proposed for-the social sciences, as clearly explained by
Horowitz in his introduction to The New Sociology (1) ).

At/the same time and by way of qualification, much of this
presentation, especially those sections dealing with social
movements, political revolutions and the general theory of
social change as borrowed fi*om noted thinkers, is nothing
but "journeyman sociology”.

As is typical of research at

this level" of the academic hierarchy, most of the useable
input... is .derivative, not original, for example, in the use
..of such standards as Arnold W. Green’s introductory text.
The first lesson in the study of social change of whatever
type is that real, purposive, singularly- conceived innovation
Vis, for a variety of sociological reasons (beyond personal
^S'iHitstions), a most difficult enterprise®

That this axiom

■
’laja^plies to academic theorising should be emphasized, for
*fehe education8.l-schol.arly milieu very often demands near•|conformity, thereby excluding and denigrating innovational
v^pproao'hes to the subject matter.
Horowitz has given us a poignant reminder, that this
was'so, even as recently as the mid~1950fs:
'.•.we are all too ready to pay homage to the dead.
Mills received no awards which sociologists make
annually for books deserving and otherwise - while
mow an ‘annual award is to be made in his name.
After Power Elite he was turned, down for every
request for"a grant from the great institutions of
the 1philanthropoids1 with but a single honorable
exception - while now sponsorship fox'* work on Mills
is available.(5)
The "newness”, the contestable part of the thesis,
begins very late in the work.

Modern sociologists and

political scientists might readily reach consensus regarding
the nature of political revolutions and the etiology of

social movements*

These standard analyses serve adequately

when examining social change (of one important type) between,
roughly/ the French Revolution and the Second World Wax', but
as aids in considering change within the last quarter
century or so, the traditional concepts (and prejudices)
become increasingly less useful.
really quite simple.

The reason for this is

Like everything else in a changing

‘;world5 the nature of change has been rapidly changing*
Integral to the theory attempted here is the
inclusion of a revised understanding of personality*

Terms

“/such as "movement” and "revolution" denote of the partialcollective interpretation and action regarding
•iji'diLiticsl reality.

Such terms were formulated and accepted

vfby --the social science community with the implication that
Jan.'**appropriate" personality cynosure of m o d e m man was
■as&lf-evident.

The usefulness of. collective terms it seems *~

iiir,.the jargon of Mannheim - has seen its finest hist ordeal
•*;momdnt.

’
The post-democratic revolutionary era has until

recently been dominated by easily perceived group
(collective) performances*

'The present theory suggests that

not only do these larger descriptions of change now falter,
but likewise^that the traditionally unquestioned cynosure
can be faulted, even in its loosest understanding, as
"ideal type",.

This insertion is left somewhat vague

intentionally, but with the assurance of elaboration
towards clarity in the closing sections of the thesis*
(The ramifications of a revised personality theory, from

the perspectives of socialization processes, the signifi
cance of !!individual ism" and "private property", etc., are
complex and of considerable import, and represent the most
speculative element of what follows*)
It becomes -then the point of the thesis to show
why time-honored conceptual definitions of social change no
longer prove satisfactory, and further, to advance a theory
. which is better capable of "explaining a larger proportion
of..the variance” concerning change in recent history, and
more importantly, in the future®*
it/The exposition of (1) theories of social change and (2)
fehe'history of social change may of course be criticized
the standard academic posture: accuracy of fact,
tnrmdness'' of logic, interpretation, clarity of prose, etc.
^ it the final prognostications included herein fall more
c-mthin the realm of "educated hunches" and the new theory,
vjdue to .its mildly innovations! character, must stand without
•Ithe usual protection afforded by the "literature" of past
ye arch, and other familiar tools of defensive scholarship.
■|0iki:he many hazards unique to this non-normal mode of
$3^uiry, perhaps the most; precarious is the near certainty
*^£iat theorists of the "old style" will suddenly become very
.•precise in their conceptions of the boundaries of "scienti
fic" work: they move with haste from the spirit of science
to that of scientism. One of the "greats" in this field,
Karl Popper, has been providing ammunition for conservatives
since 194-3 (6), apparently in the naive belief that he is
.defending the pristine Scientific Method, against those who
care more for theoretical accuracy and awareness.of change,
than methodological tradition*- Against this type mind there
is no unequivocal defense, for his premises are finally
psychologistic and ad homlnem, though carefully camouflaged
with belabored "logic". It £s hoped that this presentation
may be received in the same spirit with which it has been
constructed:- with sociological sophistication, theoretical,
rigor and a belief in the necessity for innovation in this
crucial area of the discipline, thereby avoiding tedious and
unproductive quasi-arguments, so typical of Popper and his
admirers *

CHAPTER I
LAFIERE'S THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE

In the broadest and perhaps only somewhat useful
sense5 it is possible to equate sociology with social
•change*

The most adamant systems-analysts have in the

recent past included provisions within their theories to
deal with change, though usually at the interpersonal,
;§gCiaI.-psychological level in lieu of macro-analyses*

At

iyb© mther- extreme, grand, theorists ever since. Vico have
^ftracted -from reality one or two "independent” variables,
s.*and hung the weight of all social change on those slim
'pjpmjbers,* whether they be geography, race, weather.
on, economics or whatever.

A convenient breakdown

&£ jfchese larger theories is offered by Richard Appelbaum
in a recent text (?)*

Without claiming originality he

suggests."Evolutionary", "Equilibrium", "Conflict"...and
"Rise and Fall" groupings for the many theories within the
tradition*

Far more interesting and polemical is Sorokin*s

Mode m Historical and Social Philosophies (8) in which he
character!stically dismembers about a dozen theorists of
change with acerbic grace and insight.

However, his own

theory somehow emerges unscathed, therefore limiting some
what the book *s usefulness.

We have learned from these critics and the many
others who have zeroed in on nonocausal or cyclical thinkers,
that whether it be Spengler, Toynbee, Kroeber, Marx or even
Sorokin, social change is altogether too -complex a
phenomenon - cx* more precisely, a. grouping of phenomena «*•
to be explained even in small part by one or two overloaded
causatives*

A

more fruitful approach, and one which avoids

internecine, "schools” debate, is that
LaPiere in his

offeredby Richard T.

latest text production, Social Change (9)®
*“■

’

a p i <iii 'w a» » .!u a

Of the mysteries which have developed in league with
x&aieriean sociology, one of the mors bisarre and unexplainisbl© is the discipline’s ignoring and maligning of LaPiere*
Wfe has been producing important texts since 1938 when he
’■
‘
ifeote one of the first of the second generation treatments,
..pnllective' Behavior*

In the early 19.904s he produced

£k" *i >ry of •Social Control, then somewhat later The Freudian
hltSLd .

The book used here is his capstone achievement,

i-ncorporating elements of the others.

LaPiere's concern

with innovation and change was intimately related to his
private and professional life:

he was a creative and

penetrating thinker who cared little about aligning himself
with "schools”*

Therefore he came to understand through

formalized learning as well as life experience the coercive,
perverse powers of (in this, case, professional) social
control mechanisms*

OneTleoks in vain through any of the

ma*jor overviews of the discipline written in the last 20
years for adequate or laudatory mention of LaPiere.

Two

reasons come to.mind*

First,-his areas of interest do not

neatly coincide with the "mainstream” of the discipline,
since the mao or spokesmen have cai'efully- avoided, the more
explosive and difficult areas, such as social control.
Second, his style of scholarship is anathema to the Mainstreamers.

He simply reads and thinks, usually without the

ai&vof computers, fables and other gimmickry unessential to
his tasfce

For this he has 'won permanent unpopularity with

many practitioners, although it becomes obvious upon
studying his work that his suggestions for research and
,fprther .investigation are eminently operational, were anyone
t'D.: take the trouble *
j$p

Laid ere, in terms of m o d e m American sociology, is

^ap. innovator*

A thinker with whom he shares many traits is

Wright Mills.

Their writing is always an informed hair

>=|pay..from polemics; their synthesizing minds tear through
hunks of literature with precision and an unbending
"need” to exorcise inaccurate pretentiousness, if in the
■form of overly grand., theory, computerized triviality, or
otherwise*

Mills gave the discipline its most popularly

influential power study, and one of its finest theoretical/
methodological statements.

LaPiere, similarly working alone,

provided. the most exhaustive study of social control, which
latex* grew into a study of how- men overcome societal
restraints in the interests of change.

Both writers eschew

mythmaking or intellectual .gamesmanship, sticking as closely
as possible to -readily perceivable empirical reality, and

from it drawing refreshing insights.
For reasons of accuracy and clarity, LaPiere will
be, at least temporarily, the centerpiece of what follows
concerning sociological theory.

His writing is authorita

tive;, lucid, comprehensive and candid.

Also, unlike others,

LaPiere knows and uses history to his advantage, a technique
to be emulated here.

It is necessary to emphasize that

when-a part of his theory (or a minor extension) is offered,
it is with the knowledge that such a "transcribing"
inevitably mutilates and undoes, in terms of concision and
style,, what the original writer- worked so hard to avoid:
sipfpy expression thereby linked with inept reasoning.
To ^.y that LaPiex*e *s theory, at whatever level, is a
"tight conceptual package” is to understate.

It is hoped

tha%?& measure of his style can be retained in this
presentation „
v$?o emphasize by repetition, LaPiere *s work is a
complex-and detailed accretion of data from many fields
and 'sources, much of which escape the standard theorists
of change.

Included in this broad range are anthropological

findings, especially the work of Homer G. Barnett (10), to
whom LaPiere acknowledges an. immense debt (11), detailed
histories of inventions in all types of crafts, industries
and disciplines, social history at its best (e.g. Marc'
Bloch and Preserved Smith), and other, more "offbeat"
literatures.

The theory is a subtle blend of macro and

micro-sociology, for example, the Industrial Revolution

(if such an "event” actually occurred) is balanced against
social-psychological requisites and conditions which
produce individuals capable of creating change.

LaPiere

ist amazingly perhaps* as comfortable in one area as in
another•

As mentioned before* the vast subject of social

change is a logical culminating point for one whose prior
books handled collective behavior and social control (12).
The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to
explication of LaPiere1s theory with occasional elabora
tions/ and detours in the interests of my thesis*

If is

■vboped- that; this project will not become tedious* although
times the analysis and recounting of LaPiere *s 550-page.
into less than a tenth the space will require uncomportable compression.

l'he most unfortunate aspect of this

einpt at. ,syn op sis is tlie tmavo id at-1e omi ssion of LaPi er e *s
.fPilumnous documentation. -Only his conclusions will be
$||&Qnicled‘
* therefore creating the erroneous impression
that ’they are pure armchair speculation.

His d&ta-

•gathering Is scrupulously comprehensive.
I do this so that the position of the innovator as
a motor of change will.be appreciated completely* without
my -having to create an original explanation.
I should make clear several things.

At the outset

First * LaPiere* s

exposition is not to be confused with my thesis:

they are

not absolutely synonymous* although I willingly acknowledge
his indispensable contribution*

Second* I differ with L

LaPiere regarding the role of culture and its cumulative

quality* since it is obvious that the social actor of
whatever talent cannot successfully operate without
knowledge and access to a nourishing cultural milieu.
Moreover* the tools of innovation are the reservoir of
cultural traits and.their infinitely reccmbinable nature.
In his polemical and outspoken style* LaPiere makes a
superb case-for the innovator,, but only winks at the problem
of culture and its role in change»
* .On the positive side however* I go through this
-.rather‘onerous operation in order to provide a well-made
plabfoiin from which to extend his theory, reshape-it and
px*€pent my own*

I allow LaPiere to speak for himself at

length so as to avoid unfairness in the presentation of
what?- must be considered an excellent sociological tract.
Whafe'follows then is a.blow by blow account of Social Change,
selectively edited of course, and mildly bastardized, in
orifefevbo 'better serve my intellectual intentions.

"Every innovation* whether it be a new mechanical
device* a ..new form, of human relationship, an addition to
tire stock of knowledge, or a theory* such as that which
will be presented here, is at once a utilization of estab
lished cultural elements and a violation of some aspect of
the status quo” is the first sentence of Social Change.
-**

w

ii"

» i i w i ■m w w j . - i w r « i ^ » n .1—

With, writing as sound and appealing as that, it will be an
effort not to over-quote the source.

Furthermore:

>V&
O'

■y.

«* *Through most of-recorded social history men have
apparently considered that change per se is undesirable
and that the ideal social, condition is stability* •.
Folklore, myth, legend, theology, social philosophy,
ethical and aesthetic standards, and other symbolic
constructs have, for the most part, reflected the
traditional modes of social conduct and have operated
as social controls, subtly or overtly coercing the
v individual members of society to conform to the tradi
tional ways of life. Even the philosophers of change*
.such as Plato and .Marx, have usually granted thedesirability of change only as auneans to the achieve
ment. of the good
and stable - social order; men have
in fact through most of social history maintained a
considerable degree of social stability* Wars,
invasions, and other disasters, natural or social,
have been a commonplace in most times and places; but
periods of pronounced social change have been few and
of short duration, and during these periods only
^limited areas of the social system have been affected,
fdiile the. vast bulk of. the social -.heritage has persisted,
generation after generation, more or less intact* (13)
Social change, then, is atypical, asocial, historic-

alp,.y rare -and something of a "regularity" only in the last
three ■'hundred years

in theWest*

r ’ Even now, in the midst of the most rapid, social change
^.y. that man has ever experienced, the -social ideal would
seem to lean toward the glorification of stability and
:the depreciation of change, as witness -the fact that
i|? most contemporary sociological! writing is concerned
-i’« with structure rather than process, with the state of
things ~as theyare rather than how they came to be that
way and in what directions they are going, (emphasis
added) (14-)
LaPieref-s dislike for Marx and other traditional heroes of
those who claim to own the inside track vis a vis the study
and ideological,support of change, is a potentially aggra
vating note for many modern students.

Yet in the final

analysis, LaPiere. comes off as better sociologically informed
and .currently more useful than, the more revered
radical heroes.

1 9 th

century

His attention is to individual innovation,

advocacy and adoption of technological* organisational and
ideological changes, and not to large-scale, collective
change* as evidenced in the few successful social move**
ments and revolutions of the last two centuries*
His theory was constructed upon many others’ work,
yet is noticeably removed from standard sociological
presentations in many instances.

I have added emendations

to the overarching schema, as suggested principally by
Marion G. Vanfossen and like theorists, who concern them
selves with the necessity of developing adequate conceptual
tools toward successfully understanding the future.

(Were

yffbxh&astiveness my aim, a final section on the details of
1*’
;
.fi'lsocial pi arming, in the tradition of Mannheim, .Dahl/
liindblom, etc. would be included.)

A crucial issue which

| tkill be given unfortunately short shrift is the idea now
•^ffcaihing some currency, that we should begin socialising
!
'h^our* citizens from their youth to live in a segmented world
rather than pretending we still operate in the never-never
land of Gemeinschaft.

(This is for my purposes accepted as

axiomatic, but slightly beyond the central issues, there
fore mentioned rather briefly, as is the case with other
significant extensions of thought*.
LaPiere *s analysis and description of social change
in human history, especially the recent past, is the most
precise, inclusive and sociologically sensible this
researcher has been able to find®

What will be shown is

that the mechanisms of change-themselves have undergone and

currently undergo transformations in form and content, and
that therefore *many current writers have been misled into
•considering only collective action as the motor of signifi
cant change,.

Hot only is this not the case in post-modern

culture, there is much.evidence suggesting that this set'of
ideas .never has been the most accurate portrayal of the
purposive restructuring of society.

Bodin and Vico -outdistanced -their contemporaries by
.introducing- cyclical theories of change, and Locke first
'.posited nor/natively the possibility of human-designed
^Iterations of society*

Coxidorcet* however* was the .first

.
;.,jp$itivist for whom social engineering through scientific
.wtudy of behavior seemed possible. (15)*

-On his heels, in

cnlightenment, the idea of progress (16) as not only
j^ssiblebut a positive good vied with the remnants of
'gHgp$$rvat±ve late medieval thought and institutions, in
which change of any type was anathema.

(While modern

scholars of the medieval have worked valiantly at dispel
ling the misnomer, Dark Ages - born in 19th century
scholarship ~ we still must accept the widely held, opinion
that in terms of human freedom, the Middle Ages were too
immersed in tradition to allow very much.

This attitude

may-..;become tempered through efforts of more -scholars like ;
Sylvia Thrupp (17)*- .Examination, of some m o d e m studies
portrays the people of the Middle .Ages as often having- been
aware...that trade procedures,, military customs, and other

.feudal realities (especially the Papacy) were obstructing
possible betterment of life.

Yet, sadly, the social

structure and its overwhelmingly powerful legitimations
deterred most would-be innovators and coopted those few
whom it could not pacify in other ways*

Changes which did

occur'were very slow in coming and usually of a-modifying
nature rather than the gross restructuring and rethinking
•which has become the hallmark, of modern society and its
theorists*)
I" •
yh

I?:.
.•>
ts

i•..for it required great courage and profound contempt
for the traditional to assert that not God but man
himself had created society and that what man had
wrought ..man could change to suit his needs and his
conveniences* It is difficult now to appreciate haw
radical, how subversive in the eyes of authority,
how strikingly adventurous,rthis idea must have
seemed to most men of 18th century Europe* It rejected and ran counter to a vast collection of myths,
legends* superstitions, laws and theological prescrip
tions* (18)

llStvshould be pointed oxit that while social scientists have
.since- -adopted the enlightenment appreciation of man’s
^-control'of social reality, the. vast majority of souls, even
within the political borders of “advanced” nations, still
feel "extremely timorous when the question of their social
system’s legitimacy is raised*.

Perhaps Maine was premature

xn announcing the move from status to contract in the West,
when there still remain among us many powerful and demanding
“feudal” constraints under which people must carefully
operate, lest' their ”contracts” be revoked for noncontractual
reasons.

Throughout any discussion of social change, the

basic-and perennial distinction between intellectual
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theorists, and pronelytizers and the masses with their leaders,, sacred and secular,- requires emphasis*

To forget

that the mental productions of a Vico, Locke or Condorcet
were literally worlds removed from those of their contem
poraries is to ignore one of the basic laws of innovation:
its utterly atypical and asocial quality*

To innovate is

to deviate from established cultural values in the most
heretical way.
'Darwin became a great' friend to social scientists
rrmterested in change, eventhough his Origin of Species often
differed in.their writings.

The evolution of species

•<pfeikly became the “natural** evolution of society toward a
^necessarily” imincoved state«

In this way, a potentially

radical' theory of change lost much of its punch, being
.jc^vertedinto a legitimation of the status quo*

Capital-

,exploitation of the worker, imperialist wars and other
ilitb ^century conditions seemed in some half-informed minds
'suddenly to be affirmed by ontological forces larger than
man.

Amazingly, the public still remains at least slightly

• mystified and pleased by the “survival of the fittest”
theoryespecially when their particular- group turns out to
be the fittest.
The mid-nineteenth to early.20th century was rich intheories of change:

(1) social -Darwinism; (2) To entiles’

famous dichotomy (more symptom than cause of change); (3)-*
the socialist conceptions (anarchism./ Marxism,. Eabian
'socialism, and the most effective in many ways in the

non-Marxist countries, -moralistic reformism; (4) cyclical
theories of history; (3) particularistic theories (diffusionism, geographic determinism, biological determinism); and
finally (6) the sociological theories (assimilation, social
ecology/, social lag, cultural acceleration, to name the
more famous) - each brandishing its practitioners, theorists
and schools.
Of the socialistic doctrines, Fabian socialism holds
the distinction of being the.most accurate prognosticator of
& 20th -century reality (19)-

Its playing down of "necessary

^ a n d immanent revolution" in lieu of compromise and moderately
iftlMljeral “gradualism” more accurately reflects the changes
idi&ieh even-now are being incorporated into modern society,
than the apocalyptic visions of the Marxists®

However, in

d rt&xms of effectiveness of political action, the many shortfc/feSved, single-issue (segmented) (20) reform movements win
down.

Two beliefs characterised these movements, the

* power of organised minorities, and the power of religious'
righteousness in destroying the social evils of the world
(prostitution, drinking, disenfranch!sement of women,
heathenism-in foreign, countries, etc.) (21).

Although

clothed in obfuscating State Department ideology, this
basic- “show the natives how to live’5 sentiment is today
obvious in this countx'y*s aid to “underdeveloped, nations”.
Cyclical theories, whether of historical (Sorokin,
Toynbee, Spangler, etc.-) or anthropological persuasion
(Kroeber, Leslie White, Gordon Chil.de, etc*), .when-tested

scrupulously against historical reality (as best we can know
it) became merely useful and interesting prods to. more
sophisticated research*..- (Sorokin’s monument to groups study
probably better withstands attack than -other cyclical
theories, and his popularized versions hold great appeal for
those who.- .wish;'to -return to-!iideational” culture *

The deep-

seated Puritan*motives behind his chosen trichotomy are too
apparent to attack®

That complex society should become less

•v sensute”.-runs counter to the very nature of. modernization
,r and increased rationalization of culture throughout the
^rorld* )•" Specialists of brief historical periods have
^peatedly stated that, cycles make sense only to the
sSesearcher -’whose period of interest extends beyond the
possibility of detailed knowledge:

the pyramid at two

;tp±Xes becomes hewn stones at two .yards, molecules at two
;tecromi'crohs.*

The sociologist must exercise care that

^Keimtively unlinked, “unique historical events”, do not
become magically glued in order to fit a desired conceptual
arrangement*
Diffusion!sm and „the famous determinisms suffer
from saxr*error of thinking regarding causality, in assuming
that a-given phenomenon is in direct causal chain with a
proposed .independent variable, without considering the
(usual).condition.of intervening variables.

Under modern

scrutiny,, the deterministic route has been laid to rest,
and the concept of “weighted variables” and multivariate
causation has -arisen to •"fill- the void*

The many "Only”

causes have been, .properly downgraded, to. the rank "One of.
many”•

As LaPiere notes, “Thefse) systems of interpretation

...were grandiose social philosophies rather than .scientific
hypotheses - testaments of faith neither derived from nor
testable against the evidences of social history or the
observable facte of social life”* (22)
Without going to unnecessary lengths in refuting the
major sociological theorists of change, it can be said that
.,-eaeh one seized haphazardly upon an interesting and time.^locale' specific feature of social reality, and announced that
“jail1*:-change was -therewith produced.

While Thomas, Park and

hirers offered intriguing and somewhat useful models of
(in -terms for instance of assimilation of immigrant
groups, cycles of race relations phenomena.,, and other
/ll^pplogical15 .occurrences)., Ogburn in 1922 'brought forth a
.;^mpwhat more useful Idea®.

He built on Tarde1s law of

d|^#rition - invention by the -individual - but added to that
*
•a..little Marx, giving us the still popular conception of
social lag, in which material productions necessarily out—
•strip in: their sophistication attendant Intel!actual/emotive
responses.

To use LaPierer& trichotomy, technology confronts

social .organisation and ideology with-conflicting and
challenging elements, thus--.creating the possibility of highly
"inconsistent51 behavior patterns and beliefs..
Even when, these luminaries are considered, along with
lesser figures - Hart, W. Moore.* Mart indale, etc. - their
predominant fascination, with stasis and structure blocks an

adequate appraisal of change*

It is as if change will

“take care of itself” while social scientists must concern
themselves far more with the “problem” of societal ongoingness*

This: obvious fallacy lias been attacked by more x'ecent

theorists ~ Mills* Barrington Moore* Barnes* to name the
earliest.

Out of this revolt* a most important suggestion

emerges* as pointed.out by LaPiere* in the words of Bendix
and Berger?
'And to do this* to include in sociological concern the
changes that may occur within the social system
1.
^attention'nrust he focused on the boundary-extending
*r
.as well as upon the boundary-maintaining activities of
-v‘- individuals * in the permissive aspects of culture and
Igr.
society which enable individuals tq experiment with
~
what is possible as well as upon the social controls
•yy.. which’Smit^the range of tolerated behavior without
■'-fe.h* /defining that range clearly* (23)
-That sentence •better than any other of its period •‘^igghsts- -precisely where this thesis is going.

1939

-

What remains

-*i§0r%e filled in are the outgrowths and reasons which are
d$fte©lvr@&- in- that particular view of social possibilities*
■.v

.Perhaps more amazing than, old-style reduction!sm is

< the often attacked (by Europeans) ahistorical quality of
American theory* especially that purported to explain change*
It has** been* pointed, out frequently that current American
training in sociology does not stress history due to the
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and early 20th century fascination and enslavement to histori
cal^'matters among its founders, which, diluted the burgeoning
sociological perspective.

LaPiere suggests that a “funda

mental misconception regarding social change has closed the
door to sociological exploration of the field" (2A)* speci-

?A
fieally, the belief, inherited from this hi story-1 aden
legacy, that change is a constant, ever-present element of
society, an "inherent social process”*

LaPiere continues

with the interesting aside that economists, not shackled by
this belief, have developed more useful theories of change
through their involvement with modernization programs:
The search for an explanation of this resistance
(to change introduced from the outside) has not yet
produced a general theory of social change that is
.sociologically acceptable, but it has led to a
•.
consensus among economists who are interested in
.economic stability and growth that it is the character
and activities of individual members ^of ^the society*
.not the social system itself^ that nSTstingufsh.es the
stable from the dynamic society, a view that is in
*$$1. *.-'general accord with that -which will be developed in
the present work. (2 5 ) (emphasis added)
'In one of the most revolutionary and memorable
sections of the book, LaPiere powerfully introduces key
S#eas under the heading ”The Asocial Nature of Social

'gfeaaee" .

This section follows his critique of older theorists

W K p ;sets the tone for the remaining pages.

An extended quote

(a: practice not to be repeated) is in order at this point:
...It is the thesis of this book that the changes that
occur within a society are asocial; that they are not
in any sense a product of the society per se or a
consequence of some universal and unvarying law of
social life. Social change is not comparable to the
changes that invariably occur through time in a living
organism, to the normal changes that are involved in
growth, maturity and decline,* The changes that may
occur in a society are, on the contrary, far more
comparable to those violations of the normal organic
processes that follow when, for reasons yet unknown,
a cell goes wild - when it breaks from the ”laws” that
control its growth and reproduction and, multiplying,
disturbs the functioning of the entire organism. The
forces that make for social change are, if the organic
analogy be pursued, abnormal - a violation of the
normal process by which the social system is transmitted

from generation to generation of members* 'A change in
society .comes, even as does a tumor in an organism, as
a foreign and unwanted agent, not necessarily of des
truction, but always of disturbance to the established
and organizationally preferred structures and processes
of life*«» The idea that social change emerges direct!
out of the society that it thereby changes has long
delayed recognition .of the fact that society in all its
various•aspects operates constantly and consistently
toward self-maintenance; that all social organization,
formal and informal, is as organization inherently
resistant to change; and that social change is the
work of socially deviant individuals acting in asocial
ways* That social change is not directly produced by
, the society so changed was implicit in a theory of
collective, behavior that. was. advanced in 1921 by .'Robert
'JB. Park (with Burgess, Introduction to the Science of
Sociology, hi of Chicago Press* p p «863~93^)T Change”
j • comes^about, in this theory, as an incidental conse■
- ?>, .quence of the fortuitous interaction of numbers of
^ *' *people .who have become desocialized - that is, stripped
•of their normal social characteristics
through partiife:cipation in mass milling* In the milling process, new
modes of social conduct are sometimes created and, he
If .
thought., sometimes established in the social, system as
the end product of a social movement* Had Park turned
his attention' to deviant individuals rather than to
deviant masses of individuals, he might have broken the
v■ conceptual barrier that has retarded sociological study
... of social change .and thereby inaugurated a fruitful
change In American sociology* (26}
$T

.,Jr

For _many theorists, including in some measure the

■ present.author, this position' is 'extreme*

It underestimates

the importance of institutionalized innovation (as in scien
tific. or technological research settings and "think tanks”)
and it makes by implication the unorthodox suggestion that
a major component of change (if not all change) in the tech
nological, ideological and organizational realms is not
subject to iron sociological laws, but actually random and
unpredictable in origin and frequency*

These complaints

were offered in reviews of Social Change*

However, even if

they were entirely-valid and fatally so vis a vis the useful*
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ness- of LaPiere1s' approach (which is not the case, as will
be shown), his insight in this matter is nevertheless
valuable enough to explore and amend in various ways with
•complementary and extending ideas#

While far from perfect

in formulation,.this theory is more capable of "handling
the data” of human history, especially in the post-modern
period, than any other - although in a few instances LaPiere*s.
conclusions and predictions arrived at by way of the theory
are demonstrably 'weak*

* .A common- assumption .among theorists of change is
asskdrnsistance upon the supposed cohesiveness of society;
ttoy imply much more interdependence with "social system11
terminology than actually operates, especially concerning the
pfet^modern situation#

One need not embrace an extreme form

.df^aocial atomism in order to appreciate the unalterable and
unmitigated individual quality of life* a function of the
physiological and mental situation of the human, animal,
along with societal constraints such as ones "place" in the
system and the coincidences of personal history (Mills)*
.."SocialrSystem" reasoning carries in terms of personal
security a rich psychological pay-off assuredly* and as an
analytical, heuristic device it may have been useful vis a vis
premodem societies*

Recently Gouldner and many others have

pointed to- the false, "Pollyanna" sentiment implicit in this
approach-as a- product: of

1930

*s theorists trying desperately

to put back together a world in fragmentation*

Marxism was

beating on the American door and more and more academic ears
were attuned to.the "new” tones, so Parsons and his followers
fictionalized the system perspective, and to their delightf
over the years^since Its inception,.it has begun- in some
minor ways to correlate with reality.
Change is as diverse and pervasive a reality as
stability in both the social and physical worlds, yet in
many minds, the dynamic tendency is conceptualized as a
single', -constantly uniform quality*

It -would make as much

sense sociologically to allow’change its due in terms of
various -tones, textures and rates., as to lavish upon stasis,
^g&ilibrium and stability the distorted, unhealthy attention
.•sM&cli. has become the hallmark of .right-wing sociology.
(However, vin keeping with the. nature of dialectics, it must
.be admitted that of very late, those younger, "hip"
^Petitioners - especially text writers and editors - have
to the opposite pole with unwarranted ease, perhaps
more in .an effort to catch the liberated student market than
to alter the direction of the discipline*)*
Change cannot be conceived and explained in anything
like the terminology suitable to stability.

The nature and

structure of the language itself deal a poor hand to those
wishing, to compose an adequate portrait of this perplexing
element.

It has been suggested by some anthropologists that

our physiological tensions, our readiness to explode into
action has historically been geared towards'conservatism.
•written in 1972*

The "liberated" stands, as qualified

Alterations in the environment of major dimensions were' tobe. avoided and quite- literally fought off.

This truism has

been entirely overdone in the interest of political conser
vatism, hut it is nevertheless foolish to ignore what seems
to be a rather basic human preference - for the predictable,
usual and'nnthreatening.

Yet, alas, we simultaneously seek

after entertainment and new stimuli with nearly the same
zeal with which we protect our fragile status quo.
Keeping these "dialectical forces” In mind, LaPiere
divides (somewhat arbitrarily) the phenomena of change into
several types;

(1) normal cycles, of activity and the usual

aspi-constant changes of personality, which represent the
paginal, non-innovative aspects of change; (2) the other,
unpredictable elements of human history - great men and
.eightss change over historical time labeled as epoch or era,
more generic "quality vs. quantity", the most
.di^icult to .measure in some aspects and the most inclusive
of; all such terms (27).
important- types?

In addition there are other, less

fads, fashions, cults, movements (28).

•Again turning to LaPiere, we find that:
Although a social system or particular aspects of a
social system may be fairly stable through many’
generations, social, life is nevertheless life.. It
exists only through the actions of the members of the
society, and those actions are not in any real sense
static or* stable. Actions are motion; motion is
fleeting; and the Instant the members of a society cease
acting, that society ceases to exist. (29)
His pronounced positivist, "action-theory" bias does not
vitiate the statement’s value.

LaPiere seeks to undo the

constraining theoretical knot of the functionali st s, but
perhaps his view of the social fabric is a bit too loosely
woven, his vision somewhat distorted due to his over
reacting to the stasis-champions* -• Great emphasis is put
throughout his study on the need for scholarly awareness
of the apparent static quality of systems* on the apparent
T»-n«‘V7mV'-«rMijrMrw-m «■t.-mw r,- .
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success of social control mechanisms in inhibiting innova
tive behavior, yet, on the actually unpredictable, almost
anarchic potential for change evidenced in some semi-t socialised participants in*any given society.

The genesis

■Jsand-.impact of these deviants will concern us further at a
Hater point.

*Betho&ological Interlude
i
‘&r-

History is very often the analysis and chronology

Jsgf crises and unique, unplanned situations and events*
.-'The day to dayness, the normal and unperpetrated changes
--that occupy most of society most of the time also gain the
attention of those who keep records:
is not. an unusual title.

"Daily life in..."

But "Social Change in the time of

Henry I"-would shock most medievalists, and certainly the
People who occupied that historical moment.

Therefore the

uses of history for the scholar, intrigued by change are
different from those of the standard academic historians.
There is enough recorded trivia to be sure, but incisive
and accurate analysis of change is something which until
very recently in the history of historical writing was

practically absent**

The- few well-known exceptions (e.g«,

Ibn Khaldun) prove the rule that historical writing meant
a less than perfect recording of the "noteworthy” - and in
less eclectic historical epochs the definition of that
criterion fell largely to those, few despots who could afford
and were willing to support a court note-taker.

Froissart,

with his sly frankness- concerning the social structure of
late .medieval Europe,- or Maehiavelli, whose Discourses
:.-•■smack of much less respect for the autocracy than does
Prince^ were atypical enough to accentuate the usual
-legitimating, pandering words of court historians*
•fir:..

.The time is taken here to .point out the highly

llf&bateable"uses of that most ambiguously handled art:
.■pro-modem historiography*

For a date, we might agree with

•Sixties and select Rankin as the founder of modern historical
.4Kgfcudy (JO).

But for in&ance even so late as 1969, a new

Jjf&dk, The Political Economy of Slavery (31), according to
\''authorities, totally revised the accepted view of that
ante-bellum practice, so that previous explanations were
largely obsolete*

And this is not the product of a new

"discovery"., in terms of primary materials, but more a
substitution of a revised approach to the data (Marxist in
this case) In lieu of the traditional one*
The problem of causality occupied this writer longer
than was profitable*

Some of the better studies (32)

stressed more than anything else the hellish complexify of
social life, particularly/ when viewed, as in this instance,

tram a-macro^orientation*

Still, useful is Ma.clver’.s

of causation, although his diatribes against quantitative
analysis are somewhat dated*

What this researcher did

learn from .his study, among other things, was the utterly
"assailable position taken■throughout this thesis*

A sharp

quantitative inquisitor could with little effort probe into
any number of large-scale general.isations in search of
experimental, or other proof.

As in the sociology of

Sociology, one learns that a defensible position requires
such a watering down of content, especially when of an
innovative nature, that worry over problems of questioned
cau&ality are fruitless.

Here, it seems, positivism has

Xo^ferany sense of larger reality or meaning.

When LaPiere

states without apology "Social, .change .comes for the most
part:: inconspicuously,, and for the most part it- is worked
byMMximpxessive.little men whose names and achievements
axttg&arely entered in the records of social history” (:33)s
it ^either .strikes one as a useful, creditable, assessment of
the past by an. expert - and is -thereby included in one1s
stock of knowledge as valuable and contradictory to the
overriding greatr-man. bias - or it ds junked out .of hand as
unsupportable intuition which at best is somewhat.interest
ing,. at worst incorrect.

3This section began, with a few reservations and
announcements regarding the nature of change®

We then

arrived at some' equally, hasty remarks about history and

•causality* so that henceforth- there will be. no more energy
spent in attempts at defending any of the many "unquantitatements which follow
"the direction of the society%

When one wishes to discus
he does not sweat blood

trying to fit every contingency into his analysis*

(Myrdal* s

methodological statements, both from American Dilemma and
his more.recent Asian Drama, support this view*)

LaPiere§
.-«•«»there is a complex* uncertain and. variable relation'ship between the qualitative and the quantitative
changes that occur in society*••there is some evidence.
*that some hinds of quantitative changes do more than
Just reflect qualitative changes.* that they actually
iy:
implement qualitative changes* When this is the case*
jfe,.. the quantitative change.wou3~d appear to operate as an
'
intervening variable, a link between two orders of
-y -qualxtative changesT* although' not in any sense the
■p cause.of the changes that are second in time***
...

•
t:*
•w'

*

.v* there is still another way in which the uncertain
relationship between quantitative and qualitative social
changes makes for difficulty in analysis* Every qualifative change, be it a new tool or technique, a new idea
or belief, a new form of human relationship or method
o f ;organization* begins in the •mind and action of one
man* At that point it is most certainly not a signi
ficant change; indeed, as will be seen, it is often
socially defined as the product of mental aberration*
If, however* others adopt the new, if it gains more
and snore adherents, a kind of quantitative change is
then occurring; in simple' terms, the new tool, -idea, or
method of organization is being diffused through the
membership of the society* But the question then
arises; at what point in this quantitative change is
the.qualitative change accomplished? when 10 per cent
~
~ " 1
new? when over 50

LaPiere is here (controversially)- laying- the ground
work for brief analyses of "transitory social change" -

fads* fashions, cults and .movements - all of which he
•concluded are not of much value in effectively restructuring
the social order*

(I see such activities as more propitious

regarding change than does LaPiere*)

Opposed to this, are

"socially significant changes”, brought about by accumulation
and synthesis*.

Quite simply,- change is "significant" when

enough people have partaken of it to give the particular
phenomenon the look of the normal*
What LaPiere calls accumulation is simply that:

the

appearance of a "startling" discovery in innovation (e*g* ,
;modem, medecine) which ini fact has been in the cultural.
•■••works for many decades*

Synthesis is the logical partner of

,accumulation, the putting together of cultural artifacts
(meant broadly) into a fresh pattern to form an hitherto
unknown product or relationship *

Ihese terms are immediately

recognisable as powerful antidotes to the common be3.ief that
^social change Is effected predominantly by abrupt, dramatic
social events or equally meteoric ideas.

Furthermore

LaPiere, with usual laconic sentiment, points up the modern
equivalent of "prayers and incantations":

social planning.

A note vis a vis planning and its relation to
LaPiere:

since Comte, sociologists have dreamed of con

structing the rational social order, bereft of repressive,
myths, ideologies and other.constraining devices of exploita
tion and inequality*

Karl Mannheim (35) redirected his

gargantuan talents near the close of his life towards the
multifaceted problems facing those who wished to- "reconstruct"

postwar Britain.-

In his- tracks Bahl and Lindblom (JG)

-fallowed* with better data and a generally more positivistie
‘•orientation toward social engineering.

As of- late John

Friedmann. .,(37) has made his contribution to the growing list
of authors' who wish "to he of aid in constructing a superior
environment in these cataclysmic -times.
.Each of these authors.* as well as others, -finally
succumbs to the bete noire of conservatives t. the ,ffloating
,unattached intellectual elite" with whom the hopes fox* a
.liberalised world must ride.

Without entering this merry-

or go-round of polemics and frustrations,'it', should "be noted'
the. forthcoming theory of change will, thankfully, not
to- concern itself with the ancient quls custodiet
dilemma*- ,Instead of facing the problem "squarely"

and

into the same wall which has- .greeted every liberal
^ p l a n n e r from Voltaire to -Etsioni •- fhe: elements of this
^ t h e p r y take a.less direct and therefore more effective•route.
It is therefore to be expected that the significant
social changes of the future will come about, as they
have in the past,-, in a random and 'segmental fashion
and that most of the legislated and other grandiose
attempts to shape the social future will in the
perspective of time turn out to be no more than
social events.
.At this point, however, it may suffice to say that one
of the underlying assumptions of the present analysis
is that man has not yet discovered a unique and effect
ive means by which to determine his social future and
that- thus the same- processes that have shaped the social
present from the social past are working and will con
tinue *to work to make the social.future from the social
present*, (36)

When 'using the concepts related to functional
relativity, most theorists point hastily'to the arbitrary,
culturally-defined nature of "good" and "bad" elements
within a system, without considering eufunctional change.
-Although dysfunction makes the dichotomy - normal versus
abnormal

complete, a trichotomy makes more sense if

adequate analyses be desired.

Eufunctional changes are

those which- over time generate more positive than negative
consequences, although at their inception they- may have
seemed catastrophic as viewed from the status quo.

It is

#,In the realm of the eufunctional that innovators must
Invariably operate„
In addition, LaPiere offers a -complementary
trichotomy,>-each of whose members provides differing
flamates for change*

"Stable congruence11 is best typified'

utopian vision - a highly unlikely social order in
any element5s alteration is absorbed quickly and
without -.excessive distortion by related elements.

China

between 500 and 1700 is the best modern historical example, (
"Static.■incongruence" is- quickly understandable by referring
to Franco *s Spain, a. condition which fails, to provide- the
society with individuals inspired or permitted to work for
alterations.

The monogamous family system,, the "American

dilemma" and numerous other elements of social organization
operate within this frustrating framework.
extreme example of this condition is Sicily.

Perhaps the

"2.C.
It Is the usual state of affairs with statically
incongruent societies that "entrepreneurs" of shady creden
tials arise in order to provide services and. goods which
the archaic legitimate machinery of state cannot.

These

exploitative individuals may in fact insure the continued
operation of the society, even beyond the point of its
"deserved" collapse| but this activity, of a parasitic
nature* threatens to destroy whatever Is left of the societal
^carcass.
late

Black .markets are the. best examples, along with

email corrupt I.on on the administrative level.

However,

usually before social chaos develops, an intruder or a
:f|^VDluiion (lead, by those who refuse to exploit in this
jgapmer) end the "widespread venality..

The Reformation, and

the -French Revolution are examples, yet the former began a
period of eufunctional change for the Church, whereas
t^e.^latter only increased the misery of its intended bene,i||ic-iaries by creating havce which produced a century of
,counter™revolution *
Finally, there exists the post-modern culture and
..the. area of primary concern here, "dynamic incongruence"•
When the characteristics of the social system are such
that the psychological tensions generated by incon
gruence between functionally interdependent social
elements tend to be directed toward a modification of
those elements, rather than an exploitation of themr...(40)
this condition is in. evidence.

American society is renowned

for its disorganization, and since it allows for some degree
of ideological and organizational modification, Its more
Innovative members have room to ‘
work.

(In an absolutistic

-situation, these same individuals might well resort to
artistic extravagance or insanity as expressions of -innova
tive zeal, although one would expect the number of experi
menters to ;be inversely related to the degree of absolutism
evident in the culture®

There are those of course who would

maintain that just this type of "creative deviance" obtains
especially In the U.S.)
The most Important aspect of this discussion
’ concerns the range of possible behavior and thought In any
..given society.

Historically there have been a great many

r 'cultures which demanded and rewarded behavior (in the ideoJE^gical* .technological and organizational) which maintained
H ^ k t by our standards is the unthinkable predictability of
•stable congruence*.

Societal members could deviate only

.Slightly from normal patterns* for two reasons:

social

:Ja8titrois maintained their obedience with narrow definitions
••^fe'what constituted "human" behavior and* secondly* the
•
-mental- or logical processes necessary to rational' evaluation
of existence -• the precursor to innovation along organiza
tional lines - were absent.
Static incongruence generated manipulators of the
inefficiency and inadequacy connected with "legitimate"
social order.

The roots of.western trade and commerce, lie

in the late medieval when sly* courageous merchants braved
negative -sanctions of the church and in some instances the
secular authorities as ’well* in hope of gain.

Their tactics

were by modern standards barbarous* yet considering the

opposition all aroxtnd to their "unholy" behavior* it is
surprising that, some of the more persistent entrepreneurs
were financing; royalty during the 14-th and 15tb centuries (4-1)
But for there to he culture-wide 'approval, and
awareness of the possibility of social •change * dynamic incon
gruence must prevail.

This is why within the sociohistorical

framework,' Innovation can almost become routine - but only in
its prevalence* not in its "method"* which to date has
escaped codification.or.even precise analysis.

.With -these

•^general remarks* it is time to review the role of the innovatfwbi. <

lirtv •

LaPiere feels that it is relatively easy to show

historically'that .collective,action has contributed far less
-important rchange than has the behavior of what are being
termed "innovators"*

(Again* for me this is somewhat hyper-

.ttelc.)' What is practically impossible to illustrate*
however* ‘are any hard and fast sociological or psychological
"laws"* regarding either the genesis ox* -operation -of these
"asocial" individuals.

Whether It be In technology* social

•organ!zation- or ideology* the whys and wherefores of innova
tion have not been resolved through comprehensive appraisal.
•While it is comforting, to lean heavily on the. old "social
forces" idea •- that the correct social conditions "produce11
(in an unspecified manner) certain types of mental and
physical behavior - this is hardly sufficient.

On first

reading The German Ideology, the sociologist is gratified■

*y

to l e a m that the ideological wsuperstructure" of a given
.socio-physical "sub structure n is c.altogether appropriate,
•until the bald fact dawns that Marx and Engels* realization
is an interesting description of reality:
one must go elsewhere.

for an analysis

In. this instance, even the encyclo

pedic LaPiere throws up his hands.

Any attempt at systema

tizing the history of innovation is doomed to failure.4
innovators have produced their gems under any and all condi*tions ‘of recorded history, sometimes in the great flurry of
^creative civilization (Renaissance), but nearly as often in
;splitude, moreover in social structures more characterized
b^ystatic -incongruence than by the preferable dynamic incon•lj$$ience.

It must be admitted that the unquestioned* unexamin-

abSLe a priori which under 1ies al 1 tliat fol 1 cws is the prob 1 em
how innovators "get that way’h

Though much documentation

caricature, perhaps even an "ideal-type" - although that
of contradiction - can he offered, a theory of the
development of the innovator will only be sketched in roughly.
If this be allowed* then much can be offered in terms of the
•promised theory of future social change, but if this lacuna
becomes a theoretical stumbling block, the rest of the work
loses its credibility®
Certainly the most aggravating feature of the
innovator has to do.-with the incessant paradoxes which
surround him.

It is almost -asilf some mephistophelian were

behind the scenes* pulling the strings of contradiction, first
this way then that,, in many instances tearing the subject, or

o

his social environment*• or both into pieces.

On one hand

he must be enough of his historical period to perceive a
need (again*, technological, organizational or ideological),
yet he- must utilize uncommon effort and ability in radically
transcending'the thought- and behavior patterns”of his epoch,
in order to arrange the data of experience differently.

He

must be peculiar enough in Goffman’s terms to maintain that
necessary distance which allows him critical time to produce,
,-yet he must also maintain sufficient contact with his- peers
vthatyie- is not classified insane or foolish, and consequently
^discounted out. of hand®

Even more mysterious,-he must feel

gQmefrow. that his particular social setting deserves his
^teniioxi; (which typically is of an extreme ardor) and labor,
but lie must not., be enamored of the status quo or i?he opinions
f^nthe -many who are to the point that he worries over Its
oration.

-In ail instances he must conclude, albeit with

reservations, that the rewards of productive conformity
do not outweigh the less structured, less assured rewards of
^innovative thinking and acting, a -belief which runs•counter
to the very.nature of socialization processes.
The list of paradoxes could (and will) be extended
at greater length* each succeeding sentence more illuminating
the character of the enigmatic performer in a world of the
new.

Generally- it can be said that a more perfect example of

the severe failure of socialisation and Indoctrination cannot
be conjured up than the vision .of the ■-"typical" innovator
(a necessary contradiction in terms)®

In••approaching these

peculiar sorts, the'.study of Sen koans, full of -paradoxical
"wisdom”, is perhaps of more use as an introduct ory exercise
to the researcher than positivistic investigation in hopes
of finding fabricated regularities*.
Nov/e. again allowing the dialectic its dues
innovators are not in any sense the supermen, of human.
•history.

-They do not fall neatly into Hollywood caricatures

a.la Einstein.

They are as varied and difficult to catalog

p a s are their productions, and each of them has usually -made
-a ^relatively minor rearranging of the data in order to come
:wgp with (in a very short time) what comes to be regarded as
cultural "of-cour seism1*.

Although II. G.« Barnett in his

■monumental, statement on. the stibject •exaggerates somewhat,
vhis contention supports this view:
It is commonly supposed that inventions are extraordinary achievements of rare and brilliant, individuals,
; and consequently that at any•one period in history few
feu
of them appear. A contrary view is taken in this ’book..,
.innovations - even important ones - are everyday commonplaces,... Everyone is an innovator, whether popular
.•?
definitions allow him that recognition or not.’ (k2)
.Before offering any qualification of that statement, perhaps
it is -advisable to allow Barnett to mitigate to some extent
his. own hyperbole:
There are incentives for innovation, just as there
are motivations for any other action. They may be
treated within more than one conceptual ’framework, but
it is essential that some position concerning them be
taken. The "why” of innovation is an inescapable
question. It is also one of the most difficult aspects
of the problem and one of the two~’
thathave H5 e'en treated
only very superficially.
The analysisis admittedly a
formidable task, the more baffling and confusing the
deeper the probing goes,
(emphasis added) (43)

At this point, to the disgust of the sociologist, Barnett
takes off on a- complex Kurt --Lewin-like., entirely too
.psychologist!c interpretation of the innovator, which takes
slight and insufficient account of social, factors as they
operate in the phenomenon.

That is a major reason for

LaPiere*s superior position vis a vis useful theory, although
Barnettfs ground-breaking work preceded LaPieres's by 12 years,
Moreover., Barnett1s entire book is based on data selected
from five cultures and a sect:

American,•
•European, three

vindian tribes on the west coast and an Indian Shaker cult.
He. admits (along with every other researcher) that these
souses were, as much chosen for convenience as for their
;intel 1 ectu al vatlue *
However9 Barnett *s divergent views notwithstanding,
the flipst; impenetrable -problem is not determining who and
wh.atpjfche innovator is, but how he gets that way, and why
r&X^iye to. the population, there seem to be either few
innovators (LaPiere) or many whose suggestions for cultural
rearrangement are not advocated and utilised by the culture
(B.amett)*-

(It would seem that LaPiere is talking after

the fact, Barnett before*)
What has been established is the fact that the
innovator must be convinced to an, abnormal degree that
consensual validation of his.Weltanschauung - or at least
a particular section of it - is not only unnecessary, but
undesirable.

Perhaps this explains in part Marx *s dis

pleasure towards the end of his life regarding his

apotheosis, and'the concomitant gibberish which many
"Marxists" had already begun offering to the proletariat
at The Word.

Marx* s view- of social reality in 1844 was to

say the least a radical.perception when compared to the
reigning bourgeoisie of Manchester and 'London, who were to
a large extent the arbiters of what' was- and was not "Truth”•
But by the 1880ss, his many innovations and historical
insights in t e n s of economic and social thought had been
to a large extent incorporated into civilised, bourgeois^ centered operations, such as the Bahians»

If Marx is

r4furt4er utilized as a "typical” innovator, then his life is
!pit>st instructive:

he was a miserable father, husband and

by all cultural definitions of the time; he had
absolutely no status, no role, no "position” in the social
•structure except that to which he appointed himself,
$0Jheorist of the Oppressed; he was slipshod and unkind in his
^financial dealings with close friends, earning the distinc
ti o n of being totally unreliable and cantankerous whenever
the issue of finances arose; he was in short, not a positively
sanctioned representative of what 19th century Europe offered
as its personality cynosure.

And yet through terrible

harrassments by bill collectors, wife and friends, through
unending physical ailments and emotional dilemmas typical of
an innovator1s consciousness, Marx persisted until death in
loudly defying the dominant culture, in rejecting wholesale
any apparent need for validation of his private, asocial
definition of what was and what was not Good, True and

bh

Beautiful.
bastard c

Put colloquially, Marx for his culture was a
More important, in our age of pseudo “-individual ism

(do your own thing so -long as your thing is an approved
commodity or behavior pattern), it would be pi^esumptuous and
inaccurate to minimise Marx *s achievement, that is of defying
•by intention the, status quo*

He should be accorded, along

with most pre-modem innovators, limitless respect and awe
in' pursuing "undaunted” his personally approved course of
.-.action and. thought*

While nowadays Paul Sweezy and like-

mindedr writers can with no great difficulty publish neo~
Marxist., ..critical tracts, this is all a. function of the
marvelous diversity of tastes, and persuasions that typify
postmodern-.‘Society.

To continue with Marx colloquially,

he was also a lonely bastard.
.*. But lest the image of the innovator be inaccurately
cast^t-it-should also be mentioned that the romantic innovator
(sucfitras the current example) is only one type or style and
certainly not the predominant form.

He who braves the storm

of social control- and relentless -socialization to come out
.blatantly ',fa .man. ahead of his time" is no more the typical
innovator than Marx could be characterised as the typical.
19th century -economist*

Adam Smith’s quiet and conservative

life in Glasgow-.or even more, Kant Vs comically, sequestered
.and pedestrian existence in Konigsberg make the case for
-unobtrusive innovators.
LaPiere:

* #..raan has rarely, and then only in limited ways*
exercised his capacity'to devise new and functionally
more effective forms of social life; (44)
an innovation is an idea for accomplishing some recognised
social end in a new way or for a means of accomplishing
some new social end*.*the innovating consists of the
creation of a unique and to a significant degree unpre
cedented mental construct, the idea that makes possible
the thing". (4-5)
LaPiere here points to the distinctive differences in types
of innovations:

technological, organizational, ideological*

He notes that'the process of innovation has been studied
basically through the history of "mechanics, and fine arts,
>:medicine, world exploration and the physical -and biological
Ijchc-iences" (4-6) but from this it is not to be assumed that as
r: ff
^process, innovation along organizational and ideological
..■L

iflines is radically different.

He does note that organiza

tional innovation usually takes a great deal of time, and t
ytbat the number of people involved in technical advance is
^lasually smaller than those trying to change a form of social
organi zati on (4*7)«
The distinction between innovation and development
is new made:
Innovation...does not occur in a piecemeal fashion: it
cannot he facilitated by organization and a division of
labor; and it cannot be forced by financial or other
.extraneous incentives (as .can developments)• (4-8)
It is in considerable measure the failure to distinguish
conceptually between the process of innovation and that
of development that has led many writers, including
some sociologists, to advance the view that innovation
is a- normative social process, .In this view innovation
is thoiight of either very abstractly as the emergence
of n e w .cultural items put of antecedent ones or as the
result of organized social endeavor to produce something
new; as in research institutes. -There is no doubt that

the development of innovations is currently facilitated
<by organized support; but there is good reason to
believe that innovations themselves are for the most
part, today as in time past the product of individual,
endeavor that is more ilively to be hampered than
facilitated by membership in a business, industrial
or scientific organization® (4-9)
LaPiere continues the discussion by pointing to the difference
between discovery (a mental construct that gives recognition
to *the existence of something previously unknown) and invent.
fion (the creation of something by the synthesizing of pre~
existing cultural elements into a new pattern) (.50)*

He

y-sLso points to the fallacy of believing that the mother of
.invention is necessity, when of course, necessity is cultur4^1 1 y

defined

and. redefined by the innovator.

It is not some inherent necessity that mothers invention,
but, rather, an asocial perception of the existence of a
problem that is susceptible of solution** That percep
tion may be either a specific redefinition of a socially
recognized inadequacy or, as is much more common, the
definition as a problem of what has not previously been
defined as such*.. 'From time to time in any society,
vague discontent with things as they are on the part.cf
some individuals or class of individuals may lead to
political or some other form of rebellion; but a general
and vague discontent does not result in the kind of
"asocial perception that fosters innovative efforts to
change the system. It is, rather, discontent of a
specific and individual nature that leads to perception
of this sort, the discontent of some individual with
some specific condition of life - chronic hunger, too
many babies,.«.or -some other circumstance that is
accepted as normal bv the other members of the society®
(ernphas:ls added ) (5^ ;
It is wellfdocumented among historians that the plague of the
late medieval and the ensuing lack of labor, along* with the

*0ne objection- to this statement lies in recent history* Ihe
Second World.War produced innumerable innovations through dire
necessity. However, over the centuries it would seem that
LaPiere®s attitude is supportable.

sentiment of' the ‘
.Reformation, created the markedly new
conception of the dignity of the individual*

This was the

beginning, however •tenuous-, of the .generation of 'a climate
•suita .e to innovation which has persisted until today*
However, transcending historical epochs* there is this
consideration*
Although they (innovations) reflect the trend of the
times in which they are made* they are made by some
individual who because of popularities of personal
experience and character is hypersensitive to" some
•specific circumstance of his time and place* (5 2 )
In a most informative subsection ,=*; J!Tiie Innovative
process” ~ LaPiere continues pointing to the inherently
'isfoblematie aspects of studying the innovator* due of course
the •complexity and ambiguity of the process itself*

Vft

An asocial perception of a problem does not* of course,
ensure that an innovation will in due course be forthcoming* Borne of the problems that men pose themselves
. may conceivably be unsolv&ble.*. For the most part
however* failure of innovative endeavor to solve a
•problem seems to have stemmed from one or both of two
circumstances: the fact that innovation is inherently
difficult and the fact that social preconceptions of
one sort or another inhibit the innovative process.
Little is actually known about the innovative endeavor*
aside from the fact that it is not standardized, that
it is difficult, and that it is a random trial-anderror procedure that involves for the most part the use
of symbols rather than things. (53)
Creative thinking, the kind that is necessary if a
unique solution to a problem or any solution to a
unique problem is to be achieved, involves a more or
less random synthesis of symbols that are themselves
.'Often of vague and uncertain meaning. Each such put
ting together constitutes a trial that, upon evaluation,
by the creative thinker, usual].y proves to be an error.
Essential to this process is the ability to ascertain
all the possible permutations in the. arrangement of the
symbols that are being manipulated and the capacity to
evaluate each permutation in turn in terms of its
relevance to the problem. Equally essential is the

'ability to continue -the- ende avor txdal after trial
and error after error until a workable solution has
been found, even though the solution may not be
reached for weeks, months or years. (540
Following these seminal remarks* LaPiere gives at
length data to support his contention that the talented
amateur, the marginal nonprofessional has historically
contributed (more often than the institutionalised members
,of. any professional organisation or discipline) significant
isnd radical innovations which have had tremendous impact
lipon the professionals as well as the larger 'world.

Needless

totsay, the reaction of those who have undergone the appro
priate training and apprenticeship is one of scoffing
v: d. Uvtle, until- the value of the new idea becomes undeniable.
tv*-* *it is. just because American- universities are in this
'.‘■respect (Russian-styled indoctrination) somewhat ineffect'
^ ive" that, they occasionally produce a scholar, scientist
f-*or technician -who is qualified to do innovative work in
v his field and yet not so fully indoctrinated in the
r" established beliefs, preconceptions* and ways of think-,
ing of that field to preclude his engaging in fairly
random trial,-and-error experimentation* (55)
Following very closely LaPiere *s explanation, we now arrive
at myths having to d o .with innovation, which for convenience
are "here listed and compressed?
1) That innovation is a single^ stunning ”creative
synthesis” while in fact it is a synthesis of a
long series of specific innovations, each pre
requisite to those that followed,
2) That there exist in science “breakthroughs” which
will at one blow shatter any number of extremely
difficult problems, when in fact the idea of the
great and wise scientist - to•whom charisma is often
imputed as to political heroes - and the spectacular
act are more in keeping with Jules Feme- than the
actual, history of scientific development.

3) That innovation is a group or collective phenomenon
which while* in keeping with the prevalent democratic
bias of the West is completely out of keeping with
actuality.* The V!research team'1 is effective not
because of its collective skills but because of the
talent of each of its .members and the rationalizac
tion of behavior and research possible through
financial backing, etc* As advocate (to be discus
sed) the committee may do wonders for the,innovationproduced individually*
4-) That innovations are ?ssocial imperatives” - somehow
immanent within the culture - and will “out" as
perhaps justice is alleged to do, with the natural
ness of the coming of spring.* This is a conserva
tive and inaccurate bias which attempts to depreciate
the deviant who innovates., (36)
Yery closely connected with these myths are broader
^Stereotypic conceptions about the innovator himself.

Origin-

sidling in Confucian China, the idea has also been embraced by
p>
$$$fetern cultures that the innovator i s ,of such refined and
:«nusual sensibilities that his behavioral excesses,? his
llaiaoral isms”, must be allowed so as not to smother his
4
innovating furnaces® Prom this it is an easy -jump into the
of the artist, supposedly so much of another, “higher”,•
world that peculiar or outlandish behavior, particularly in
the case of recognised artists, is now considered merely par
f or the -course9- What is evident immediately to those
familiar with the history of new ..ideas- and cultural apparatus,
is that a peculiarity of outward behavior does not typify
the innovator so often as an oddity or unconventionality of
mind, the ability and/or need to reshape reality through
*My reservation about this statement is rooted in the late
We s t e m .•development of complex ..organizations, an extremely
important innovation,,for which there is no ascertainable
single innovator. Organizations seem to have grown out of
a larger cultural heritage, and very slowly*

symbol manipulation.

Although it has often been noted that

some of the more-famous inventors and artists behaved
“strangely”, or that they utilized slight infirmities to
their advantage in avoiding the time-consuming duties of
normal existence, these are but the partial manifestations
of, innovation, and not its essence.
There are many things which need to be said
regarding the innovator and. his indecipherable craft*

These

few pages have been a whirlwind statement of necessary con
ceptions before the remainder of the theory may be discussed*
The ultimate' goal, the wedding of several, key theories, is
possible without .a clear understanding of what the
;|gnovator is and to the degree possible, some appreciation
of. how he*- operates.
4gjL$&$Qcial*perception

It has been established that he holds
of social reality, and through unflag-

g§||g •effort and a brand of hyper-motivation typically lacking
-orthodox societal members, he may - but usually is not
able - .bring to the consciousness of the social environment
his suggestion for change*

That change is most, often of

small dimension, yet quite distinct, and even in its minor,
unmonumental form it excites opposition®

In order to foil

the -.dictates of:the :
•society, in-'order "to sidestep and person
ally.sabotage.the unceasing demands of roles, social controls,
and sentiments of his culture, he must be possessed of enor
mous egocentricity which corroborates his belief that the
thingC-s) .which concerns him is ultimately of more value than
the conventional activities and thought he eschews®

It does

not surprise the sociologist that only a miniscule- proportion
of any cultural population displays these personality requisires, plus of course sufficient intelligence and creativity
to pursue innovative careers*
. I t ,LaPiere?s trichotomy is recalled, it makes some
sense to note' that the innovator - as failure in socializa
tion.-* is (theoretically) more likely to be found in American
.culture,• known.:for its' .dynamic incongruence, than in Franco*s
Spain*

LaPiere points to three possible responses tc dynamic

■incongruence by-, those members of the culture who do not for
the most part imbibe its patterns and values;

there are

parasites” (predatory criminals, social incompetents
i
a®d''jsexual and other antisocial deviants); the similarly
i

\.

learned behavior of “neurotics and psychopaths51; and finally
iS8g5.op.ther -group who occupy us here, the innovators (37)®
Jteir c ui be imagined, this -line of reasoning has serious impliagtions for many current ideologies regarding the "sad lack"
of -continuity, integration or predictability in post-modern
-culture*

Would it not he gravely/ "dysfunctional” to any

culture to produce a dearth of innovators due to the society
arriving, at ,*the social nirvana of static congruence?
Utopians in this-instance, even those with the dialectical
skills of Marcuse, may be at -a loss to respond except in
the- most abstract and imprecise maimer®
Central to the theory of Barnett and LaPiere is
the subsidiary :eole of the "advocate" (58)*

Briefly,•he is

the man or -group who has the pull to have the innovation

examined seriously 'by members of the -culture to whom it is
directed®

Very often the innovator- is not in a position of

influence or does not have the personality best suited to
the propagandizing of his ■invention or idea®

Although both

theorists allow this necessary adjunctive role considerable
treatment within their works, I icLXl not-*

This is where my

theory begins to overtake LaPierefs and consequently where
1 will- diverge from S ocial Change *

Along with the advocate

however - who finally is a. more 'rough and. tumble PR-type.'
fthan the innovator ~ is the adopter (59), the final actor
Oih LaPiere *s theory*

LaPiere is quick to point out that

norther of the three roles -.pushing for institutionalisation
of-::the innovation, that of innovator, advocate or adopter,
is 'any •more or less easy than the others*

Each is fraught

-with a multitude of complex difficulties, but' naturally of
different types*

Innovation is problematic mostly concerna

$SiSg*ian 'alteration of consciousness; the advocate must be
sufficiently persuasive and in time with the culture that
others will listen to him and not disparage his defence of
a-;,suspect addition to the culture §, and the adopter is
.instantly ridiculed by his contemporaries, or worse, forced
to fail in his use of the innovation by way of a 'selffulfilling prophecy•
But"again, for my purposes, the innovator takes
center stage in what follows, due for the most part to the
specific type of innovation central to this thesis*

The

role of*advocate and adopter is implied, but a discussion
of them is not of key significance*

CHAPTER ll
A REVISED THEORY

Ever since the great democratic revolutions of the
18th and 19th centuries, social scientists have made the
- ..mistake of assuming that political revolution, with its
self-righteous, humanistic splendor, would he the "going
.thing” .as far as. rapid, social change was concerned, fox' some
time/at .least*

Even those who saw the limitations, histori

cal^;* ..of this mistaken perception allowed themselves to
faUfainto anothex* equally fallacious theoretical rut by
viewing social movements as the most important motor of
change* * Luckily, there have been of late some theorists and
historians who recognize the inconsistency between these
viopeMfend the empirical *data emanating from the most advanced
cul/bures.*

Building, on the sound understanding of revolution

and social-movements offered b y writers like Barrington
Moore, Crane Brinton, Hadley Cantril, among many - theorists
who avoid-* the above pitfalls - I have constructed a theory
of future change in post-modern culture, which owes much to
the suggestion of Marion Vatrfossen.
Basically, this Is a theory which considers the
effects of the sophisticated, relativistie attitude or
“enlightenment” on a populace, plus an appreciation for
historical context such as the ,disso3.ution of feudalism,

5s*

and at the other end of the spectrum, the advent of "postascetic” culture*

Very briefly;

the breakdown of feudal

social structure in terms of obligations and duties between
classes brought with it the popular' revolutions of ‘France,
America,' Russia "and China •
— to name only the most successful
when the aristocracy and royalty refused to revise its
position in the society in favor of the ”enlightened” bour
geoisie and an infuriated populace*-

After the particular

cultures- each evolved into an industrial setting, the need
,for political revolution was in large measure over, as was
the ...easy possibility of it.

Put bluntly, the forces of

coercion - in most instances an. uneasy reactionary coalition
; .between the remnants of the aristocracy, lingering; ruling
houses, and the more affluent bourgeoisie - had taken their
.lesson of. 1r/B9. seriously-, and were growing ever--more skilled
|<:in the arts of oppression*

However, as there were still

^tremendous forces extant in the interest of ma;5©r •social
change, the social movement developed in the late 19th
century -as -a suitable -tool,-

It combined the large-scale

impressiveness of political revolution with wisely conceived
gradual!stic tactics (e*g® the Fabians and reform groups),
thereby avoiding holocaust and. annihilation, at the hands of
counter-revolutionary forces*

Thus far- in the description,

few historians and political- analysts would quibble, except'
over details, or the sticky question of causality.
However, this is where, a revised .perception begins
to come to the aid of scholars who, for example, look sadly
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•upon the memory of the liberalizing 1960* s and proclaim
(with the approval of their Xike-thinking peers), "Alas,
there was no revolution, only mild changes of fashion in
some elite groups; no redistribution- of income, no altera
tion of power, no change in relations of production"*
would respond;

X

"Quite wrong - the cultural revolution ox

the 60Vs was just that*

It had and will continue to have

far-reaching effects in a liberating direction, not only
in .elite, collegiate -groups, but -across -a wide range and
diversity of personalities throughout post-modern culture”•
^At this point LaPiere Vs thoughts might be phrased in this
xtamier;

"Yes, I see that my innovator theory has been

latched onto and that the user of it recognizes that
especially now-in an era of mounting* menacing social
control agencies and mechanisms, surely the only practicable
ui^ans of social- change is through the innovator out-thirik~
out-maneuveringf out-innovating the repressive features
of the status quo”**

Offered here in dramatic form, and

greatly simplified, is the outline of what will follow.
Individual innovators in the persons of traders,
merchants and bankers, sowed the early seeds in the. late
medieval which erupted into revolutionary action late in the
18th century*

In that four or five century span many changes

*Very "recently a financial analyst, Harry Browne, produced a
popular manual, How 1 .Found Freedom in an UnFree World (N.Y.:
Avon Books, 1974-T^'Ech in'crass and“atEeore"ELcal terms sets
■out one possible course of action for potential innovators,
at least regarding certain aspects of modern social life. While
his views are not completely coincident with mine, it is the
best (only?) of its kind, and has been warmly' received.

enveloped European society*

‘
The plagues decimated the

feudal ‘
workforce; the Renaissance and Reformation substituted
for unthinking servility necessary to the operation of the
feudal social arrangement* a youthful* naive -rationalism and
individualism*

technological deve3.opments were rifes

of

extreme importance for modernization and. my theory was
Gutenberg*s contribution*

She rux*al, homogeneous* incestu

ous -country folk escaped with but little reluctance.to the
city* •where social mobility was possible and where the eon,cOmitant ideas of personal freedom and endeavor were the
lliouse ideology*

liie absolutistic ”thought11 (or lack thereof)

. m ''-necessary to lord-vassal allegiances and a social, structure
viewed. as- God-given* began early to. fall to the "modem***
more relatxvisti'c* understanding of social relations as man#rdbated and therefore man-dissoluble*

As mentioned much

the perception of the possibility of change was and
of 'central importance to the success of all those who seek
an. alteration of social reality* whether it be the innovator
or- the mass movement leader, or for that matter he who seeks
to develop fa better mousetrap"*

With the discovery of the

American continents, the mandate for geographical and mental
exploration was accentuated, and men like Luther and Calvin,
Columbus and Cromwell straight through Voltaire and Rousseau among the peculiar, outlandish and unappealingly innovational
of their times •- pursued the light of reason into the darkest
contradictions of medieval- life®

y /

But the Age of Reason brought nearly as many
problems as it solved, fox' with the displacement of God,
Country or King as supreme being, Europe and the colonies
in America fell under the merciless rule of Progress*

It

can fairly-be said that only in the last generation or two
have the,millions of genuinely exploited laborers of the
18th, 19th and 20th centuries been vindicated in some small
way for- their mutilated lives*

They left their rural

* hamlets - in which Christopher Hill tells us they labored
perhaps 15 weeks per year (60) - and migrated often by
'.necessity to the mills, mines and factories, where around
ight clock til death was the schedule*

But with their

Spoken backs they produced what now is termed post-industrial,
post-modern or post-ascetic culture•

Certainly they are not

^|;pne responsible, but "were it not" for their slavish
•^.forts, affluence as we know it could not have been created•
■

But being human animals, the urban proletariat

could not tolerate indefinitely the abuses to which they were
constantly subjected®

Some of the liberated bourgeoisie

(LaSalle, Marx, Proudhon, Blanqui, Kropotkin, etc*) came to
their .aid, and those strong workers who .could not be intimi
dated. b y •their employers and whose, strength was not utterly
exhausted at the factory* slowly, but loudly began the labor
agitations of the early 19th century®

And as in almost any

historical period, those who revolt even mildly feel the
immediate blow of reaction®

Even the famous Paris Commune

of 1871 ended with the terrible deaths, of

17?000

"revolu

s:o
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tionaries", many of whom, were infant s.*.

'Thus it 'began to

dawn upon social, theorists of change that violence brought
the same^ and more of it; the famous British gradualist
tactic,- although less dramatic and requiring more patience,
t

"proved" finally td"be the-*most feasible "approach.

As' 'already-

noted, reform movements met with amazing success, much more
so than the violent expressions tor change which preceded
them.
What type of person joins a movement, gives:his
“•■all, irelates to its activities thoroughly and allows himself
ofep. be caught in a "religious” dedication to the cause?

As

be detailed latex*, these participants are distinctly
•modern" or "industrial" citizens:

not well educated,

~not yet estranged sufficiently .from former, rural -absol-uUl^stic thoughts about goods and evils, not mobile, not well
Raveled;

not, then, affluent participants of post-modern
Even if social movements could operate efficiently

issu.the current historical matrix, organizers would be hardpressed to fill their rosters,, to organize viable cells, to
impress upon their members the ultimate goodness of their
:goal and the ultimate evil of their opponents, to have their
participants carry cards and swallow whole a moralistic,
hyperoptimistic ideology*
•Put- idiomatically, the world has grown too wise,
the people have grown too sophisticated —• that is, in the
most advanced sectors of the most advanced- nations*

Bore-;

over, it ml,I not do, in criticising this position, to note

that there have always been folic who would not accept
absoluteSo

That Nietzsche v/ould have been a poor follower

does not impune the' theory; for today there are millions of
Nietzsches9 but more worldly even than he®

Certainly one

of the shining triumphs of the modern cultures is the number
of minds whose orientation is becoming more and more cosmo
politan,- non-nationalistlc but international, nonlocal,
nonsectarian, nonabsolutistic•

These millions of minds

seek - to steal from Mills - as much, freedom as their reason
?catr handle®

And to date it seems that very few innovators

Bn the realm of cultural change have exhausted either them'iteftves .or the possibilities in their search and experimentafor the rational life®

Habermas * recent book, Towards

at Rational. Society (although from -the Rrahfcfurt. metaphysical
1?r lition), -eapsulizes- the aspirations -of those with minds,
tou^ey-and time®

There has never before been in human history

"iftch•an opportunity for individual growth through experimen
tation .across a wide range and diversity of lifestyles and
'cultures as now exists for some people in our culture*
Ogburn' s useful concept of social lag immediately
comes to mind'-as we witness those who in every way are capable
of relatively limitless experimentation, yet are entirely
unwilling to forego their acquired cultural baggage, in the
form of outdated beliefs and properties, which prevent them
from making the most of the culture®

I stress the historical

■element of the argument- (i®e® the possibilities- affluence
brings to the social innovator) for there is throughout the
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culture a peculiar combination of sentiments:

first, an

awareness of dizzying flux and change (adequately documented
by Toffler) and second, the competing, contradictory idea
that things never really change much finally, and that what
was good enough for father®••

The resolution of this contra

diction is something beyond the capabilities of many societal
■members*
The statement of Bendix and Berger (referred to
;ahove, p. 23')- comes now into clearer focus as to its relevance
*$to ray theory®

Very obviously, if one is to inhabit what can

be,;termed a ’'multiplicity of selves”, thereby maximizing the
c^portnnity for involvement with others in a cross-section
•-s^hsituations, the whole concept of ”bound&ry-maintenance "
becomes relatively useless as compared to its opposite,
*%pundary-expansioii”*

Closely connected with the first

m flnhlorL ed concept is one of the most potentially reactionary

filers -*ev.3r to have been propounded by psychologists:
'Gestalt*

the

The idea that the social, actor could ever be, or

.rather,• ought to be,, a consistent, monolithic, thereby
morally-, predictable Oneness .throughout situational variation
is straight from the Bible:

the soul®.

It is easy to picture,

the utility of defining people in this way, when the locus
of one's entire life is a small, homogeneous, sherds-driving
tribe in the Midd3.e -.East two millenia ago*

It was functional

to some- degree- for* a man to be known as ’’good” or ’’bad” to
his .kinsmen and to occasional intruders into the culture•
The idiocy of trying to employ such standards in the post-

-ssp&ern situation is immediately -obvious*

The media do their

best to make high tragedy out of modern life by using these
anachronistic conceptions of behavior and the protagonists
involved in that behavior.

The favoid.te example' in the' late

60* s was to show "dispassionately” the photograph of the
phi beta kappa, good, down-home community boy sitting in a
federal, prison for resisting the draft or selling marijuana.
Somehow that was to suggest the "inevitable” irony and
"■confusion, the ’’alienation” ..if you will, "necessarily”
inherent- in the modern situation*
perception and understanding®

This is a mistake in

Clearly, the "violator” was

iimovating,"but he ran afoul of social control agencies 'Something proficient innovators learn not to do - and the
powers that were, in very clear-eyed fashion, incarcez'ated
his for his "bad” actions.

There is no ambiguity here:

the innovator knew just what he was about, and the impressive
agencies*knew as well.

There is no high tragedy:

there is

only the historically usual condition of the innovator being
penalized through the normatively coercive power weilded by
the state.

The innovator threatened - altogether too loudly

of course - to overthrow in some relatively minor way the
status quo, in favor of a more rational, personally meaning
ful world.

Hi S' reward' is the usual fare for people of such

aspirations.
Hand in hand with the necessity for situational
ethics (an unfortunate term), a resilient definition of
"selves”, and the desire to expand" boundaries through multi-

faceted interpersonal- experiences, is the relinquishing of
•many other key values of the acquisitive culture*

The

innovator in this sense does not care for property except
that property which immediately promotes his capability for
innovating* interpersonally and otherwise.

He does not care

for nor is he .fascinated by power- over people or things 5
his interest is perennially focused on the "using up" of
himself and his resources in the direction of people,, whom
he defines as able to properly "use him".

This is. not

.philanthropic, or centrally so; what must operate however in
•/the arena of multiplicative selves is a high level of
^reciprocity 9 inasmuch as people are capable of responding
r\ '

\- *.

'*

airly for "goods" (used very ‘broadly) they receive.

This

is not to be construed as "game theory" or a rehash of the
popular economic models used in small groups theory.

Even

|xa^ioueh of mechanistic thinking in an area so •sensitive as
l^fcLs.ie a touch overdone.- If there is. a -theory which
approximately conveys the untended meaning here* it would be
'• one of the 18th century models of human behavior* understood
to be constituted of .well-thought out* calculated and rational
action* but now. based on the desire to experience things and
people under mutually satisfying conditions.*

Parenthetically*

*There resides in the use of rationalist, psychologies (known
also as "naive positivism" or "Pollyanna" interpretation of
behavior) a paradox which I would do well to dispose of
immediately. Because there are evidenced in human behavior
any number of irrational or nonlogical acts (exhaustively
analyzed by Pareto among others)* the theorist who therefore
avoids the enlightenment understanding penalizes himself on
poor grounds. .. Voltaire* Kant and similar thinkers .were aware*
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the age old debate (e.g., Hobbes vs* Rousseau; Marx vs®
• smith) about whether man is "basically” good, cooperative and
well-meaning or bad, aggressively antagonistic and an evil
doer, if it has any relevance here, probably finds me on the
side-of those who support, the kinder appraisal of man*

But

instead of man being this way or that !,by nature11 of his manness, I would insist (in the standard sociological posture)
that given an appropriate social structure, post-modern men
•' would for the most part treat each other well, well enough
f-at any rate to facilitate end encourage innovations! behavior
jsiaong one another, as opposed to the treatment historically
Stem sure, that wide-eyed rationalism, .most memorably repre
sented in "the social contract theory, did not offer a compre
hensive. definition or analysis of human behavior*. What it
did do with fabulous success was posit a normative vision of
“‘m&u, as agreeable and reasonable, in pseudo-scientific terms
.feich typified 18th century polemics® This argumentative,
J^rperbplic. style should not obscure the usefulness for
■fecoxdsts of change of the positivist legacy®
jplUu."
There is no debate that men manifest socially both.
*rdtional and nonrational actions. In addition it is agx'eed
.that life is continuously ambiguous and difficult to exhaust
ively investigate® The marginal success of small groups
research better than other sociojogical subfield testifies
-to the problematic nature of wmixid-watching". But after that
is said, what remains is the unsavory options either we adroit
to the -.lure of apotheosizing the irrational as the central
feature' of life (Jung), or we largely ignore it and its unpre
dictable quality, and focus instead on ‘
rational activities,
ail(i Jflpst important, the possibilities for rational improve
ment*’of life when and if individuals care to attempt same.
The question for sociologists should be, IP a person chooses
to- be as rational as he sometimes can be, THEN how does the
social structure appear to handle his attempt, warmly, coolly,
or indifferently? That a person may continuously live a life
of thoroughly nonlogical action is admitted; that many people
actually do is unlikely. Therefore the entire theory present
ed here is suitable for application only to those who make
the effort at rational existence®
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given the -unorthodox.

They would behave amicably simply

because of the benefits derived from interaction and the
concomitant lessening of social, controls surrounding it*.
Also:-essential in understanding the post-modern
innovator is the realization that his definition of "self”
differs radically from the psychiatrically approved recipes
for "healthy” self-conception often promulgated in advanced
societies.

Along with'the pleas•. for self-scrutiny, self-

.^acceptance, self-forgiveness, self-expansion through medita—
.^tion*. etc. is the implication that one's unbalanced selfyiewyi.s more a function of .alterable, internal tensions and
•i|§ux-oses than of an ill-constructed social order®

Being

stars' that,this line of argument is, among other things,
one of'.the oldest of conservative ideologies, the innovator
..sjipives .continuously to expand "self" by ignoring it?

self

static, predictable, plugged into a status quo of an
•eifisenttally unchanging collection of closely inter-related
situations and personalities.

The "multiplicity of selves"

"the innovator prefers, indeed finds necessary to his .actions,
is a construct of situations, not of continuity (habit) or
property (home)*

The innovator* s self is the product of his

accumulated knowledges and experiences, his aim being to
increase incrementally both components to the betterment of
his ability to handle various, nonintegrated behaviors*
The unending demand among popular psychiatry, that people
ought to-become neatly, wholesomely contained entities, free
'of tension and distress, holds no more appeal for the innova

tor than the multiplicity of selves idea would hold for a
Southern plantation owner of the previous century*

The old

Southern gentleman is precluded from making personal enlight
enment and- experience a goal., for his position as patriarch
demands that he display for the land s.n,d his chattels (which
includes the family) an unreasonably, inhumanly narrow,
righteous and unbending "self” which strives only to "preserve
and protect"*

There is no more antithetical a position

conceivable to this feudal mind than that of the innovator,
whose 'being is not in having and making, but strictly in
knowing and doing*

The~latter is in no need of "roots",

family, home, "place in society", not to mention religion,
ccmiitmity and for the most part, government, as it would
have been understood by the -planter.

Inasmuch as there still

reififeih, in advanced cultures persons with a feudal orientation,
th^gSosaibility of large-scale -innovation as described here'
is-:-d:
e"ssened*

But with the advent of post-industrialization

and dts* continued growth, the provincial is forced into a
quasi-schizophrenic condition of watching the world about him,
emphasized through the media and popular culture, speeding
towards the dissolution of almost everything he holds sacred literally - while he*sits on the veranda fighting with all
his resources merely to hold ground.

That his position is

finally untenable- is obvious to no-one more than to himself•
If the above plantation P atn ax ch is thought of as
'an ideal-type (on the "right11), then other members of the
post-modern culture may be compared with his .arch-conservatism

on a continuum.

For instance, the 'businessman who lives and

works in the urban sprawl may have dispensed with religion
and a love tor community.

He may in the interests of

furthering his career, engage in random, minor innovations
in circumventing distasteful restrictions imposed upon him
by'■the government*

Also he may rationalize (in Weber’s

sense) other types of behavior to more comfortably fit his
personality and various needs, such as the exploitation, of
:a competitor’s, secretary more for intelligence than sexual
•reasons.
ha-

But, more towards the right end of the continuum,

demand from his suburban wife and children and- his

professional subordinates, behavior suitable to the obse
q u i e s '‘Chattel*

So, while for him life may make a great

deal of-sense and be in comfortable accord with the dictates
mdrlimi tat ions of -the culture, for those subject to his
possible oppression, his "will to power” may constitute the
single greatest.irrationality of their existence.

For the

innovator, the possibility of being put in such a situation that. Is, in- the hands of a person(s) who can demand of him
irrational «-and unnecessary acts of fealty, or put differently,
one who would .seek to restrain his ongoing search for new
stimuli - is the ultimately detestable condition.
This has tremendous and far-reaching ramifications
for our current societal arrangements.

The military, social

movements, clubs, religious .affiliations and the more rigid
complex.organizations are but the most obvious targets- for
criticism and avoidance on the part of the innovator.

In

6?

order to maximize his benefits .while, minimizing costs, he
must stay clear of, any social arrangement which begins to
operate in noncontractual fashion at least in his business
and professional concerns*

But even in less formal relation

ships and settings, he becomes the artist in the realm of
!?traveling light”*, Property means involvement with and time
spent in the upkeep.of®

Noncontractual relations .mean time

and energy having to be expended which under contractual
-arrangements could be avoided, if that be desired®

Along

the same lines, it is necessary to point out the sad lack of
"helpful” structures in current society designed to benefit
,|ghose who wish to enrich their lives through interpersonal
^innovation®

The lacuna -now present (evei’ywhere except

perhaps in the most liberated sectors of metropolitan
;ppltiire) insures fox' the innovator a degree of probable.
fiftioffectiveness and loneliness which prevents most societal
participants from even considering innovatioriel roles.
Costs, are thought to outweigh benefits to an extreme degree®
In its most- precise expression, the innovator•sposition ..may be. summarized in this way?

there are a regret- -,

ably few. and finite number of moments in life; -expenditures
of time,, energy and attention are not to be sloppily allo
cated, but whenever possible activities are to be rationalized
with the intention of utilizing one’s life-space to the
fullest; this is done in the hope of realizing maximum satis
faction of those few but precisely formulated personallydefined "goods”*

The cumulative- -effect of this Weltanschuung

across the culture is wide-scale social change®

Whereas

Weber was made apprehensive.by this position, the postascetic innovator feels less 'anxiety over it*

Those histori

cally evolved relationships and behaviors which do not prove
viable in the post-modern setting, he sets aside, often with
severe regrets - and no ready alternatives®

His job - the

subject of the thesis >■ is to refashion social arrangements
to suit his overarching schema*

Thai; of course is when the

innovation, peonies in, and when negative social sanctions
•■•become the most pronounced*

In reconstructing one *s culture

to’^sait -oneself, the loss at the outset in terms of comforting^abstract sentiments, literature and similar cultural
productions*1may seem unbearably heavy*

B\xt the promised

rewards of final emancipation from' historically spent
components of social organization and the beliefs which
Invfaiably accompany them.* is in the opinion of the innova
tor" Worth the. effort and sacrifice®
'While I risk.stating the obvious, it seems advis
able "at, this point, in -concluding an introductory statement
of the" theory, to remark about its historical position*
In the development of some new mental constructs, it is
possible "to assess them as peculiar to only a specific time
in history, evg., that air power was.something that ought to
be exploited militarily, a realization only possible circa
1910 and in no other time*.

This theory is.not of that nature-

It is .likely that those-who-were entirely disenchanted with
their particular sacio-historical matrix, at whatever time in

history, happened upon this theory, appr.oxinia.tely, but
threw up their hands when the possibility of implementing
alternatives .arose®

LaPiere overstates slightly the case

for the innovator, in semipoXemic style, with the intention
of offsetting the drift in social theory towards the collec
tivity®

But his even bigger error is to understate the

importance to change of the cumulative nature of culture, not
precisely or in every case the result of single innovators’
works®;

The point X wish to make here is. that my theory

makes some sense of the m o d e m situation and is capable of
predicting significant change in all major institutions of
m t h e post-modern cultures*

But the fact that it does is a

^.function .not only of its attempted comprehensiveness, but
more *importantly, because it responds to the possibilities
t&dfcor. change at all levels inherent in current society which
&s,S?ere distinctly .lacking in all previous societies*

This is

^•'ixot -so much the case of the epoch being ready for the idea
■ ""(ideas of personal freedom being very old), but the idea,
having found the suitable epoch*

This also explains why

the -theory, is useful in pred.ict5.ng change only in those
relatively small but extremely important areas, of the world
being termed "post-modern”*

The other areas are in varying

states of inter-epochal flux,- some frozen in- extreme static
congruence at the primitive level (Sicily), others in pain
ful static incongruence (much of Africa) and still others in
the beginning of -dynamic incongruence necessary to the pro
duction of post-modern.' culture (the more advanced Latin

•American countries)*

One tragic aspect of this is the fact

that in some of these areas, there are•foreign-educated
nationals who have experienced resocialization while studying
abroad and therefore seek the same kinds of freedom through
change that I have been discussing*

Theirfs is a sad lot

unless they wish to migrate to more advanced areas (which
they often do of course)*

One can imagine the pain of a

sociologist taking his Hi*!)® at Berkeley, then having to
return to Japan, or Thailand or any of the Latin American
oligopolies, areas where the feudal-religious orientation
still,.holds sway*

Hox^ever, the same kind of personal dilemma

mi gilt--ensue when the .American student from Iowa studies with
the Critic,ai school at .Frankfurt or with left-wing intellec
tuals in Italy, only to return to his unliberated home*

This

kin^'Of difficulty, personal emancipation in the midst of
str^baral.repression, will -become in the hon-adv&nced
sectors •••(as it is currently here) more and more of a problem,
to add to their* already excessive list®

CHAPTER III
SOCIAL CHANGE IN HISTORY

Prefatory note
The writing of this section was done with the
awareness that certain unanticipated difficulties of scho
larship-: seriously handicapped me in presenting an .adequate
selection of data to support my thesis*

This is not an

apolp@ia, but a methodological explanation regarding the
problems of working both the historical and sociological
fields- in “
pursuit of demonstrable Truth*
As'every scholar, I had in•mind the "ideal method'
of 'handling the phenomenon in question:

to secure f rom

histijfchans the finest bibliography of works dealing with
socidQy change; to sift patiently through them seeking data
to support (or refute) my thesis about the history and
future•of change; and to present the findings in a grand
synthesis similar in spirit* if not in method, to Sorokin’s
masterpiece*

(Aging scholars smile at such youthful plans

of grandiose dimension*)

Nevertheless, I compiled, an

enormous list of suitable studies, began.in earnest the
sifting, and to ray dismay these months later, have con
cluded. that the task overwhelms and depresses me®
several reasons*
First, the she ex' magnitude*
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For

no

Second, social history, ever since the 19th
century shift from-political to sociological emphasis, has
been written in very general terms, practically by definition.
The move away from hypexp articularism, in the description of
military and dynastic changes ad nauseum, has given way to
a similarly exaggerated extolling of the "flavor of the
period”5 etc*, in homage to Kulturge schicte*

Therefore the

j^ost useful, modern historical sources, those that conscious
l y include sociological, reflections, are invariably a mixed
.-blessing., on one hand taking cognizance, of social forces and
rcultural styles, but on the other, often Hegelian!zing their
'Igreas of interest with overly diffuse, sometimes mystical
>Cqaracterization of Zeitgeist*

If Thucydides is at times a

sboxe because of inordinate, enumeration of disconnected
•Retail, then Alfred Weber (inter alia) for my purposes is
aerually useless because of his distaste for stating the
:gppnsociological in favor of more suitably specific and.
psychological statements, which of course typify earlier
historians*

The fact remains that "social change” is a very

short term for a most luxuriously rich and complex gathering
, of phenomena* .And a reading of history with any but chron
ically over-sociological eyes presents disparate data, many
of which cannot adequately be dealt with through sociology
alone.

Although this thesis is written by a sociologist,

since its aim is to predict (after considering the past in
broad terms), I have had to consider information from his
torians which often chafed and-forced me to recognize

■realities which fall outside the familiar terrain of my
discipline*
Connected•with this is the key problems

how to

utilize heavily sociologized descriptions of the past in the
interests of the individually-rooted theory I am defending*
LaPiere chose the most obvious route in pursuing the data
of technological advance, easily attributable to particular
people, but what of the organizational and ideological com
ponents?

My solution to the important quandry is only mar-

finally, satisfying, but necessary in order to facilitate
him.completion of the task*

Simply this:

I immersed myself

iilifaistorical treatises and after a good deal more reading
tksfo&rX could present, I decided with some- qualifications,
.that-the history of Western development over the past
miiyhenium is largely the.record of the activities of thousands
of^innovative souls who operated in the ore major culture
times promoted and stimulated their work.*

(At least

in ‘comparison with the repressions typical of Eastern, social,
structure.)

k complete documentation of this insight would

require not 60 .pages hut .several, thousand*

What- is offered

here-instead.are the rudiments to .that documentation, an
.outline with some specifics interspersed, the assumption
being made that Mthere•s a lot more where that came from”*
The contours of•innovation axe therefore being detailed
rather than, the more perfect but less workable project, to
specify point by point this critical input to social change*
The ”contradiction” - to generalize the specific — is more
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apparent than real-

Introducti on
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This section will constitute a necessarily
abbreviated statement; regarding, that grouping of phenomena
•known under the rubric ”social change%

as it has appeared

in (principally) Western history sinee the Middle Age s *
Obviously, because I make no pretense of being an historian,
all.'of what follows depends upon the general consensus of
professionals in that discipline, the varying opinions of
which,, I have synthesized into sociologically relevant
statements*
ty

As is well known among students-of historio

graphy, there are inherent in all histordeal study countless
potential .difficulties and. confusions, depending upon how the
-dat&tere comprehended and -presented-.

For example, in this

ps^ieular case extreme care must be taken not to mistake
them5’great-man theory” of history, of late held in deserved
ly low esteem, with the B&mett-LaBiere theory of the. inno
vator in the processes of change«

When in the 19th century,

historians of romantic sentiments began the apotheosis of
historical notables, there had just been on the European scene
a number of extremely impressive and effective political
leaders, the names of whom are the first the young student
understands to be "History”.

The fact that men make times

and times make men is no longer an astonishing, controversial
issue.

New, however, is the fact that complex society is

much less supportive of the great-man idea, due to plethoras
of critical variables, most of which elude the control of any
single figure.

Although the media persist in elevating the

actions of individuals into the limelight, this has more- to
do with the nature of mass entertainment than with empirical
reality.

*
However, it is immediately obvious from an examina

tion of Western culture that particular men at particular
times with outlandish ideas have affected pervasively the
technological, ideological and organizational systems.
This has been true from the beginnings of civilisation, yet
.is seldom mentioned that many of the "great men65 have
no -‘Harness

the innovators of the wheel, a multitude of

century trade practices, and so on®

1 5 th

"History" for centuries

whs .the-work, of court-paid scribes -who under severe censorship.'3.ionized their employers and friends while disparaging
teemles and ignoring the other 99$ of civilization.

Whether

those important souls whose innovations genuinely aided in
the debarbarizati.cn of the West should be considered "great"
is more a moral-aesthetic than, historical, judgement.

My

point.is that those men usually considered members of the
pantheon are in many cases no more significant than the
unnamed vis a vis the totality of social change over the
past mil1enium«
X did not happen upon this view of social history
merely to conform to Laldere and Barnett, or solely through
their work.

One of the more esteemed "generalist" historians

rf
~tO
(“
of the current era, Herbert

Muller, has made the point

most clearly, although his reflections relate specifically
to technological development.

(However, it should not be

understood that his remarks are irrelevant; to ideological or
organizational innovation*

The" reason that technology has

been stressed whenever independent creativity is the point
of discussion

as mentioned above

rests in the fact that

other elements of social change are far more difficult to
■attribute in their origin.

While we know-that in 1300 Fra

Xuca Paciolo invented double-entry bookkeeping, revolution
ising business life, we can not so precisely assign respon
sibility, for instance, to those who made England the
"mother of parli amentary government", or America the -"birth
place of jazz".

This has less to do with the nature of

change than with the problems of post-facto analysis
regarding innovational approaches to reality, whether tech
nological, ideological or organizational.)
Muller:
In thus anticipating the European genius for tech
nology, these craftsmen also foreshadowed another
.'-major theme «• the importance of the creative individual*
In prehistory such individuals are perforce anonymous,
at best being commemorated in some, later myth like that
of the master craftsman Daedalus, .and. their inventive
ness is obscured by the slow pace of change, the gradual
diffusion of new skills, and the conspicuous uniformity
of .artifacts* Today their importance is commonly
minimised because of our awareness of their dependence
on culture, and of the deep, unconscious, involuntary
processes of historic change. Yet nothing would seem
plainer than that every new invention must have been
the work of some individual - not the automatic outcome
of an impersonal process, nor the product of a committee
of embryonic organization men. Even the very gradual
improvements in skills or changes in styles were due to

minor innovations that could only have been the work of
individuals* The diffusion of new arts end skills
itself required exceptional men bold enough to break
the cake of tribal custom, perhaps defy the patriarchs
or head magician* Hence the faster pace of innovation
in prehistoric Europe meant among other things that
there was now .an increasing number of enterprising,
imaginative, more or less unconventional men® He may
doubt that their works were always welcomed or that
their tribal societies were eager.for change; but at
least these societies were growing more disposed to
accept change, encourage the innovator, and thereby
were anticipating a civilisation- that would provide
more opportunity and incentive for the creative indivi
dual than had any of the great Eastern societies®
(Note to the same page): In Change and History Margaret
Hodgen has made a pioneering'study in this, field: a
detailed history of" technological innovation in England,
shire by shire, parish by parish, over its entire hist
ory. Three major periods of innovation - .„. - reflect
the larger "movements” made familiar by historians and
illustrate the ... impersonal processes of historic
change that the innovators may be quite unconsciou s of *
But a close study of these periods, as of the -whole span,
gives much more, prominence -to the work of individuals
other than the few famous inventors. Thus it was not
.strictly "England” that produced or underwent these
innovations: they occurred primarily in certain
regions, more specifically in certain towns or parishes,
and always were the work of particular men, who in the
16th century begin to be identified by name in the local
records.- Of the more than 12,000 parishes-in England,
down to 1900, fewer than 20% ever took up a n e w craft
or industry, and most of these ventured upon an innova
tion but once® Most of England, in other words, remain
ed a traditional, agricultural society, sit most adopting f
improved tools-made by-more enterprising men elsewhere® (
This has been quoted at length because of its implications
for sociological investigation of past eras, the specifics
for-which more often than not are dispensed with in favor of
"periods”, "trends”, and the like.

There is no sense in .mini

mizing the interdependence of creator and culture, but because
of our current historical proclivities, with the, boom of demo
cratic, sociologized sentiment, to suggest•that an individual
mind shares little responsibility for a particular develop--

Bient,- is to verge on the heretical, gaining profe-ssi;onal
responses of "great^manism" or simply "psychologism".

(The

cold reception of LaPiere's Social Change sustains my suspi
cion that sociologists1 rancor- is most stimulated by those in
the fold who honor*the specifically individual and/or unique as opposed- to the patterned, consensual or integrated - for
some- analytical purposes in preference to the more comfort
ably diffuse and general developments of Man.)

The following

vpages will attempt to walk the narrow line between blindly
*
•
*sociological vs. romantically individualistic accounts of
innovations said change in history.
Along with' recognizing the innovator’s role, one
fraust also realize that particular types or "styles” of
purposive social change have been possible and effective
doniy.under certain historical conditions.

It is intuitively

fblear that modes of change under the Pharcahs, within the
polis, and in Charlemagne’s Europe were all -decidedly
.different.

Somewhat less obvious are the enormous differences'

between successful innovating behavior in the epoch before
1789

, In the

country.

19

th century.and during the sixties in this

Styles of change which made great sense within

certain social structures made none in others, and the mark
of the innovator—leader (if they were one and the same person)
was the 'ability to determine when a social change device had
become antiquated, and institute a more effective one.
Furthermoresocial change is often characterized
as having- to do with those elements of a culture which are

conspicuously alterable:

political-leadership, changes in

attire, distribution of goods and services, and so on.

I

propose that a fresh look offers different data, that social
change in fact will begin to escape the notice of those
analysts who are prepared and/or capable only of understand...ing change in anachronistic terms®

It was announced during

the sixties that no "real" change obtained because the "move
ment" was ill ““Organized, the goals diffuse and the "revolu
tion” -merely .emotional®

For 30fs radicals it was -a disheart

ening-" affair with.,.no- party ideology, cells, secret codes of
.ftbought and behavior and the rest of the package*
.

A corrective to this view is easily provided,

/ilo'cia! change in the past two hundred years has been pre
dominantly structural®

Marx was not the only thinker who

doggedly tied men 5 s thought and actions to a particular
s t a t u s and role*

The fallacy involved here- has been pointed

fgsmtz too often to require repetition.

Today the Weitan-

sschauungen of millions have become, for sociological purposes,
Indistingui shable•from ■one another although the compared
individuals operate within entirely separate strata of the
r*
power/privilege- hierarchy®- It is not as easy to predict the
values and related activities of the. laborer today as it was
in 1848 or 18/1*

The swollen middle class has taken over

the traditional role of the elites as trend and fashion setter
(something••which bothered the old-school, e.g., Karl Mann
heim’s "The Democratization of.Culture").

And because of

regularized affluence for increasing numbers of the citizenry,

demands, for structural and distributional modification
reminiscent -of the early
deal.

2 0 th

century have subsided a great

Put succinctly, the social analyst of change must

begin looking, not so .much for dramatic rearrangements ofsocial 'institutions, but "Tor equally important, more
difficultly detected., shifts in values and processes*
I have dispensed for the most part with Eastern
history since it followed such radically different contours
until Westernization began in. -the 18th and 19th centuries.
Thereafter it has -been subject to similar situations and
-outcomes with those of Europe, given that certain idiosyn■ssg&hic- features, very often of religious nature, have left
:thelr mark-.
v*r

Now that the -basic premises are clear, I may offer,

h^iway of recapitulation, a heuristic breakdown of the last
m^Henium, which has been employed by many current historians,
although they characteristically stop .short of purely socio
logical analysis®

Before -the -high- middle ages of the 12th.

century, in those centuries somewhat mislabeled "Dark"' by
19

th century scholars, whet change took place (especially

organizational) seems to have been the handiwork of individual
strongmen whose hegemony was extremely local and whose inheres'
were consequently particularistic.

With the creeping growth

of secularism and-the merchant mentality which surfaced aftex*
the

1 2 th

century renaissance, social change took the form of

conflict between liberalizing mercantile interests and the
re actionary sentiments of the Papacy-and -some of the ruling

elites* those who failed to utilize the "soiled” capital of
the traders.

With the advent of proto-rational.,ism through

Kepler* Copernicus* Galileo* Luther, Erasmus, Descartes and
•later Locke, the stage was set for a new mode of change,*
although again of a largely 'individual nature*

This mode of

change has been popularized .as the extremely atomistic
behavior of "renaissance men” and reformation zealots«
As economies and concomitant political arrangements finalized
in the

1 7 th

and 18th centuries, completing the shift from

^feudalism to early- industrialism, the reactionary and liberat
ing forces met head on and popular revolution became the
This proved successful beyond .
•the wildest hopes of
'CT^lylibertarians, but with Metternich and the return of the
pendulum (cf* Henry Kissinger1s The World Restored), revolutidfi began to produce diminishing returns for those who sought
employ it within rapidly industrialising areas*

The forces

#^dotinter-revolut.io:a mushroomed; the .Bolshevik, enterprise of
the 20th century was in many ways 100 years too late in any
country but Russia*
What must be kept ‘
in mind is the fact that these
dialectical' processes of progress and xveaction. were carried
on at varying rates throughout Europe*

Since Britain was the

first to have a"modern -political revolution (164-0), the first
to industrialize thoroughly and the first to become essentially
a culture of nongovernmental complex organizations (early
century), it may be compared with late-blooming Russia or
'Germany only to emphasize differences at given times, riot

19

th

similarities®

But each country went through roughly similar

changes (which is not to say there is anything ,!inevitable”
or "necessary” about such regularities), given that some
advantages, accrued to, for example* Bismarck, through the
fatal lesson of Louis XVI.
1770

s, by

1870

If the masses were seemed in

rulers began employing both stick and carrot*

and the birth of cooptation was. at hand.

Socialism could not

be repressed to death in any country, and the masses were
quick to learn that the social movement was their only reliable
weapon against poverty and frozen social position*
We now move abruptly from conventional historicg m p h y to the' realm of hypothesis, the point of this thesis*
The:., social movement in all post-modern..cultures (which elimin
ates from comment the Third World) is no longer appropriate
ifgenuine, penetrating and durable social change is sought*
Ifchas repeatedly been shown, in 184-8, the Paris Communef
@rable peasant revolutions in Russia and other European
countries, in American labor-management warfare from the Molly
AleQuire.s on, etc* that the forces of oppression and cooptation,
the social control facilities accessible to.the ruling inter
ests, have made not only political revolution, but also the
social movement impractical*

Whereas revolution is precluded

by the sheer strength of. state coercion, the social movement
has- been vitiated rather by the growth of- knowledge on the
part of the masses*

A definition of self which permits

”whole~liogn" movement support is not terribly sophisticated,
and certainly not relativistic regarding values*

Absolutist!©

thinking and social movements (historically) are inextricable
and necessary to each other®

Thus we see that the likelihood

of mass support for ideologies and cell participation is
inversely related to the .general level of education (used in
a specific sense net related to indoctrination or citizen
ship training) and the inevitably ensuing critical conscious
ness , which has 'played havoc with political leaders since
the French. Revolution». In short, the -world's worst follower
•is. the man who thinks independently of ideologically proffered
thought-patterns and values®
-yx
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in whirlwind fashion I have outlined the growth

of various forms of change in modern history.

Moving further

.intoy*hhe hypothetical, we arrive at present-day Europe and the
TJ* S ©,: the relatively uninhibited areas of post-modern -develop
ment «
••.'.t*

It is an irony of history'that the.innovator again

comaiV to the fore as the most efficient and probable exponent
of, change, after sharing the limelight with collective action
for the last three centuries®

Given the relativism of the

age and the intense, irrevocable coercive powers of the state
(largely due to telecommunications and similar technology),
the

1

one-wolf innovator stands a much better chance of alter

ing the .status quo than easily recognisable and repressible
mass demonstrations of intent®
There are connected with this thought both happy
and unfortunate correlates.

A necessary if not sufficient

reason for the existence in large numbers- of highly rational,

independent, relativistic: social actors, is both' affluence
and the availability of higher education for other than the
traditional elites.

With, the diminution of supernatural

systems, ideologies of various sources and related oppressive
features of older cultures, the modern situation has provided
the potential innovator with- means, ability and willingness,
three key components which in earlier epochs were often
absent, either singly or altogether®

However, the current

period of history is anomalous because of virulent, absolutism
'living in uncanny proximity with Weimar-like relativism
a vis personal lives and commitments, or lack of same,
historically an analogous situation obtained in i4*th century
‘Jtoae when merchants and other radicals carried on their lives
within sight of the Vatican.

And, as in that time, there are

frepuent clashes- between those whose allegiances vary with
calculation and those whose are invariably stable because of
Emotional, nonicgical ties.

lUhe innovator, for whom feudal

•behavior is anathema, has learned (because of inquisitors up
through McCarthy)'to protect himself from zealous, feudal
minds-seeking consistency and predictability in those about
them, b y carefully clothing questionable acts and thoughts in
a veneer of compliance.

Ibis runs counter of course to all

conservative morality regarding the supposedly Goodness of
t h e ’monolithic self, but it has proven itself the single
reliable road to survival for those increasing numbers who
practice change.
With some repetition coupled with the addition of

new remarks, we have .gained the required position from which
to make a swift review of history, and in so doing pointing
up two related facts:

(1) social change has been largely

due to independent innovators\ (2) collective., action under
taken in the interests'of altering social reality will sub
sequently meet with- marginal success.*

(N.B.:

In supporting

•the view of social history which casts the innovator as
numero uno, I am, •again, not denying the cumulative nature
of -culture and. the disparate abilities, of different societies
to aid. or hinder the aspiring, inevitably present innovator.)

The Middle Ages
ipt:

Binc-e .-most sociologists get their knowledge of the

medieval/-, second-hand - (a few of the more fortunate ..read
BXfmhls Feudal Society) - the "stagnant feudal social structtrfei of "Europe from GOG to .1200 has become a .professionally
ritualized conception®

Revisionist historians like Sylvia

Thrupp have been proving our static interpretation to be
fallacious,- and. they cite numerous, newly discovered instances
of purposive, violent and/or innovative behavior on the part
of medieval people®

It has been pointed out, for example.,

that legalism prevailed as one of the spirits of the age, and
even the otherwise ignorant serfs committed to.memory their
privileges and responsibilities along with the many nonlogical
*The following will rely heavily upon the 18-volume "Rise of
Modern Europe" series, edited by Langer, which has been repeat'
edly mentioned to me by professional historians as the finest
and. most succinct generalist study of modern social history.
Also of value was Herbert Muller1s trilogy, Freedom in the
Ancient World , Freedom in the Western World,~Freedom/in the
Modern World® ’
’

components of mental life* .This fascination with the. legal
realm provided constant conflicts “between lords and peasants,
and it is heartening to encounter the tenacity with which the
undex*dogs often fought the improprieties of their masters
through the court system (62)-.
I knew enough about the medieval to avoid complete
acceptance of the discipline shorthand:

feudal Europe equals

unmitigated repression and changelessness®

But aftex’ con-

culting some of the more reliable interpreters of the period (6y),
ftor my purposes here , it is more safe than., not to characterise
the era as relatively undynamic, in LaPiere1s terms, ?lstatic*aply congruent"*

1. allow myself this somewhat begrudgingly,

fis©? if one performs too many "heuristics” 9 the data become so
compromised as to mean nothing at all.

Reading reputable

.studies in medieval social history (of which there are an
aipa.sir.2g ■number) leaves the reader with the wry -impression, that
tfefess. people, although unlearned and ridden with superstition,
.nevertheless exhibited an .enormous.capacity for resilience and
rebellion - perhaps in the search- for new. stimuli - in careful
disregard for constraining social structure.

M o d e m social

theorists use the manorial system as a foil to complex society
and with ..good reason.

When compared to the variety we take

for granted, the manor was indeed a limited scenario in which,
to carry out all of life *s functions.

But to write the entire

epoch off as Bark, changeless and sterile, "waiting13 for the
Renaissance, is foolishness.
Traditionally, the year 4-76 ushered in the "dark
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ages" by way of a cataclysmic defeat of the Homans at the
hands of northern Barbarians.. This is not quite accurate•
Less dramatic, but more in keeping with the facts, we find
that the invasion from the. north had taken several'centuries'
and was not a rapacious onslaught, but a quiet usurpation of
power and status by upwardly mobile foreigners®

Roman culture

was recognized by the outsiders as superior to their own, and
its lack', of* vitality -allowed their primitive robustness to
"conquer”; .but, as in. so many other meetings of peoples, the
more •■simple were readily assimilated into the older, more
richly ..endowed culture (64-)®
W

However, by the time of Pope Gregory•the Great

(54-04604-) there were indeed regularized.and ferocious attacks
on the •remnants, of Roman grandeur, along with famine and
diseasfa. throughout -Italy.

Rome was preserved- from utter

destruction only by the. diplomatic skill of'Gregory, for he
placated the Lombards and more by accident than design, •initia
ted "'the -hegemony of the Church over Europe for the next
millenium.

The 8th century showed little improvement in the

lives of the "Europeans”, with the•Arab invasions as far as
Spain; .and the miniscule Caroling!an renaissance died with
Charlemagne leaving Europe in a 10th century of appalling
despair..arid pessimism throughout.

The year 1000 approached

to no* chorus of joy,, for as many prophets of the age proclaim
ed, it. seemed that Western man would not survive his first
millenium*
Strangely perhaps, technological advance did not
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seem to be inordinately affected by such organizational and
ideological chaos*

Lynn White describes the birth of the

stirrup, three-field crop rotation and similarly explosive
inventions all of which, preceded the 11th century by several,
hundred years (65)#

This anomaly, the continuing progress

of material innovation within a-social structure either
static or declining, from this point forward begins to
typify the West/much more than the East*

The static congru-

■ence. of later Rome and the early Medieval gave way gradually
to -.-incongruence, and then, much later, to the dynamic•incon
gruence of today (of course varying in quality and speed over
difi&rent regions)*

While the divine monarchs of Eastern

civilizations assured that technology was restrained and
applied -principally to art, the Western .leaders with their
pugnacious acquisitiveness never tired of employing" novel
device^;,to. further their power.

However, to continue in the

realm# ©f sociocultural paradox, the East developed quite
early, amidst less material poverty than is often thought,
conceptions of human spirituality and sensitivities which
were utterly and forever foreign to the West, yet at the same
time failing- to rival Europe in mechanical achievements.

Thus

the ideological element grew into degenerate complexity and
subtlety in the East, the technological component flowered
without remission or conscience throughout the modern epoch
in the-West, and organizational developments lagged in both
areas (but to different degrees), even now creating the most
problems for both worlds,.

We- may assume from this that
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Individual creativity may readily find an outlet in either
the Eastern or Western directions, but that those who would
radically alter social organization (e.g., Cromwell, the
philosopher, Lenin, etc.),chose for themselves by far the
most'difficult arena in which to innovate.

As students of

complex organisations we find this unsurprising, but in seek
ing a characterisation of social change through history as
relying heavily upon individuals, the trichotoinous distinc
tion must constantly be kept in mind.

It will not do to

dismiss the LaPiere-Barnett theory on grounds that largescale organizational changes have in the past century been
ijjihhe result of many small increments rather than "great man,r
^•achievements.

Complex organization is new in world history

and-unless we wish- to become completely temperocentric, it
|§is essential to recognise that as early as. Gregory the Great,,
ifibe individual (leader, adviser, soldier, or inventor)-had.
felfar more difficulty in rearranging.social relations than in
coming up with novel, mechanical, devices or mental- concepts.
This is the nature of social change.

Luther rather- easily

concocted a radicalized theology; he had- tremendous difficulty,
in establishing a viable non-C.atholic church which, could
successfully compete with Rome.

Within less than a century

after his 95 theses were proclaimed, over d80 Protestant
sects had. blossomed, the vast majority of which would have
met with no^approval from their "founder".
sort are rife through Western history.
clear:

Examples of this

The fact then is

we have been very proficient at thinking up both new

Aa

apparatuses and intellectual explanations, but, as in other
civilizations, our ability to sensibly organize social
relations is nearly always out of step, either, somewhat
ahead ("open 'marriage11) -or behind (feudal demands within
contract relations).

This seems to hold constant even with

out regarding/-the problems•of power and privilege, the "who
gets what, when, how" dimension of change.
Between Charlemagne and 1100, "history", as
chronicled by contemporary observers, remained tied to small
■.iandtfrequent baronial battles*

More important for my analysis,

tte actual distances' between levels of the stratification
were .usually slight.

As Europe climbed its way out

the :.socic-pQlitieal chaos left by the complete inf 11 tra.tiorr of the Roman system by northern-peoples and the con'€tPBitsnt dissolution of classical order, there existed
':ifeo.ffie lent -opulence for anyone to exploit very much*

How~

^fer^ out of the destruction two positive consequences were
ih evidence, the conversion of Norsemen into Christian Normans
•.(responsible for major creative input later in history) -and
the tenuous understanding among the populations that -a
"Europe" was in the making.

(The 9th century historian

Nithard first used the-term when assessing Charlemagne1s
impact (66).)

'From my reading of the period, it seems that

key figures working in decidedly innovational roles propelled
the West away from Roman decadence and the onslaughts of
both Islamic and barbarian invaders.

One can say with more

eettainty about this epoch than of any subsequent one, that

early Europe was the handiwork of specifiable innovators*
hardheaded and foolishly courageous types who could look
forward to brief and bitter existences* whether or not they
sought to inject change into a dismal era®
Among these relatively few but essential figures
are the leader's of the Church, generally considered the singl
•force which made any concerted effort to maintain the social,
fabric, of the civilization*

This is not the corrupt and

heavily entrenched Church of the pre-reformation* hut a
young and still supple social force* hardly yet deserving of
the name ‘-organization’5.
St*. Benedict.

Among these early purists was of

St* Odo* Abbot of Oluny in the 10th

ceptpry*„.while preserving the shredded remnants of Western
tradition* also began a .mil itanti y altruistic monastic movevmept on the basis of the Benedictine Rule*, formulated 400
yc|^rs earlier.

It has been noted that this essentially proto*

s^^eluwork. role of the early monks found no counterpart in
the East* end before degeneration set in* monasteries served
.as centers for learning - purely intellectual and secular —
and security throughout the troubled times.

Moreover* the

■stigma attached to manual labor so typical of previous
civilizations* was almost completely eradicated under the
influence of this order* which* as Sombart pointed out, -was
very likely the root of bourgeois values:
ality and..thrift.

hard work* punctu

If any organization ever worked in direct

contradiction to the sentiment of the culture, it was this
one* for it was said that if 99% of the monks were destroyed,

the survivors could reconstitute the entire -order piecemeal
and we are left with the implies si on that precisely this was
done on more than one occasion (67).
On the other hand, after paying homage to the
positive aspects of. medieval ingenuity* it must likewise he
remembered that the era seethed with incessant paradoxes
and contradictions*

Although they retained their older

technical skills and added to them* although some of the
writers of the period (Boethius* John Scotus* Cassiodorus*
etc?*)'"produced laudable tracts on rational governmental
theory and semi-modern morality* the strange fact persists:
medieval -men took some perverse pride in binding themselves
tsih’tbawork&bXe schemes* “preposterous practices*- Godlike oaths
and ceremonies* only to break loose out!andishly* making a
MC-tkery of their self-imposed restraints*

Youths fornicated

i#*ekthedr&ls* while ”whores prowled for customers* students
inhkoly orders played dice on the altars” (68).

It was- a.

time of •”fantastic licence and irreverence" compensating for
the threat of horrifying sanctions.*

"At-no time in the

world’s history has theory* professing all the while to
control practice* been so utterly divorced from it" (69)«
These contradictions exploded.in -'the' 15th and 14th centuries
*But these paradoxes and conflicts had their brighter side:
"Medieval worldliness led' to a growing naturalism* humanism*
and individualism that anticipated the Italian Renaissance,
and characteristic passion of Western*man to savor*-know* fe
and express all the manifold possibilities of life in the
-natural world. In short, it promoted a spirit of freedom".
Muller* Opus cited.* p. 51*

but before the period of Dante#s discontent* Europe took
asylum from morbid introspection* during the famous 12th
century.
As Charles Haskins''proved.-long ago in. a famous-work (?0), whatever was dark about Western (predominantly
British and French) (?1) civilization dissipated in the
blinding light and conviviality of the 12th century,,
proto-renalssance was possessed of everything good:

This
a lack

of firm national boundaries and the related promotion of
>cosmopolitanism? intellectual commerce with Islamic and
.Eastern sources* especially in regaining lost knowledge of
Assistctie ...and Greek culture; an undogmatic clergy linked to
anrats yet. unossified, noncoercive church — concerning, that
is, those who were not potential enemies of the Crusaders*
But. as quickly and. wondrously as the clear light of tolera
tion had dawned over the continent, it faded, with the
•^hrivai of the bloody and treacherous 13th and 14th centuries.
These were years in which seeds of discord were sown that
flowered into problems of unmanageable magnitude we still
face in our own time*

The -familiar divisions - church-state,

nation-nation, Islamic-Ghristian, church-intellectual - and
ether confl.ictual dichotomies all find their roots in this
unforgiving period.
However, both the highspots of glory and the lowest
points of cultural and personal despair were basically the
province of elites®

For the common people, it is reasonable

to suppose that life was brief, predictably strenuous and

•boring*

Thus, when viewing the past with, sociological

emphasis, those great leaps forward, heralded by professional,
historians very often amount to ideological or organization
al changes perpetrated by the upper crust, having only -second
ary effect upon the masses*

As mentioned above* technologi

cal change is more democratically represented in history*
As White conclusively illustrated (72), from the 7th century
onward, innovation in nutrition, warfare, and unrelated
manorial technology made possible the production of a delicate
surplus economy, paving the way for the urban explosion of
the early renaissance.

While an intense discussion of tech-

Urological change during this early period is beyond my scope*
O: it is important to note that■Ogburn was at least partially
correct in his comparison of mental vs* material constructs*
t:Jt ’seems there was no end. to technological improvements* both
of European minds and borrowed-from, distant cultures (73)*
^fbut the rate of change in social structure and value processes
significantly lagged.

Apparently there existed an almost

humorous' cat and mouse relationship between lord and serfs
•uthe-'lord made a feudal demand upon the vassal?s energy, the
innovative vassal promptly devised a tool or method with
which to shorten or ease his labor so that he might return
to his own affairs, the lord "reevaluating the serf’s perfor
mance”, and upping the take, etc,

Modern parallels are obvious

♦In emphasizing the appreciable gap between technological and
ideological development, I reefer the reader to. monographs on.
warring techniques, e.-g. A* Z. Freeman’s nWaXX-Breakers and
River-Bridgerst Military Engineers of the.Scottish Wars of
Edward I ” (74), which emphasize the consummate skill of men
engaged in mutual annihilation, but still thoroughly within
an intellectually feudal framework, as late as 1 5 -0 7 ®
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•The heritage and -significance of the middle -ages'
for the modern world comes through most clearly in several
familial* terms:

Christianity, the classical tradition, the

feudal system, and. the urban bourgeoisie (75)®

While the

roles of the last three in the slow growth of freedom and
innovation do not require comment, perhaps several remarks
about the Church and its doctrine are necessary in view of
the usually negative response given "supernatural systems”
by sociologists.,
t-

■The first medieval treatise on government, John

of -0alisbury?s Policrattcus^ was inspired by the behavior
of 'tcfe prophets of 'the Old Testament who rejected their
sovtffeigns, in stipulating that subjects need not obey
monarchs who disregarded the law (76).

The author of this

woriktwas •certainly a mil-lenium or so ahead of his time (1 1 5 9 )
i n ‘f i l i n g for legal responsibility on the part of ruling
individual s', who within several centuries had assumed the
mantle:•of deity.

(Even today it seems behavior in the

upper reaches of political life operates for the most part
either in pro forma legality or cloaked extralegal maneuvers,,)
It is important of course to distinguish between the often
repressive Church bureaucracy and Christian beliefs, the
latter of which animated such radicals as Aquinas,.- who
managed to gain official backing for his rational conceptions
of men as possessing free will®

On the collective scale, the

peasant rebellions which came somewhat later also found
intellectual and emotional sustenance in the basic Christian
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•premises of equality in brotherhood and its logical
extension, the value of the individual.

Probably most

important of the many "liberalizing" sentiments built
into Christian dogma was this issue of the individual, his
uniqueness and inherent right to certain "natural" preroga
tives, although of course most -people lived without them,
East and West®

Bub as Muller states, "The barbarities of

our own time seem worse because of the still-live •
.Christian
sentiment that you simply can't do certain things to
people” (77)**

(The most poignant reminder- that this spirit

.does ’not infect the entire world resides in the Bataan
March and related ordeals through which the Japanese
:giih. their- "less than human” captives in the last war.

While

^atrocities- in-the West often occur, they are inevitably
'3$fesnded as abhorrent aberrations.

Such feelings were not

iaiSfcm&Xly associated with beast-like aggression in other

cultures®)
I made this digression bn the spiritual sources
of innovation'because of the distinctly Western, quality of
•existence -which during the medieval emerged in full bloom
and was to remain relatively continuous thereafter; and to
emphasize the interdependence ox innovation and freedom,
.which thus.far has been assumed rather, than stated®

•With

out actually doing so, it could easily he demonstrated that
the other three factors (classical philosophy - especially
Aristotelian

the feudal, system with its incessant; conflicts

end eruptive nature, and the determined bourgeoisie) all

•contributed to the general awareness of the. strength of
investigation on empirical grounds, which more than any
thing else determined the prospects and dilemmas of Western
life*

Such investigations and primitive research were

naturally the bailiwick of innovators of one sort or -another,
and with each passing decade their mental productions multi
plied (almost comically), far outdistancing- demand*
All the major developments which dominated later
history began as inauspicious rumblings during the middle
ages,.' and only recently, very recently indeed., have the most
advanced sectors of the West begun operatixg in a universe of
steucture, process and values for which the medieval gives
W' clues- as to future trends*

1350 - 1700
,

*

-Although a cruel and suspicious time, the 13th and

centuries excite and stimulate the student of change,
even, moreso than .the preceding epoch*

The death throes of

medieval social organization .-were practically complete, .and
.the beginnings of vernacular literature, nationalistic feel
ings, on. the parts of many societal members, and growing
general intolerance for- -anything unconventional (particular
ly within the formalized supernatural system), brought an
avalanche of change to Europe*
But more startling than the bloody exchanges
between national armies was the unforeseen expansion of
.minds and-purses resulting from trade and consciousness-

expansion imported by the Crusaders, from Byzantine and
Islamic sources* -The 'entrepreneur of the -18th and 19th
centuries:has been.immortalized in social history, song
and scholarship, but their 14th century precursors, bent on
individual accumulation through daring and invention are
'equally important’
, simultaneously shocking and delighting
differexit segments of their society*

The innovators held

.center-stage, if not with the clergy, then with the common
people as well as with many lords, who began leaning heavily
.uponItalian, French, Hanseatie and English merchant capital
finance their wars and public works®

Men like Tiedemann

Limburg, Nicholas Bartholomew of Lucca, 'Sir Richard
fftitbington, and -the best known of all, Jacques Goeur, began
,:to give the clergy and the royalty -alike reason to fear and
Sctaire the quickly entrenched Third Estate (78).

These men

A d - their -peers began to exercise- such power that by the
mid^14th century, they clamored for representation in govern
mental operations, and with the failure of the Hundred Years
War to resolve itself, they succeeded in establishing institu
tionalized statuses for themselves in every.major country (79
It is to be emphasized that these men worked with feverish
self-imposed regimen.

The ideological support of the time

they did not have; in fact, like all innovators, they had to
operate sub rosa much of the time, being not only the origin
ators of various techniques in trading, navigation, banking,
'coinage and so on, but also their own advocates in the face
of suspicious and counterinsurgent mentalities in both the

First and Second. Estates.

They had the opportunity, the

courage,, and after some wrangling, the means for opening up
trade between East and West, the Baltic and the Adriatic,
and for the most part had to rely for moral and intellectual
reward upon themselves. . Althoxigh this kind of independent
alteration, of social reality-is.not .unique, there had probably
not been an instance of such great import for succeeding
generations.as in the case of the merchants and bankers of
■the early modern period*

Their capital!., created urban centers,

,said*.as is well-known, everything Western. good end bad, was
born in the ever-growing metropolis.
igKi.-.

On the other end of the change continuum, - collective
in. its most rudimentary form also flourished.

In

Sici3.y, France, England, the Netherlands and elsewhere,
.popular, revolts wrought murderous havoc upon recalcitrant
arbitrary lords-.

The Sicilian Vespers (from which we have

word:-"mafia") was the most spontaneous and brutal, with
the-massacre of the occupying French, but other- attempts by
the 'lower class to .rectify and soften their wretched condition
were longer in coming, and more difficult to subdue.

The

invaluable distinction between revolution and revolt was at
this time unknown, for the first of the great democratic
revolutions, with armies, fully developed ideologies, recognis
ed leaders and so on, were far off.

The peasant revolts were

tragic lunges by the dispossessed, -futily trying to construct
the social world more equitably, but certain to fail because
of the-.-technology and social organisation -of the. time.

Repression or. the simple dwindling of energy and supplies
invariably ended the libertarian- activities (80).

The

notion that purposive change as possible and worthy .finally
reached the masses, in the 18th century is only partially
correct®

The great revolutionists from Cromwell to Lenin

shared with the .early peasants 'and their spur-of-the-moment
leaders' the conviction that reality as given required
rearrangement .(.very often in a regressive direction).

'What

the peasants did not have was the ability to construct-or
reconstruct a new-social fabric, only to destroy the noxious
elements wholly, like children confronted with an unsolvable
pfezle.

But as Engels noted (81), the sheer-fanatical seal

<3$#later■plebian revolutionaries was fore shadowed clearly in
-the suicidal battering -of social structure performed in this
era-by the untutored masses®*
■

By the middle of the 15th century, the world was

.dfenging at a rate which must have seemed to many as absolute
ly "unGodly”, which it was.

The Papacy was a power, bankers

ruled the' fortunes of more noblemen than vice versa, the
working, class grew and developed appropriate sentiments (in
some instances capable of being termed a distinct "class
consciousness”), and the first- series of large-scale, monar^
chic'ally inspired national wars began in efforts to enlarge
*As is often noted, the Black Death beginning in 1348, killed
one-third.of Europe’s population, and this put a premium-on
the value of individuals, if for no more enlightened reason
than the need of laborers-; thus, the further growth of indivi
dualism and its inevitable correlate, rationality.

treasuries and gain general esteem*

And of course, the

renaissance was on, the ref citation around the bend.

However,

in keeping with my focus thus far, I will skirt the well-trod
ground of theological-intellectual history in favor of econo
mic and social, change, 'disregarding the. endless arguments- of
causation:

do ideas cause behavior, or reflect behavioral

definition?

I see in -this period the minds of Fuggers and

Medici fascinated far more by temporal calculation and inven
tion than religious insights or aesthetic achievement.

As

matter of fact, the more artistically inclined the Medici
^became, the poorer 'were their returns on the European market.
•
-*
•

The impetus for mercantile and consequently social

.^development shifted from the Mediterranean to the North Sea.
Antwerp -became the banking center of Europe, and economic
delations were already so interdependent that a delayed
figalleon arriving in Lisbon (the receiving port from the East)
paused, banks to fail in Germany (82).

To add to the modern

flavor of the era, prices began climbing as gold and silver
reached Spain and Portugal in huge quantities, while wages
for many remained fixed as relics of feudal agreements.
(Tawney documents this phenomenon along with other problems
in, his The Agrarian Problem of the 18th Century.)

There is

speculation that inflation was also a work of manipulation
by the gold-hoarding Spanish government, but the debate is
unresolved (83)*

Meanwhile, technological and navigational

innovations of the Portuguese brought misery to Arab middle
men who for years had exacted gigantic taxes and carrying

charges (often over 50$) on the exotic imports from India
and China.
However, "speetaculax' as were the changes caused
in the ‘long run by the enlargement of the scope of commerce,
it must be emphasised that the discovery of America and the
sea route to the Indies did not all at once revolutionize
the economic organization of Europe" (84-).
the type goods being imported:

This was due to

only the finest and most

expensive luxuries, spices and .jewels, to name the most
#popular. - Although the upper class clamored for increasing
bussitities,- for the common 16th century participant in
ecfaomic relations, changes were slow and indirect.

But

because of the great distance between exorbitant prices and
fixed wages,"’many of the-bourgeois merchants had the oppor
tunity to amass wealth, and this capital created the search
fap'investment possibilities of all types*

Hunger for the

new"and profitable in whatever form was fed by innumerable
mechanical devices and innovations! techniques, especially
in.'"money and banking" and related industrial areas®

This

is a prime example of the sociological truism that "both/and
explains more accurately than "either/or" when considering
cultural change.

"Beth" cultural milieu, social forces, etc

"and" the presence of independent, untrained and noninstitu
tionalized innovative talent assured the birth of industrial
ism during the early 16th century.
The figures concerning industrial growth are stag
gering.

Thanks to Gutenberg, the production of books repre-

sented the first mass production item, and silk, alum mining,
ship-building in Venice, among others, followed quickly as
factory-based capitalist ventures (85).

Strikes among

"unionized" journeymen'began almost immediately (86), in
response to conservative tactics of masters clinging to the
dying guild idea of limited membership and the correlate,
high prices for goods.

As an example of the maddening rush

for factory production, Louis XI in 14-66 imported 16 Italian
silk masters and set them up in Lyons,

The city boux'geoisie

^protested because of preferred treatment given the workers
and also out of provincial distrust of foreigners.

After

’being moved to Tours four years later, the business began
to explode, and by 1^00, more than 800 masters and 4-000
workers produced r.silk for the French nobility in order to
keep the King’s gold within the borders of France and not
in Italy as had been the case before (87).
these numbers doubled.

By mid-century,

The same magnitude of operations

obtained in Papal alum mines near Vclterra to name but one
of the many other European "manu-factories”.
Naturally, with industry of this tr/pe came the
urban proletariat,1powerful high-finance tactics, attempted
monopolies and cartels, and most of the other incursions
into medievalism which have become "natural” in our day.
But it is wise to cite still more statistics:

out of the

70 million European inhabitants in 1500, only 2 or $ million
labored in capitalist enterprises, and less than a third of
these -worked in factories, the rest in crafts or home-based
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piece work.

What did occur however, in spite of the figures,

was the birth of a new kind of human, the industrial prole
tariat, whose life in every-way differed, in major qualita
tive terms, from the lives of anyone who preceded them.

And

this small, cancerous cell of antimedievalism was the joint
product of innovating talent in enterprising merchants,
bankers, visionary lords, and not least of all, those whose
.genius made mass production possible.

There is absolutely

no evidence to suggest that nebulous social forces or
* "'-Zeitgeist or Mind coerced or even aided in any way those
relatively few individuals* from whose hands came the
1 ^thousands of technological and organizational changes that
./%rOuld inexorably finalize the death of medieval social
structure, and begin the move Maine has described, from
/ ‘'status to contract.

There is no period so crucial to an

|•Understanding of what followed than this period, the renais
sance of not only intellectual and antidogmabic fireworks,
but the small and barely sustained maneuvers of the few to
make changes in centuries-old traditions, or even more
difficult, to formulate and institute entirely new procedures
*”X tended to think of history run. by impersonal forces. But
when you see it in practice you see the differences that the
personalities make15, could have been the words of a Medici,
Pugger, Chigi or Welser (bankers), of kings, lords, merchants
or traders, all of the 16th century; they were spoken by
Henry Kissinger -in January, 1974*. If one substitutes for
"personalities'1 the phrase "innovative actions and thoughts
of specific people", my position is c&psulized. (Time, Feb.
4-, 1 9 7 V p. 24-*')

aimed at unorthodox ends.
A note contra economic.determinism: all the evidence
points to the royalty and nobility
makers of the period,

being the actual decision

and the existence of a strangely impotent

wealthy class of financial leaders*

.Apparently the jump from

successful businessman to power-wielder was still beyond the
-conceptual limits of even the most

ambitious money-lender.

Jacques Goeur and the

collapsed at the hands of

Fuggersboth

dynastic monarchs, who without their funds could not have
amassed sufficient power to end their benefactors* enterprises!
tJBut this situation was soon to change when revised ideas
Regarding self, the stats, and God began permeating the manip
u l a t e d bourgeoisie.
'i

•

As previously stated, the 16th century generally was

^autime of monumental increase, in population (88), total
i|4Wealth (89), industry, trade, and size of the known world,
Emigration within and very soon outside of Europe, and so on.
And, as ••'traditional history teaches, the reformation was also
a logical philosophic and religious outgrowth of renaissance
secularism.

Luther is in most estimates considered not only

a*"great man”:but also an innovator of the first rank.

With

his "discovery11 that salvation need not be earned through the
application of .sacraments performed by a priest, the selfconceptions of the masses altered radically.

As the notable,

still respected Preserved. Smith put it,
Columbus burst the bounds of the world, Copernicus those
of the universe; Luther only broke his vows. But...the
repudiation of religious•vows was the hardest to d.o at
the time, a feat infinitely more impressive to the masses

than either of the former* (90)**. That the Reformation
strengthened the state was inevitable, for there was no
practical alternative to putting the final authority
in spiritual matters, after the pope had been ejected,
into the hands of civil government. Congregationalism
was tried and failed as tending to anarchy. (91)
No matter, what motivation is attributed to Luther and
Calvin in their world-changing activities, the fact remains
that .^nothing could have pleased the bankers and industrialists
more than the demoting of the.Papacy and a concurrent boost
for;individual!sm and the work ethic.
for Community*)

(Cf. Nisbet* s Quest

However, the speedy growth of -monarchy and

^nationalism proved that reformation sentiment was a mixed
tblessing*

The Pone had been much less vigilant about mercan-

r^ile activities i n .the most creative, ruthless, accumulating
practitioners than the civil governments were to become.

It

■is,,,easy to -picture an early 16th century "liberal” trader in
i./hls old age blaspheming Luther and the development of states,
^because of a rise in the sin of sins, the "death of initiative
and individua1i sm".
Prom this point forward in the history of Western social
change a subtle blend of individual and collective action is
noticeable, but not like the Peasant Rebellions two hundred
years earlier.

The difference lies in effectiveness, and with

the growing secularism destroying Papal Europe, all of the
same cloth, with the growth of life’s variety, industry,
urbanisation and numerous other indicators, the value of the
individual skyrocketed -•formally expressed as humanism,
coupled with and mutually supportive of capitalism.

The brief period between 1610 and 1660 is--known as
both the baroque era and the "age of giants”, alleged by more
than a few historians to be the two most fruitful and excit
ing generations of European history (92).

Whether or not

this enthusiasm is shared, there is little doubt that
Spinoza, Hilton, James X, Charles I, Cromwell, Hobbes and
other of like stature gave a fresh, though often conflicting
tone to an era which saw the irrevocable climax to the drama
of vinedievel dissolution, a phenomenon which began several
centuries before.

With the crumbling of all feudal restraint,

(.the state by 1660 had become sufficiently reified in common
•"thought! that discussions of its "possibility", held in earnest
w x the beginning of the century, seemed very dated.

Although*

the liberation of intellectual leaders and artistic develop
ments of the era receive more emphasis by historians than the
dtiPe'of*the commoners, there is much evidence which illustrate
„the growing pride of urbanised masses, flaunting ties with the
church or the nobles, and turning instead to the state for
authority and reward.

The very word "statistics" comes from

Italy during the 16th century,, when.it became necessary to
tabulate such data, both for taxation and out of general
curiosity about population .growth (95)*

The -spectacular rise

of vernacular literature, from popular drama to penny narra
tives and the Newgate Calendar records, demonstrates the degree
to which commoners partook of "modem" culture and its many
outlets,* relative to feudal society, for learning and enter-

-However, Europe at the time was still predominant!
nonurbanized (9^)* and forces behind changing attitudes and
behavior originate, of course, in the cities.

Only 13 or 14-

cities had over 100,000 people, the trading centers still
walled in .from...medieval days, the capitals beginning the
familiar urban, sprawl.

A truly "metropolitan economy", in

1610 barely noticeable, had by 1660 become recognised as an
important,, advancing .mode, of financial development*

Along

with other outcomes of this period, the capitals began for
, the first time to outdistance trading centers in size and
Importance, a function of the growing significance of central
ilteiaged political and economic activities (95)•
Patterns which are familiar, today originated in ih
-time., the .joint-stock companies, trade wax's between nations,
;#&re-devil expeditions with solely mercantile ends, and most
rspgportant, the new and apparently permanent bonds between
Companies and state military organisation were forged.

No

more was one merchant vying with others in the marketplace;
now the finances, prestige and finally, the military might
of royalty stood behind the buccaneers.

Drake's rape of

Spanish shipping in the preceding century was the -adventure

o f a single man. but similar encounters 30 years later a
wholly new situation:

the English government and its rogues

pillaging goods of the Spanish king.

In these terms it was

difficult to avoid the growth of national sentiment in the
populace since the state proved to be the most exciting,
honored and fruitful benefactor thus far in European history.

The innovators had t o m from the -middle ages a social
structure dependent upon fealty and trust, man to man, and
with their intellectual advances, merchant ventures and
industrial inventions, they had perpetrated the formation of
central governments with developed bureaucracies•
Three countries, each developing vastly differing
©odes of social organization, dominate histories-of -the 17th
century •- France, England and Holland..

The rest of Europe

. was either in eclipse (Spain and Italy) or in more primitive
v* frtages of coalescing (the East).

The study of this period

^provides for the modern sociologist .an exercise in revaluan ti on.

The absolutism of Louis and William both served the

»interests of their countries superbly Xlouis so much so that
"VFrance under him ^became the most powerful nation of Europe,
gland the first truly modern one); religious sentiments (in no
i l « y attached to economic or other secular incentives) were
$"&o virulently alive that Germany was devastated during the
- Thirty Years War and its opponents1 treasuries were emptied
in the conflict, a war in which m o d e m scrutiny has all the
leaders "doing the' wrong things", i.e., operating nonrationally; modern science and the discoveries of those luminaries
who motivated Whitehead to label the period "The Century of
Genius" (96)* had almost no effect upon everyday life.
(Newton, the undisputed genius cf them all, was absolutely
unconcerned about practical applications of his insights, and
only in the early 18th century were the implications of his
formulations appreciated widely.)

To put it succinctly,
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this-century constitutes the birth of the modern'era.

With

the exception of some obvious technological advances, the
Europe of 1700 displayed all the elements of society that
had come to typify the West--two centuries later.

But the

incredible variety of the period, both in terms of cultural
diversity and intellectual confusion makes problematic any
.effort at brief characterization.

The century- of -Newton

also saw Pascal, Milton, and Locke (each of differing impact
upon their contemporaries)% the birth of science and scientism
sharedv,the period with merciless discrimination against
herfetics and Dissenters (revocation of the Edict of Nantes,
etcvi^ and the high point of blind faith in ahsolutisticmohMrchs; radically innovative literature and popular thought
(whether in Shakespeare or the Levellers) in 1600 had by the
cl'fifee-. of the century degenerated into highly -formalized-,
tedi'Ous patronage of the powers that be (Racine, Corneille,
etc*-); and most astonishing, as late as 1683, c5.vilisati.on in
the West was threatened by an overwhelming Turkish invasion
(200,000 strong) attacking-Vienna, the unified response to
which has been labeled the "first" world war.

The transitions

in every field of human endeavor1 stand out as amplifications
and logical extensions of those in both later medieval, and
the 16th century ronaissance-reformation era.

Tawney informs

us that life for the common man changed relatively little
between 1485 and 1640 in England (97) - in spite of the
enclosure controversy and related dilemmas growing out of an
agricultural economy changing from subsistence to commercial

scale.

But with technological advance (inter alia, the tele

scope, microscope, thermometer, barometer, pendulum clock,
air pump (93) ) and the new-born fetish for measurement;
with such ambivalent personalities as Lord Pra?Lse-G©d' Barebone
(99) trying to rationalize -Cromwell's Prot ect orat e over
Britain, thereby offering into history a unique British
construct: the loyal opposition; with feudal remnants all
around and modern genius refusing to allow time to stand still,
life became so relativized and under-structured for many as
to make 18th century absolutism a "logical" outcome*
>/

Holland was peculiar insofar as her hardy and unre-

,*p|rrained bourgeoisie lived with the protection of governu^nially-assured freedom to a degree otherwise unheard of at
fthis-time.

The most limited knowledge of painting in the

pe r i o d tells the tale:

court portraits and religious motifs

'0X&France and Spain, as opposed to the matchless bourgeois^inspired realism of Rembrandt (1606-1669) and many lesser
men in Amsterdam.

The burghers’ hard-headed acquisitiveness

continued unabated, which directly or indirectly assured a
degree of popular freedom and democratic achievement unparalleled
in Europe,* and not emulated until the founding of this country.
(The unG-odly behavior of these merchant folk so infuriated
the more pious Spanish that in 1563, the entire "heretical"
-population-of the Netherlands was condemned to death by
Philip II (100).)

But, alas, with only 2 million people,

the tendencies of the Butch did not effect a sea change in
.governmental- and civil rights practices throughout the continent.
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At this point it becomes necessary to review in brier
the place of £he innovator in what had become an aver
plexing”, persistently enriched cultural milieu.*

As I stated

'in the''beginning of this section* innovations! activities
have met with varying degrees of success in the distinguish
able epochs-, of -.Western., history, although their unorthodox
quality has met wi t h 'less automatic disapproval here than
in the East.

We remember that the individuals who reshaped

Europe between 400 and 1000 worked against intolerably poor
|pdds* and only with the growth of the Church in the 11th
|p$ntury did -civilisation in Europe find a. stalwart and
:j^emanent influence regarding its survival.

In the 1Jth and

.j^th ‘
centuries,?* apparently no-one stood to have lasting
Igfcfifluehce.

Incessant wars and the Crusades plus the Black

4pfath and gross insecurity among most societal members, make
:1$hose- few innovators who did produce--significant-change seem
uncommonly lucky.
However', as every schoolboy once knew, what made
renaissance man different from the medieval mold was the
.astoundingly high* opinion he. held of himself.

This courage

,to institute alterations in all levels of existence - which
later reached epidemic proportions - boosted Luther and
fi'iends into revaluating the place of a staid'Church in the
spiritual (and consequently, secular) lives of men.

The

ideology of the reformation■produced -high levels of literacy
so:necessary, -to ••later'developments in history, •-along, with

sundry other' monstrously important changes, all of which
were of course outside Luther’s purview.

Subsequent victories

for the individual were less sweet, for the birth of personal
rationalism and the scientific.'method came hand, in hand with
increasingly depersonalised governments, so that as Fromm- —
(perhaps exaggerating) noted, man in the medieval "felt
himself secure and safe"(101), and the birth of nation states
and intense bureaucratization minus feudal.obligations created
general malaise.

Again the individual innovator tread sensi

tive soil when propounding the new:

Galileo was forced to

%xsetract his findings, "Lutherans hounded the pious Kepler,
'fetlvi.ni.sts
exiled Gxotius, "Jews excommunicated Spinoza,
■hi"
■iteglicans silenced Hobbes and burned his books, Jesuits got
• the works of Descartes put on the Index" (102).
Ti§p ;,t

With the beginning of the 18th century, the aberrant

Creative soul began to find himself once again in workable
Surroundings, after a tenuous century and. a half of arbitrary
response from the powerful, religious, and small-minded - in
many cases one in the same.

The history of the democratic

revolutions and.the results of those mass *movements in the
1,9th century are. common enough: that I will not enumerate
details, even to the slight degree I have done so thus far.
What needs to be mentioned, in reference to developments over
the following 250 years: are several broad trends, each of
which affected innovative talent thoroughly.
Our knowledge of the past three centuries is in most
instances copious, especially when compared to the eras just.

surveyed.

The history of invention alone occupies many

volumes, even excluding the cataract of achievements in
this century.

But as mentioned before, technological inno

vation came into its own as a prized and laudable activity
shortly after the "Century'df"'Genius",'"’
'add' 'hehcefofth^has
met with .far more acceptance than earlier innovators would
have thought possible*

Our attention thex*efore shifts (and

in this we differ somewhat from LaPiere1s fascination with
material improvements) to ideological and (especially) organ
izational innovation.
The. English Puritans and their spiritual allies, the
^Hissenters and related free-thinking religious groups hit
^Igpon the then shocking conception of life as purposively
■ improveable, and not necessarily dictated by royalty.

When

liCharles
I lost his head
in 1649, the first utterly
secular
'........ .
.■ v

‘r

'^Igbvernment.went into, rocky operation for slightly more than
Jgsl&ecade, protesting all the while its Godfearing intentions
But .when Cromwell died and the Restoration came* the newer
line of monarchy realized, that levels of expectation among
the people (for the time being most catered to in the nobility%
01ity /
were such that pigheaded absolutism was no longer a healthy
practice.

The line of Georges, famed for their ineptitude

and lack of tact, were all;.the British needed to begin
utilising, almost-by chance, the services of a Prime Minister
and cabinet.

In France the excesses of Louis XIV had begun

to wear upon the patience of both the merchants and noble
butterflies, compelled to spend -lavishly in their court'

existences, so that his death marked the beginning and the
end of his inimitable style.

Changes in values forced the

ruling powers, whether the King, Parliament, clergy or nobility,
to continuously offer demonstrable proof to their subjects
that their authority,was legitimate.

This concern with mass

approval (15consensus formation.”)? if even at first of a
nominal variety, was something- antithetical to the teaching
of Louis XIV.and his able ministers, and while England had
never suffered under such bombastic absolutism, even for
.Elizabeth, the concept of "accountability" would have been
repugnant.

Whether or not one agrees with. Weber and many

othfes that ideas are capable of propelling individuals to
social action, or adheres to the opposing Marxist-Mannheim
understanding of ideological justifications, this fact is
clear, without establishing causality:

by the beginning of

the!&H;Bth century, the bourgeoisie in all countries (except
Spain), .the --increasingly literate masses of both the urban
proletariat and peasant class, and many of the nobles whose
fortunes languished because of outmoded restraints on their
activities, all conceived of the monarch and the central
government in increasingly rational terms.

Newton*s formula

tions, which to him seemed irrelevant to larger issues, had
begun the usual process of filtering down to mundane levels,
to such an extent that Voltaire as spokesman of rationality
enjoyed a readership in the hundreds of thousands, beginning
in 1733 with his outrageous Letters on the English.

The

people,-not only the idle rich, found time to read and idolise

the author of Candida, and his influence on_popular issues often religious or political - reached a height unknown to
any other writert past or present, \*4th the qualified excep
tion of Mao.

He produced 15,000 words per day at times and

his hyper-rationalism, free of any shred of doubt about the
possibility of men shaping their existences, has thoroughly
permeated the ■.-French-to-this day, not to mention the rest
of the Western ’'democracies".
History from this point is neatly divided into major
conflicts, either between nations or between classes or
‘interests within individual countries (external vs. internal
ways).

The politically dormant but intellectually bright

period of the first 'half of the 18th century, as we all know,
finally culminated in the most innovative of all collective
behavior, the violent overthrow of a government too slow in
recognizing the liabilities inseparably linked.with feudal
Vteltanschauungen.

She study of the French devolution alone

tells one a great deal about the dynamics of this style change.
First, there must be urban centers filled with semi- or non
literate, manipulable, disenfranchised masses, whose patience
with piecemeal reform has been exhausted and who have suddenly
felt the agony of yet another setback to improving-.their lives.
Secondly, there must exist intellectual leaders and spokesmen
of the masses, who almost invariably originate in the bour
geoisie, and whose movement and speech are for whatever reasons
permitted by the incumbent rulers.

Finally, there must obtain

an incredibly obtuse governmental bureaucracy or oligarchy
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whose skills and resources in both co-optation or oppression
are unequal to the task of any longer containing the wrath
the collective, and whose claims to legitimacy have time
and again been shown to be unfounded.

Only 'with these con

ditions as a minimum can the large-scale (or inclusive)
political revolution (as opposed to palace coups, etc.) meet
with success.

As is well known, the vast majority of revol

utions have failed even in an attempt to gain control, to
say nothing of' their ideologically utopian goals for recti, fying wrongs of the society.

No matter whose analytical

framework one uses in assessing the etiology or lasting effects
y 'Of revolutions, whether Brinton, Lyfcrd Edwards, Leo Gott1 -schalk, Davies- Gurr, or Eckstein (103), inter alia, for the'
? typical societal- member, the chances are good that immediate
f- benefits from upheavals will net be in the offing.

Collective

social change of the revolutionary -sort "devours its own
children", and in its efforts to fully institutionalise its
"challenge ideology", no-one is safe from arbitrary repression.
The enormous literature on revolution attests to at least
this much.
After Napolean9s demise, Europe9s leaders (particularly
Castlereagh and Mettemick) were very quick in talcing steps
to prevent another Bastille (104). -Counter-revolutionary
tactics of every nature were employed all over Europe between
Waterloo and the general *continental revolutions of 184-8, the
most wide-spread and glorious of failures in collective action.
An anomalous situation prevailed :

on the one. hand there was

118

an almost universal disgust and fear over the -wanton destruc
tion during the -later stages of the French Revolutions on the
ether, factions from different strata of the social structure
and for diverse -reasons were strident in their'support for
liberalism and-the ".sensibility4' of gradual eradication of
social ills.

Out of this dizziness, bastard ideologies

grew* romanticism, method!sm, and pietism (105) sill gaining;
large supportf along -with a generalized reactionary mood in
favor of royal restoration.

But the dialectic of European

.modernization see-sav/ed with ©mazing speed between extremes,
..and by 1830 revolutions again shook Europe, for much the
tetisame .reasons that the late 18th. century American and French
&: ^internal wars" had come about.

However, because of the

strength of the. still viable aristocraticolandowners and
!?'•father reactionary elements (particularly in Britain), these
i&g^phe&v&ls of the.mid-revolutionary period met with failure.
§r:(‘
0ne histoid.an has claimed that the only difference between
the 1830 and. 1848 revolutions was this lingering ability of
the conservative ^elements to fight back (106).)
By this time the liberal humanitarian doctrine had
gained such a following (and concurrently, radically-inspired
bloodshed-of earlier-years was still repugnant) that members
of the ruling classes began piecemeal reforms which were the
precursor to the m o d e m art of co-optation, in draining off
from the revolutionary factions both leadership and popular
support (10?)*

At this point and for the next century and a

..quarter, somehow the notion entered the minds of leaders and
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r followers alike that French-style revolution had become a
no-win genie, or"at best, one of diminishing returns.

Political

organization on the part of rulers grew much tighter and
their techniques of coercion and repression advanced in
sophistication geometrically while social improvements for
the disenfranchised lumbered along the gradtialist route.
Nevertheless, a new- mode of change became necessary.
a

r

The enormous growth of urban centers and the expansion

o f 5Cormnunication (for example, the repeated attempts to esta* bli^h ill England a radical, working-class newspaper between
BIO and 1850, rrnaliy c u l m m a t m g m

cneap Sunday papers

,
'flt4>ound 164-0 (108) .), along with the. ever increasing interest
:socio-economic '.matters among the traditionally dormant
lt>wei* classes, gave rise ter the social movement (or segmented
devolution), the tool of the collectivity for social change;.:,
illfetb ’o u t own day;

The prerequisites for successful social

^■inovat-ion of this type are several':

(1) a high level, of

general, frustration and dissatisfaction, but of such a mature
that the potential participants recognize the (Mills *) con
nection between personal problems and: public issues; (2) this
frustration must become focalized - pure anomic despondency
has been in evidence throughout history, but social movements
have not; (3) urban concentration of a literate and politicized
mass; (4) at least a rudimentary understanding of secondary
behavior,"-the most essential move from Gemeinschaft- to
Gese31schaft-thinking-, necessary to an acceptance of complex,
organization;- (5) rapid and efficient mass communication

Q r\
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•(certainly ...one ,of the handicaps, of the earliest attempts at
such organization was the lack of telecommunications); (6)
the .capacity to create a separate definition of social, reality
'and. put of this, .a. hypothetically re arranged, social.:organiz.a-'
tion; '(7) the early' emergence of strong leadership*

The real

key however, as mentioned before, is also the reluctance of
the. conservative interests to. utilize brute-repression, (the
predominance of "foxes"), the use of which would doom any
, social laovement in its infancy.

(This formulation is a.

composite of the findings of Hadley Cantril, Hans Toch,
forinton and other well-known interpreters of collective
^political action..)
t

Even if the social movement can. formulate an appealing .

“"challenge ideology’1 - as opposed to the institutionalised
^ideology *(oi? simply, "institution")., of .'the status, quo - it
f
a multitude of organizational problems. The mortality
r.vv' 1

^ate, for movements is extremely high, as it proceeds through
each- of the four basic stages: social unrest, popular stage,
stage of formalisation, and institutionalization.

Without

going into detail, a few remarks may be in order regarding
each of. these stages (again, drawn from prominent theorists).
Most movements fail -to emerge from the first stage of social
unrest., since one or more of the prerequisites listed above
are not in evidence*.
The popular stage is characterized by the focalization
of general distaste for the status quo, very often through
the "discovery" •- by the emergent leadership - of a scapegoat.

A martyr at this point is...almost essential in order to g a m e r
support -among the uncommitted, but -interested, masses.

(The

powers that be if of any sophistication will naturally do
everything possible to avoid, creation of martyrs, and will.
go so far as to disallow the opposition to fabricate one a tactic not ..unknown to enterprising movement leaders. )

The

infighting will become extremely heated and through something
Of a P&rwiLnisn selection process, the most adept will I'ise

’ t o “the top-and immediately begin pamphleteering, beginning
.dissemination of "The Word", usually in'capsulized slogans.
'leaders make certain that the impression is left with
lithe';.followers of. overwhelming external -popular, support for..
Itteir caus'e(s)*

Rostering' begins and the "historical i m d n -

; ©ibility" of the movement is proclaimed.

Coinciding with

tsthese aggressive moves, the establishment-is provoked, info
■^ohfrout ati on.

An initial defeat usually ends the future

'the-movement, either due to leadership loss, or because
-*(as Bismarck did with such skill) the ideological position
of the challengers is neatly included in the program of the
■ dominant interests.

If the actual aims cf the movement are

purely ideological (as the anti-war movement of the 609s
apparently was), then eradication of the issue dissolves the
^movement; -but often radicals -in- search of -a-,cause -merely
gravitate to another of the (many) possible areas which
x*equire rectification.

The movement, during the formalisation- stage has airead
been more successful than- most, and its'- ideological line
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changes, from ..the inclusive,... .all-encompassing demands, which/
typify revolutions, to the. more tractable segmental defini
tion?

change, of one particular social evil or institution*

The choice of this stolid institution is a -delicate one and
not' always'so simple as one might think, f or if 'the' "institu
tion is a paper tiger and insufficient moral indignation is
aroused by. its obtuseness, then the movement •will founder
for lack of .a detestable enemy*
under--consideration:

Additional factors come

for instance, high social mobility or

~ simple geographic mobility are both bad for any movement®
. Captive audiences tied to distasteful statuses and locations
j.

—

the best movement personnel - which is one-of .the -reasons
or the poor -organizational qualities displayed by the student
activists of the last decade*

Also in the minds of the

ml-eaders is the necessity to reformulate.the movement line
more absolutistic, personalized and simple terms so that
j^&omplex problems can be relegated to easy solutions.

Large

r.f and-nonpersonalizable- evils (e.g. population problems) are
nearly impossible to use as bases for movement activity.
At this point too those intellectuals and others with nonstandardized...information become disenchanted with the sim
plistic panaceas offered by the: leaders, and defect.

An

officially prescribed ideology is. formulated, along with a
- multitude .of.-procedural. ..regulations pertaining to the, move
ment member's, referred to by. this time ..as the "elect"•

Goals

are made specific and time-tables set.
The leader of the formalized movement rail have about

him tv/c types of assistants, the 'philosophers--of the move
ment and the-'instrumental lieutenants.- Belov; these are the
regional and cell leaders, who are trained in the art of'
managing--mass demonstrations.

They do this in such a way .

as to completely avoid the possibility of members conversing,
seminar style, so they might not discover (to their amaze
ment! ) that their supposedly shared goals and values are not
so, homogeneous as the leadership would like them to believe*
An assumption of tremendous camaraderie is allowed to build
uptamong the membership, and the meetings of members take on
carnival, good-time- atmosphere, utterly foreign to the
fi^ktreme rationality going on in the small leadership •
.enclaves

-Mi

One of the leaders9 major concerns is of course funds, with
. which they purchase regalia helpful in creating consensusformation among the. members, plus other obvious expenses,
JptipkL without which the entire operation collapses.
. jL subtle shift begins within the ranks.

Those fiery,

? effusive types for whom the movement in its infancy was an
emotional., outlet give way to more bureaucratic souls, railing
to take orders and whose intellectual-emotional commitment
to the movement is 4of a more predictable sort.

The mainten

ance of cell conformity across the board is essential,
otherwise factional strife rail sap the movement of its
combative strength.. Therefore discipline must be maintained,
and to do so, some fratricidal techniques are employed.
Finally, the movement will meet with success and
-gain.the changes as originally conceived, or modified:-'along.
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•the way, thereby, reaching institutionalisation;.or it- will
meet the established order in. fins:! confrontation and be
crushed.
In order to appreciate adequately the impossibility
of another '"classical" social movement taking place in this
country or in parts of Europe, the-.-individual- -personalityof the cell -participant requires examination.

Even in the

days of a relative abundance of social movements, leaders ..
(who" typically, are extremely intelligent and capable men,
.1‘not ..the.
-raving lunatics portrayed popularly) had a devilish

•titime maintaining internal cohesion within the movement,
•^specially as.it grew.

Those, who. participate in-the cells

constantly reminded of their-ingroupness, ethnocentrism
and general rightness in the ways of the world.

The member

;$9ust buy-the national or regional ideology at the. cell level,
1&©-n&t must become at once highly personalized, but general:
viiie*,. simple and sloppily applicable.

As Cantril put it,

# the cell is the, "microcosmic element of the movement", and
, the internal discipline and social control - usually through
peer»px*essure - is rewarded with heavy emotional payoffs as
to being "in the 'know" and correctly aligned -rath- ultimate s.
In brief, the "true•believer" is as much at home in the cell
meeting as he would be in prayer meeting*
It is at once obvious that the marginally informed,’
or more ably phrased, the "selectively informed" individuals
who fill the rosters must adhere in. thought and action to
definitions .of reality (at least -regarding those,-segments.

da six with by the -movement-) anchored -in"-ab solute s. -Social movements do not traffic in moral and intellectual gray
.areas.

T he’remarks of the leaders are in keeping'with

strong value positions on every issue or possible issue
(something Nixon does naturally) in an effort to avoid
dealing with the specific and controversial:
pf slightly progra:mmatic abstract, sentiments.

the mouthing
The point

of my thesis then is largely concerned with the degree to
which a leader (who must be simultaneously "one of us" and
/"above it all") can elicit from his personnel unthinking
solutistic behavior; -and, cornel atively, how much the modern
;^peiitality-‘will accept -prefabricated,:., highly, subjechivisbic
•%and empirically-' inaccurate' assessments ’of reality.
The last real social movement in this country was
:;i$KingVs civil rights movement.'- A man of 'great-intelligence
Ife,and consummate organizational skills, even he finally failed
cf £long rbefore his death) to knit together a thoroughly effect
ive collective mode of social change.

To begin with, the

opposition had, at least at the outset, everything going its
way:

the laws, moral sentiments of the populace, social

* control agencies, ,etc.

But even more problematic than -Kingf-s

enemies were some of his allies, the white intellectual
spokesmen who worked f o r .understanding:' on the part of middle
America.

In order to retain their aid (which certainly

effected change, in the. same, --way Victorian female crusaders
aided in the-reeducation of patrician England vis a vis the.
poor) King had to concur, with their intellectual notions of

equality.

But in order-to simultaneously retain his black

followers* zeal and self-sacrifice, he was forced to assume
the ministerial-posture of simplistic emotionalism*

Towards

the end of his work he faced- more and more the accusation of
absolutists (on both sides):

"two-faced", which of course

he was out of plan and necessity.*
■♦Closely related to these observations about the "last real
•social -movement in the U.S." are current speculations about
the situation of blacte today and what, if anything, they are
doing en masse * To answer this, I attended recently a
'brilliant sermon-lecture by the acknowledged "leader*1 of
/.blacks today, Jesse- Jackson, whose topic at Amherst College
'(March 6, 1974) was "Black Capitalism: Myth or Reality".
"-His'hortatory techniques were flawless and extremely reminis
cent of his mentor and patron, Martin Luther King (whose
daughter, Yolanda, was in the audience - she attends Smith
college nearby) but his ideological line was utterly different
.
-w i n brief; the civil rights movement is completely
dead :since "civil rights are a foregone conclusion". What is
needed‘now is hard work, thrift, investment, the study of
economics, control of media through ownership of outlets,
cessation*- of .*senseless consumerism by exploited blacks, an
end .to the black.bourgeoisie pseudo-African heritage cult,
-•etscj* ,
:*;J,ackson had recognised two facts which •he did not
reveal directly to the audience: (1) repression by the state
hdthen&ed. the possibility of violent black revolution, as
in the assasination of Panthers, to cite the most blatant
case. (2) The black population is too well educated and
becoming increasingly attracted to American material exis*
.tence to he sincerely attracted to a King-styled quasi
religious movement. Jacksonfs brilliance as a demogogue
-took,these-two -severe liabilities vis a vis a social move
ment and turned them to an advantage, all the while continuing
his use of movement lingo and the inextinguishable message
of black pride: "God didn’t send us over here to be the slaves
of white folk; we were sent over here to save humanity from
the foolishness and incompetence and greed and emptiness
of the white man’s practices. Only the black people can save
the system. We are chosen to be the saviors of humanity and
we- will not allow the white man to drive the car over the
cliff with his wife in the front seat, his children in the
back seat and the black folks locked- in the trunk"•
Increasingly atomistic Weltanschauungen have enveloped
the most capable blacks in the U«B* and they no longer need
.or desire pseudo-Gemeinschaft camaraderie within constraining
movement apparatus. They seek segmented lives as much as
their class peers who are white* No-one knows this better
than Jacksona

Speaking from experience* I may add to these reflec
tions some "data” concerning student political activism of
the recent past.

Many art•intelligent and eager undergraduate

had severe problems with himself and his peers when he tried
sincerely to rrgo active” and yet maintain some sense of indi
vidual intellectual and moral autonomy.

SDS meetings and the

like were exercises in unanimous frustration:

on one hand,

everyone cared very much for intellectually vigorous and
sophisticated political behavior, but on the other, were
V faced with the necessities for collective action.

-The old

sr*organisational route was immediately repellent given the
*<
1--'
i#^J.;Story of party politics in this and other' countries, but
serious substitute was discovered, thus the birth of
politics-by-antics in Rubin et al.
(Moreover, in conversation with a graduate student
fliat the University of Massachusetts visiting from Free Univerci ty;- in Berlin, the situation in Europe has taken the next
logical step.

Rather than dissolve the concept of change

through collective'-’behavior (as I suggest), the German colie, giate. population has renewed its efforts to "unlearn what it
already knows to be true”, an unenviable and probably impos
sible task.

It seems a renewed dogmatism is being foisted

upon the student body by radical leftist leaders, and recal
citrant nonbelievers in the straight Marxist formula for
modern living, paradoxically, flee to the U.S. to find less
regulated intellectual air!)
Thus in the past 600 or so years, social change through
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innovation has come full circle, from the early, damnable
merchants and bankers of the late medieval and the indepen
dent renaissance-refoxmation individualists combatting both
Church and royalty, to the successful collective change
instituted by Cromwell*s group and subsequent mass movements
of either the inclusive or segmental variety, and finally
back to the reappearance of the relatively unattached inno
vative member of post-modern culture.

I have concentrated upon political change in the last
pages.
•

To use Raymond Williams * trichotomy, "democratic”

"industrial” revolutions have both been subject to changes

itei study of them has continued relevance regarding the limits
m f social- change•on the -large scale.

More difficult to deal

-■siibh are "cultural'3 revolutions, traditionally involved with
t3$pdulations in quantity and •quality within the realm of
l^linir.

As Williams5 own work illustrates (109), the socio

logist can shape a .methodology suitable to the examination of
art (serious and pop) within social structure with much profit.
However, I would*like to expropriate his term and redefine
•"cultural revolutions to mean not only change within the
aesthetic institution, but far more broadly, to include change
in the educational, recreational, kinship and supernatural
institutions /as shaped by the innovator in ways described
above*

As mentioned earlier, the problems for innovation

within these major;structural components of post-modern culture
reside not so much in external pressures for conformity as in

the Individual inertia -socialised into societal participants
and seldom brought to the level of "critical- consciousness".
It is clear that innovative behavior within kinship relations,
for example* is relatively free from severe external threat
which of course did obtain in premodem and early modern
periods*
However, as Marxists- and the like are quick t© point
out*, the ability of people to innovate within both these
institutions and the remaining ones (economic, political* governmental, stratificational) very often hinges upon the
■f.^hility to perfect inequities and irrationalities within the
.JSiStter (e.g»' funds, power, prestige are necessary to some
of .innovation).

It is one thing to recombine existing

cultural...traits.- into*-a revised approach to religion (something
:J^hich has been done incessantly since man’s beginning), but
■^ffejmething else to independently restructure the social control
i§%£ces -already in the hands of centrally-managed •governments.
This and related arguments in favor of large-scale
"social change (or its frequent correlate, sabotageiand terror),
suffer from the illusion of' establishment size and strength
. typical of left-wing .and right-wing organizational thinking,
the product of minds bent upon magnifying the evil of their
opponents through reification in order to enhance their zeal
or sense of accomplishment (cf• Xdpset and Raab, The Politics
of Unreason).

Complex organisation is both strong and weak,

and one of the first lessons to be learned by the m o d e m
innovator when dealing with these three institutions (which

serve as the Marxists1 nemesis) is to locate the many weak
nesses and quietly begin work in those quarters.

While

emotional satisfaction may be gained by confronting armed
employees of the established order* those interested in gen
uine change are found more often (if discovered at all!)
operating through “approved” .channels* but with personallydefined subversive* rational ends.

They have discovered

that life is too short to allow the use of any other technique.
(The innovative process is of course more complex and difficult
to characterize than is apparent in the above sentences* but
-for purposes of broad distinction* it will suffice at this
fpoint'i)
i%%.

As for the “cultural revolution” as defined by scholars

?d.n the sociology; of art* knowledge and beliefs?

the changes

I n the arts over the past 300 years have very closely followed
anticipated) historical events* as closely that is as
iapf can emulate social change without becoming state-sponsored
propaganda.

But as popular!sers such as Toffler and scholars

...like Milton Albrecht* Wylie Sypher and Raymond Williams have
shown (110)* alterations within the arts have recently sped
up at an ever increasing rate* so that for instance* the
novel (first conceived in the early 18th century and only in
the last 25 years coming.under severe critical attack as
being anachronistic) lasted 250 years; entire schools of today
come and go along with their unique definitions of art in one
or two seasons.

The complete works of Balzac or Dickens or

Trollope run easily over $0 volumes and required maniacl
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dedication to produce; the complete works of our greatest
current- writers seldom exceed a half-dozen books and are
usually the product of one "stage” in his life (before he
went into film* painting or race-car-driving).

The guitar

has replaced the piano and violin as the most popular musical
instrument in the U.S.

A moderately talented soul can perform

impressively on the guitar within months; violin and piano
technique come after years* and sometimes not even then.
(3?or examples ad nauseum* see Toffler.)
" But hex*e again* and perhaps more here than in any
.other institution* individual, innovation consistently produiqgb the fresh, new and imitated.

It is intriguing to

sp#ibulate if. other institutions (those "more critical” to
the .continuance .of .the social system* to paraphrase Parsons
(I'il).) were as relatively unstructured and unbureaucratized
astfthe ;aesthetic* would the paucity of innovative productions
be* alleviated somewhat.

CHAPTER IV
PROBLEMS OP CUMURE-WIDE -INNOVATION

There are currently many innovators of the type
described here operating quietly within post-modern cultures.
But their numbers are not yet large enough to eclipse in
importance the great mass of societal members who willingly*
"unreflectively” buy the 'legitimated ideological and material
•Jgikckage offered them from earliest socialization.

Since this

tfs the case in even the most enlightened populations* in
"those sectors of the world still in primitive and neo-modern
stages* the number of innovators is probably negligible.
•however* -with the growth of education (as opposed to indocUrination) and the concomitantly sophisticated culture which
'develops in league with it* there will be more and more in&i•••■viduals* selectively rejecting those prescriptions for thought
and-behavior which, they find personally objectionable.

That

this should someday become the norm seems entirely reasonable*
unless technological advance is further shackled by capitalist
interests, and the continuing fraud of "scarcity” is forced
ad nauseum upon the consumer.

Whether this development is

only "reasonable” or also “reasonable and good” will now be
examined from a variety of positions:

from that of the

individual trying; to make the transition from societal member
to social.actor; from that of the "social system”* approached
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necessarily in slightly reified form; and fx*om this writer's
viewpoint as the product of thinking and reading over some
time on what has come to be an exciting and perplexing
•theoretical area.
The distinction I am making between the societal
member and the social actor is of enormous consequence for
the persons involved in the actual transition.

There are a

multitude of dichotomies which might be offered, by way of
illustrating this crucial series of mental and emotional
changes which precede alterations of actual behavior®

Of all

the possible antipodes, the clearest is the difference between
life of predictable- and anxietyless regularity versus an
existence which is constantly under the scrutiny of the
innovations! mind* a life of experimentation» institutional
modification and what can become a threatening amount of
-ambiguity about "selves11 in various settings.

Recently when

I taught a group of undergraduates the rudiments of the theory*
many of them balked at this point, not understanding now one
could possibly extricate himself from the "web of beliefs"
and behaviors which any culture imposes as a matter of course.
In order to oros s finally this gap in understanding, I used
the blackboard and drew in enormous letters the word "EGO",
explaining to them that I intended this to be understood in
the popular sense, that an individual is "egotistic"•

Although

egocentricity, selfishness and the many related terms are used
almost exclusively in this culture with pejorative connotations,
it roust be understood that the prime qualification fox' any

innovator is an unshakable belief in the value of his actions
and the relative- "dys-value” of alternatives•

That this

behavior, i n .no great need of consensual validation, requires
a resilient and self-reliant ego, is so basic to the theory
that it may easily be overlooked, undsrstressed and there
fore not appreciated sufficiently.
Robert S. Xynd in Knowledge for Whet used to much
^
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If I may copy him now,

it could help clear the necessity for complete understanding
of this idea, that the innovator is "self’-ish, meant etymoL:logical3.y»

According to .Homey, "Human behavior institution-

ses itself in four paths of attempted escape from anxiety”,
^either by (1) rationalizing anxiety in the Freudian sense of
•blaming someone else; (2) denying the existence of anxiety;
, (5) narcoticizi'ag anxiety "by drowning it in hard work, slogan
r3§3cink..or excitement, or by purchasing a shiny new car"; and
avoiding anxiety.

If these subterfuges fail, then we util

ise four alternatives: (1) "Wo seek reassurance through
affection; (2) submissively seek the cover of identification
with some traditional source of authority; (3) have recourse
*to,power-tactic, s and redoubled aggression; or (A) we may with
draw within ourselves".

Although composed in 1937? that

description is still quite useful when considering American,
societal members.

It is less useful In the consideration of

social actors, as I intend the term,

All of the above tactics

in the interest of emotional self-preservation and a shot at
the American dream of happiness, assume (in the traditional
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psychiatric mode) that the individual must "adjust" to the
social environment with some success in order to insure a
’•healthy” self-image and to gain contentment.

I counter this

conservative bias with the thought that "adaptation" is more
to the liking of the innovator.

In precise terms, the inno

vator serves no institutions above himself, and, when the
conditions are amenable, he will reverse the usualy relation
ship., of power-and prerogative between himself and the sanc
tioned-social processes.

Institutions are ways of getting

certain ‘necessary jobs done by the supposedly efficient
*•«<|3?g&nization of behavior.

The innovator in almost all cases

in mind redefinitions of those "ways” to suit his partic|:%lar and (to the degree possible) unique socio-historical
position' and personality.

When an individual steps outside

Yijffehe .positively -sanctioned mental constructs of his culture,
r-JPien steps back in long enough to announce the bankruptcy
incorrectness of its major institutions, he i-s implying,
to put it mildly, that his perception of the inadequacy (as
a 'function of his knowledge and experience) is better than
the perceptions of anyone else.

"Better" in this case means

the doing of something with minimum irrationality built into
the process.
What is being emphasized here is the undeniably high
regard in which the innovator holds himself, at least when
the process of innovation itself is at stake.

There can be

no subtle disclaimers or qualifications associated with a
newly proposed life-style, invention or other type innovation
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.(The innovator! s proposed contribution must of course be
susceptible to objective assessment; for his “high regard” for
self is based on a willingness to view himself and his work
in terms of accuracy and feasible applicability.
•than a free-wheeling eccentric*)

He is more

To- those societal members

of tender sensibilities, the self-assertiveness and downright
brashness for which innovators historically are known, will
largely nullify his effect upon them.

This is where the

advocate (in LaPiere1s terms) serves his indispensable purpose,
making .palitable for the unenlightened what in its raw form
very often approaches treason, vulgarity and the acme of
Ilpd-''.taste*

The innovator whose target is a distorted struc-

<ture of| social relations, is by definition ”bad taste” per‘sonified*

(However, at least in some instances, the innovator

m s forced to serve as his own advocate when no-one else is
^available for the unenviable task.)

Bo, by extension, if a

Societal member decides however gradually to move into the
position of social actor, the first and most important step
is the development of a powerful ego (which has little to do
•with'egotism)*

To quote Saul Alinsky on this point, keeping

in mind however his tangential usefulness as a model of all
innovators since his area is exclusively collective action,
he writes, under "Ego” in Rules for Radicals:
Throughout these desired qualities is interwoven a strong
ego, one we might describe as monumental in terms of
solidity. ...Ego is unreserved confidence in one’s ability
to do what he believes must be done. (112)
Although this has the religious quality one would expect fr
a "crusading" organizer, it nonetheless underscores my point

as^Jea&er a. heavily nonrational component with- which to "stir"
the masses, etc., which would be diminished or nonexistent
in many other types of innovators*
As in many things, the development of such a durable
self-image Is much easier discussed than implemented.

It is.

a common tenet in most schools of psychology and psychiatry
that our personality or its important components are well
developed at an early age*

Some of the transactional theorist

now speculate that the "Adult" may be firmly ensconced by the
.age of 10 months (!), while other writers suggest prenatal
P;
,
1J|*nfluen.ees on;personality (113)* Connected with this belief
s.

the correlate- that personality is very difficult to change
* •''"significantly after childhood, the basic capabilities of the
^individual being somewhat immutable, that later socialisation.
% W 2 ll affect only the tip of the iceberg.

,While for the sake

piltpolemics, I could argue exactly the opposite tack, I will
-•'instead embrace the "middle way".

It would seers that some .of

our' basic., characteristics go unchanged throughout major
■■.situational and maturations! variation.

But there is still;

enough' crucial "material" left beyond those relatively minor
areas to facilitate the development and operation of an
innovator through resocialization of whatever‘method*

(This

assumes the exclusion of that -very uncommon childhood, one
in which a wide range and diversity of stimuli were presented
as "normal" from the earliest point in the development of
personality, e.g., progeny of artist-intellectuals whose

home(s)- is often filled with obviously innovations! types.)
This does not so much dodge the issue as give credence to
both views, the overly psychologistic and the overly socio
logistic, neither of which alone satisfactorily explain human
behavior.
But beyond Minherent" limitations end the further
lacunae created by early socialization, there remains the
monumental problem of convincing the societal member that
..much of what he has viewed as given is only as given as he is
reticent in questioning it, in not viewing it historically
•

in not thinking of its givenness in relativistie terms,

ffl&en and if the member crosses the conceptual barrier between
fjpersGxial problems” and "public issues51 (Mills), that moment
-osn signal the birth of his action-centered existence.

With

•^■'highly personal understanding of the fact that men create
Hfcejir society, the societal member begins the shift from
3j^s©ive congruence to active incongruence (to modify laPiere),
and♦the possibility of his becoming" an apostle of change is
heightened.
Besides this initial perception of the possibility
of social change through personal effort, there remain other
key.necessities to the development of the innovator.

He must

have extended periods of -leisure time in which to work on
plans, literally or mentally, other time in which to test
his hypotheses (in many cases a process taking years), and
to varying degrees, he might require the assistance of
significant others (often other innovators, a source of

not apply to premodera cultures in which the necessities of
life still take center stage in the allocation of energy.
The idea of "post-modern" culture holding within it the seeds
for intense

creativity stems from this rudimentary fact,

the hungry,': tired and worried man
and reflect

that

does not sit idly fox*hours

or ponder over "problems”,either personal,

aesthetic or social, which only he or a few others consider
, problematic to begin with*

But the fallacious assumption

that affluence is not only necessary but also sufficient for
-\<$r?ea£iviby is too often made.

Mentioned much earlier was the

J||pigh incidence of paradox concerning innovators*
'^pfeother:

This is

their richest field of possible endeavor is in

post-ascetic culture, but that same culture has to date
nptoceed.ed in producing "the lonely (uncreative) crowd” along
'vip^h much parlor talk about "creativity", as in the case of
'•HKtpB*missus matching the blue- wall-to-wall with the yellow
^drapes.

A culture of Michelangelos we are not.

However, to

reshape society into more rational and satisfying patterns
requires a different sort of creativity than reshaping marble
into the "Pieta% so all is not lost.*

With the ever increasi

complexity of culture, the ideas necessary for far-reaching,
significant change become proportionately less:.magnificent
in scope or intensity without losing their effectiveness*
proceed dTaXectically, I do not embrace the "technophobic
view, e.g. Ellul3s Technological Society, although as the
poetry of individualistic protest against absurd rationaliza
tion, such books have uses.

The invention of* the cog was a footnote to the wheel, and
certainly easier, less grand, less intense an application
of intelligence.

But the effect over time has certainly

been as great for the "footnote” as for the original state
ment of genius.
The societal member moving towards an, active life of
change must temporarily forego the standardized "positive
reinforcement" dished out by the culture at various levels
vfor more or less conforming behavior.

The aforementioned

>egOvstrength is indispensable of course, but more than that
Adhere must be a healthy conception of self which transcends
.iPas.;.most.basic of socially ..concocted needs: for approval.
'afta'ry Stack Sullivan defined schizophrenia as the holding
-"of a. world-view which required or made possible fox* its holder
consensual validation” from one’s peers and associates.
-at -least a brief time, while working in the white-heat
•*$^>^rati©nslity,s, the innovator will be subject not only to
„a lack of warmth and companionship (if his innovation is
genuinely radical) but also to the inverse, dislike and sus
picion.

The social dialectic, between the conformity necessary

to the maintenance of a social order, and nonconformity every
bit as necessary for the generation of radical perception
and action, is the central problem for the innovator.

If

the transactional analysts are even close in their assessment
of how the personality operates, we see that the prohibitive,
parent-centered nature of social control practically assures
the death ox* diminution of child-produced excitement, and
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the correlated adult-controlled innovation, which grows from
an urdiampered enthusiasm for the new*

There has never been

a culture which championed innovation, any more than there
has ever been a war fought in the interests of kindness*
But the post-modern scenario unintentionally does make possib3.e
more innovation at more levels than any previous culture,
IF those who would experiment with the untried can. extricate
themselves sufficiently from the socially-constructed needs
■*.which typify the societal member*
mattex1, there is this issues

To further complicate the

if the innovator is not direct3_y

^impeded by his peers, he must remember to allow them the
•f^ivilege of 'bestowing their approval upon his work*

This

i0>es not actually gratify the innovator very much - his grati
fication is mostly:self-generated when and if he is successful this kind of behavior does keep open possible lines of
:jppfjtion to the outside world, something critical for the
Acceptance of the new formulation*
:*

Given the nature of higher education at some of the

best .schools, along with an increasingly relativistic orien
tation permeating the entire culture, the production of
innovating minds should reach "record levels" unless the
post-modern situation suddenly and irrevocably regresses*

And

from all indicators, that is unlikely, even given the temporary
shortages, real or contrived**-

With organized religion, the

Protestant Ethic, traditional family structure, community,
the almost monarchical absolutism of central governments
all on the wane throughout the more sophisticated ranks of
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the culture, it becomes at least more possible for some
societal membex’s (e.g* a New York male of Jewish background
whose father is a professor of sociology, mother a social
worker, who attends Columbia,,etc*) to enter the role of
actor, that is, when compared with the heroic energy arid
cunning which had to be utilised by would-be innovators in
previous times*

Frederick Douglass might .serve as an example

of the latter case*

The cry of conservatives, that times are

too easy and in the old days one really had to work, etc*,
.is the happy announcement to the innovator that his machina
tions will be allowed, perhaps encouraged, in a period of
Relaxed absolutes*

Affluence it seems has brought more than,

Edsel or the Baper Bahn of Hamburg*

It has given the

favored areas of civilization something no culture has provided
-before::

room for thoughts and feelings which differ from

ihhe prevailing modes*
<s$tr v:

, What amazes me is how few disenchanted societal

members are aware of this fluidity and how even fewer do
something creative with it, although the education-marriagechildren syndrome does succeed in curtailing activities of
potential innovators (a facet of "traditional existence"
which historically has served the status quo quite well).
Hopefully one important role of education in the future will
be in instructing students that obedience is no longer the
dominant cultural, motif, that increasing rewards, emotional
and otherwise, make innovation an, appealing activity*
.While there remain other relatively minor hurdles
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before the individual who seeks a life of diversity (relativef
that is, to the gigantic hindrances just detailed)* I will
not pursue them at this juncture,

I made; the point above that no society has yet been
constructed so as to maximise opportunities for individually
inspired alterations, of its structures, processes and/or.
values*

.Also I stated that the current culture of the advanced

areas of the world more closely- approaches this optimum
situation than any to date*

Per analytical purposes, let us

,
‘^i imagine; the prospects and dilemmas of a society in which
viniculture*-wide 'innovation*1 was encouraged.

If we begin with

Conditions much like our own., the immediate problem to surface
----would be that involved with enf orced rationalization, especially
economic lines*

Hie innovators would set out to rid

lives cf as much tedium, meaninglessness and regulation
^ t h e y

could,

This would leave most of industry and many

services employeeless.

Thus it i's clear that a genuinely

- post^ascetic environment would call for the emancipation of
workers from the noxious tasks they now perform, without
however.destroying an economy capable of producing affluence.
Automation comes to mind as a probably partial solution.
To those familiar with the production systems now
employed in post-modern culture, it comes as something cf a
shock to envision a society full of innovators.

Under its

current organization^ post-modern industrialisation would
have to institute far-reaching changes, for instance in
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assembly line format £ s$o that all plants would more resemble
the modern beer factory, in which a handful of skilled mach
inists and several nonskilled button~pushers.suffice.

Unless

this could be done, the economy would regress severely, so
much so that the freedoms gained by' participants in the
culture through individual innovation would.be lost in large
part due to a general primitiyi.sation of life. *
^ rl A ^ e n T S :el^d?ifT'8r8rit tack is taken by Galbraith in his
famous series of books on m o d e m economic arrangements. He
and his followers scoff at the supposed difficulty of liber
ating people from dead-end jobs. According to his understanding of the problem, we are already creating many make: 'work-° jobs (the more reactionary component of union ideology)
.ghnd destroying energy and resources hand over fist in a lame
‘
ireffort to resuscitate the work ethic. Naturally, the ruling
Itf&s&pital±st** interests and financial leaders work' together
grin order to insure illusory, fabricated scarcity, but they
■klhmve very nearly cooked their own goose.The problem is no .longer to deconsumerize the culture
- or-;:automate all the plants, but to junk a terribly expensive
.ideology of work, in order to preserve the ecology, the supply
1?of natural resources and as a fortunate byproduct, to procure
tkhe emancipation of make-work laborers. Total recyclibility
«
technologically feasible, so the necessary conservation of
materials could become a built-in part of the economic world.
W h a t would have to change is either an ideology which demands
constant energy destruction (human .and otherwise), or one
which retains the work-ethic but skillfully avoids the destruc
tion of irreplaceables. Thus the growth of service industries.
X have not utilized this view (with which of course X
have no complaints theoretically or politically) because of
Galbraithss uncertain standing among many of the mainstream
American economists and other social scientists. No less an
"authority” on the nature of work, etc. than Ely Ghinoy
dismissed this set of assumptions out of hand when I broached
the topic in a current seminar, "The Working Class”. Also,
see for example Paul Samuelson* s latest revision (9th, 1973)
of his classic text, in which he writes "Galbraith; The Icon
oclastic Vision*1.
Since I claim no -expertise in the area of economics,
X^have adhered (slavishly perhaps) to the generally accepted
views (what Galbraith calls the "neoclassical model”) rather
than those of an innovator; a rather strange turn of events!

Bui; more effective over time would be a redefinition
of goods and services, pushed mere and more in the direction
of the latter as opposed to the consuming culture now in
existence*

Self or selves would need to be defined not as

acquisitive, but mere as inquisitive, in search of novel,
stimulating, educational and entertainting activities.
Three color televisions in one household produce little more
than programmed monotony, while consuming vital materials
and manpoitfer in their production.

The accumulated trappings

of .those who aspire towards a prestigeful existence become
^©omic and grotesque, while the depletion of resources (both
fgjpier&l and human) continues.

In a 'truly innovational culture,

q^p^ople and not things would become the best toys an adult
could have*

Boundary expansion would be the by-word.

*'$' Two mistaken attempts, at change now being- instituted
i$£Lth some frequency are the communal living situations
*practiced by those of the counter-culture, and at the other
extreme, the much touted Hteam~*production" system being used
in the manufacture of Saabs and other, goods.

Both of these

are:;incorrect in terms, of the innovator1s future, the former
because it steps back into preindustrial, times, depriving its
adherents of liberating technological developments and often
of stimuli, the other because it suggests that an occupation
should be of prime significance in one's life as a source of
interpersonal meaning and self-definition.

While a job may

have strong appeal for the individual, it is fallacious and
dangerous to suggest- that work for gain should ever be expected
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to fulfill any but the smallest portion of the infinite
capabilities of men.
-liberation:

We arrive then at the prerequisite of

the genuine, not quasi-liberation of laborers

(taken broadly) from routinized tedium.
If the economy were set up correctly, it could be
operated (to the degree necessary for a deconsumer!zed
culture) so that it required far less, time from.the workday
of any. given individual.

This is hardly a novel or revolu

tionary idea^ Marcuse for one has been harping on it for
decades.

But more than just free time is needed in the

procreation of an innovative society.

An entirely recast appro

priation for what life is or could be is as necessary, and
my thinking, a much more difficult enterprise.

The vision

of "liberated” workers finishing their 20 hour work-week,
t^only to rush off to their "second51 job seems at this point
fltin .history almost an inevitability.
•^ssse&ia:

If I may quote the

on a recent newscast from an American Motors plant

% "in*Minnesota, two workers discussed the idea of mandatory
-vs. optional overtime.

The first said "The more I work the

more useful I .am to my family”.

The second, from a slightly

less noble position, said "It’s mighty hard to turn down
seven and a half dollars an hour”.

Though a small "sample”,

I suggest that their understanding of the relationship
between work, life and money is consistent with that of most
laborers, and not a few professionals.

About these ideas -

man as object vs. man. as subject - both Marx and Sartre have
written persuasively.

Liberation begins with more leisure.
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a less constraining definition of self, and the knov/ledge
and skill necessary to use one's moments to the fullest.
Society would have even more dramatic problems with
innovators or social actors than those having to do with
modification of work*

On the international scene, if other

less fortunate nations became pugnacious for whatever reason
or lack thereof, it would be difficult to arouse a culture
of relativists into anything approaching nationalistic fervor.
The. whole idea of nationalism is anathema to the innovator
; since it carries with it countless feudal obligations and
^demands, many of which have historically served no-one but
f-qSopXe like the ICrupps.

Nationalism is as dead and unappeal-

ihfe today as human sacrifice (with which if "bears some resem
blance), and as ‘anachronistic as the traditional family or
• the Catholic church.
g

If post-ascetic culture were accosted

more primitive nations, it would have to generate- enthu.for .resistance among its citizens' with purely rational

' "propaganda”, which would bear no resemblance whatever to the
tripe usually administered to the masses by the ruling elite.
More likely however is that old-style international, confron
tation -will be avoided by the use of the most effective tool
yet developed in league xclth managerial enterprise and big
business:

co-cptation.

Why-waste resources in subduing

aggressive smaller nations when the input of commodities will
do the same thing.

The power of goods and industrialization

has done in part what the Second World War could not, bring
relative peace to the world.

If big business concerns have

enough money tied up in foreign markets, rest assured they
will do as much as they can to preserve international equil
ibrium, as much as they have done traditionally to encourage
imperialistic wars.

The multinational empires can operate

in no other way.
It will take more than abstract sentiments mouthed
at election times to gain the cooperation of a populace most
of whom are capable of informed, rational thought.

Although

this condition is still of the future, the relative disgrace
the* recent Washington scandals have brought upon the admin
istration now in office corapared to other equally heinous
j^ut -less publicised crimes attributed to former administration
■indicates the increasing sophistication of both the public
fat-..large and those who shape public opinion.

However, as

^pointed out in the historical documentation, the skills with
^?hich evil-doers manipulate the laws and their enforcement
|jiip.,„-suit specific interests increase in complexity and effect
iveness relative to the advancing skepticism of the public.
But the key point here is that in the past, political leaders
have had little difficulty in mobilizing public opinion and
action on the basis of very flimsy propaganda, thereby bring
ing to the m o d e m world some of its worst scourges in the name
of national security or whatever.

This could not happen

among the more enlightened groups of post-modern culture today
and it will become increasingly difficult to gain from the
traditionally unrefXective masses the degree of cooperation
elites have come to take for granted.

This observation goes

back to the early days of the enlightenment and the birth of

liberalism, the tracts of which offered "education” as the
panacea for neo-modern ills®
The only catch to that basically accurate view was
in not realizing to what degree vested interests determine
what is and what is not "educational”®

The current castra

tion of H E M •funding, -specifically of most controversial
sociological research, is a m o d e m example of an age-old
truth about authority:

those with it do not care to have it

•^.kndwn. how badly they abuse it, and the critics without 5„t
,*find it very difficult to speak and be heard without the
permission of their targets and adversaries.

But in count-

ifl.ess subtle ways, including those that are being described
-,asv ”quasi-legal% damaging information finds itself before
?htbb public attention.

In short, when Nixon says "cynicism”,

#^ead "politically informed".®

As with most features of post-

•^imodern. culture, there is absolutely no reason to suppose that
this brand of awareness should manifest itself less in the
future®

Although some writers, notably Philip Slater (114)

foresee in American culture the possible development of neofascist government, with heavy support from the less enlight
ened and easily threatened lower middle class, I find this
position difficult to accept.

Even within the traditional

bulwark of conservatism, the southern middle classes, there
is today surprisingly strong support for some of the catch
phrases of the sixties, "Do your own-thing”, probably most
popular of all®

The use of these cliches is not an indicator

of a Harrington or Alinsky-styled "radicalization" of the
middle class*

Yet, without knowing it, the people who espouse

these basically atomistic sentiments are making a profound
political statement, to the effect that Big Brother a la
1984 would he the ultimate evil, worse even than hippies,
communists or college professors.

The fact is, praise he

to the Enlightenment, that education in the form of schools,
travel, the media or otherwise, does have ameliorative
effects upon provincial hatreds and prejudice, the stuff out
of which nationalism and similar political notions are
-created«
p

We see then that the difficulties' "brought upon the

If"state” through the increasing sophistication and..experimen- tation of its participants have to do with cohesion, IntegraI’ion and united action.

Eve2? since prefeudal ^Europe, many

gjpen of the West have sought after individual liberty to live
#%h.eir brief spans in the style they chose*

The.-.Crusades are

*best understood as a. mass adventure for othermae unemployed,
bored men-cf-arms whose usefulness to a rapidly modernising
social structure had diminished®

The explorations of the mid-

•millenium are also expressions of men seeking room and socio
political, emotional space, removed from the incestuous fra
tricide ttfhich had become Europe*

Our entire history is one of

moving to.new ground, and now that all the grounds are known,
and until space travel is a commonplace for citizens, the
time has come that external exploitation of existence give
way to something which has never been allowed to prosper:

1

interpersonal exploration*

Mere and more of the liberated

middle and tipper4 classes (meaning those whose material wellbeing is assured) have found their acquisitions lacking for
life-long fascination, so quite logically they have given up
the third home in the mountains for the yearly month-long
fling on alien turf, with the intention of learning the
folkways of the specific situation, and seeing just how
successfully they can adapt to the new scenario.
In more ways than one, the popular book of the 1950ss,
Hatlon ox Sheep, is shewing its age®

Social actors are poll-

taLcally wiser, more sensitive to the value of cosmopolitanism
sp&IL much less easily shackled by neo-feudal restraints.

The

mitecb. discussed move in this culture from proscriptive to pre-scriptive law will find vehement resistance among the many
■3Rffiso.se

time is too precious to be eaten up by state-designed

H&Hvia, whether' it be In filling out forms or waiting in
Sites to fill out forms®

Ingenius, quasi-legal methods of

circumvention or sabotage are and will be developed in the
avoidance or irrationally constructed regulation of thought
(e*g® pornography) or action (e.g. marijuana smoking)®*
*Por a thorough exposition of "rationality15 as I am using
the term, see Martin Jay* s masterful The Dialectical Imagina
tion, his newly famous history cf the Frankfurt School. Also
of -use if Trent Schroyer* s Critique of Domination* Of basic
interest is Horknexmer® s early statement, "Traditional and
Critical The or;/” (Or it i cal The ory). While I was aware of my
debt to Marcuse*s conceptions C m all hie work), until reading
Jay, the congruence of Horkheimer1s and Adorno's notions of
rationality with Marcuse's (and thus, mine) had escaped me.
But for limitations of time, I would rev,rite much of this
section so as to include the powerful insights of these
German philosopher-social scientists.

As in the case of the Kansas law prohibiting extended kisses
in public, there will be great sections of enacted law which
will not be -enforced due to wide-spread refusal or obstruc
tion, both on the part of enforcement agencies and their
constituents* . That this type large-scale "innovation” could
produce a fascist or totalitarian response in the form of a
reactionary government seems., only slightly more probable
than a group of Weathermen successfully taking over the
White House with carbines®

Both views make good romantic

drama and poor analysis of how people of post-modern culture
behave (not to-mention ignorance of this country's socio.pGiltical heritage)®
The social system will begin to look much less like
Parson's version than like Mill's, at least in terms of the
:ind8LV-.dual <* In the economic realm (which after all served
•as JHarson’s model), there will be even greater rational!zatio^in&nd centralized planning, but in the interest of using
as few men for as few hours as possible without jeopardizing
necessary output®

But in all other aspects, especially

.involving human valu.es and social control, "integration”
will mean nothing®

In the world of a Cooley, value integra

tion made some sense; the world of Alvin Toffler does not
expect or permit any type of holistic interpretation of
reality, for both in social and physical terms, it is much
too complex to lend itself to such premodem evaluations.
Like it or not, diversity and change will displace Parson's
emphasis on continuity and system-maintenance just as surely
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as the auto replaced the carriage*

The purpose of the

system will be to insure sufficient goods and services to
its members ■so •that their self-imposed schedule of living
m i l be expedited and not interrupted as is now usually the
case*

And that this vision is not construed as the latest

nonworkable utopia, it should be emphasized that just this
kind of life-style is already approached,by..a. great many
social actors, who in most instances occupy professional
positions within the upper middle and upper classes.

The

divorce rate, singles' housing, the rate of job-changing and
i#he decreasing- importance of stability throughout life which
p m w are beginning to permeate these classes are some of the
Hotter known indicators®

With more time, education, and

;moneyv the remaining strata will doubtless follow suit.
IMpat. was described in; an earlier time as chronic social
^jisorgauization or disintegration is more properly charac
terized today with the phrase, "business as usual"*

As promised, the chapter will now be concluded
with my personal reservations about culture-wide innovation
as predicted by this theory.
Depending upon the critic's viewpoint, the theory
may be said to utilise a conception of man which is.either
"radically empirical and rational" or "naively positivistic”»
Since the theory has been offered with the implication that
it is of scientific value5 X will only for the sake of
argument consider seriously the latter characterization.

Ai ;/r
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The 20th century has produced a conception of man which 'is
for some uncomfortably ambiguous:

he is calcul&tingly cool

and precise enough to produce unending technological wizardry,
yet with the same gray matter he has come close to selfannihilation In the interests of ill-conceived, ill-defined
abstract sentiments®

Jung and like thinkers have suggested

repeatedly that we are more subject to the dark, unfathomable
and treacherous whims of the "unconscious" than to the pull
of the 18th century's favorite, reason®

The existentialists

have tried to make the case for radically aggressive indivi
dualism, to the exclusion of an understanding of what
j^iulture and the individual-*' is all about®

However, even

^bi:most sociologistic rationalists can be awed at least
'momentarily by the incredible irrationality which apparently
‘
^ f v a d e s post-modern existence at some levels®

But this

*$j?fhselessness stems not of course from anything so indistinct
l^Sithe unconscious, but from an irrationally constructed
social order®

We are as instinctless as the bees are instinct-

ridden, thus what we get out of the social order is pretty
much what goes in as far as rationality is concerned®

But,

so that I.do not seem utterly blind to nonrationalist per
spectives-, it must be admitted that people tend to behave in
their own best interests with not quite the frequency and
predictability Adam Smith supposed they would, and they do
tend to embrace nonsensical, emotionalistic appraisals of
reality somewhat more readily than J®- 8® Mill would have
thought possible®

However, since this theory concerns

it is important that a measure of the stupidity evidenced
by populations historically will henceforth be avoided due
to the democratization* the general•diffusion of social know
ledge*

Just because the 16 year old girl next door "believes

in" -astrology does not mean that she won’t "believe in"
birth control pills rather than relying on magical amulets
and chants*

Try as some might* the modern social actor

cannot very easily unlearn what he .knows to be true* on
behalf of romantic attachments to the primitive*

Sullivan’s

insight about the richness of a child®s small* intense vocab'jj$jbary as compared to the watered-down * precise words and
ifj^rases of the adult world does not impune the value of
-^precision and a. m o d e m understanding of causality,

Historica

jp:^mples. of gross irrationality have also been connected,
if^er since'Kegel, to societal irrationality -at the structural
Jtevel*

Presumably (a basic tenet of Critical Theory),

*increased, rational input into structure would produce, in
ap unstated dialectical fashion, similarly demystified social
behavior*
When the modes of perception which grew out of 35®
years of science, producing relatively exact formulations
and theories, can be transferred to the masses regarding
their understanding of not only physical but also social
phenomena, then the richness and luxuriously/interesting
imprecision of premodem thought will no longer prevail*
(That 80$ of those polled believe in Nixon’s culpability

.while only 20% approve his removal is typical of the contra
dictions inherent in

a worldview based more on emotion than

reason, if I maj use a mildly accurate dichotomy*)
Connected with the problem of just how rationally
men can be expected to behave is an analog:
will they be?

how adventurous

The innovator would wish that experimentation

in a variety of .settings could not jeopardize an individual's
’life,-chances in other nonrelated areas of life, as is now
the case*

Somehow the British politician who enjoys prosti

tutes ipso facto becomes unqualified for office*

'The point

•’Hof ..his having been elected, to provice capable government,
connected only tenuously with his bedchamber behavior,
rW&P: -time' and again, a minor siindiscretion1’ concerning one
•.iai-ea of existence becomes nefariously linked to the 11whole
^recalling my objections to Gestalt theories), and he
t

^puffers out of all- reasonable porportion*

That Byron and

JirtidhklTi ’-violated” literally thousands of damsels.tsomehow
* did not diminish their stature as poets; but when the vener
able Justice Douglas took a young wife to fit h-is young mind
and body, he won the lasting disapproval of the sturdy
middle class..

Likewise in the financial world, one major

blunder spells the end of a burgeoning career, whether the
disaster was a function of poor business sense or some
totally unrelated iniquity*

In order to make innovation

the norm, the individual^ protection against negative
labelling would have to be assured so that he would not have
to consider his 11good name”, when taking innovative steps in
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whatever direction.

What is needed is a move to a "segmented"

world, a series of disparate, mutually irrelevant, noncontig
uous roles-situations, the behavior within any one area not
threatening the individual's status in another.
It is a common assumption among many writers that
humans "by their nature" seek the familiar, predictable and
therefore unthreatening, that undue amounts of fresh stimuli
can .precipitate near "traumatic" reactions.

This again makes

the mistake of turning historical actuality, the chronicled
‘
^behavior of man, into a non seauitnr. that man is "essentially"
; fearful of change.

My reading of history, especially in this

|p?denturyf shows just the opposite:

men working' feverishly

overstep, widen and modify institutional, structural
*-constraints upon their lives in the interest of maximizing
filuncommcn opportunities.

What history does show is that men

Ifehave subjected themselves and each other to the ordeal of
^uhending monotony, mind-numbing repetition and generally
, senseless rounds of highlyypredictable, unexciting behaviors.
•'However, in allowing the conservative position its due, 1
am ,in something of a quan&ry regarding the limits - defined
by the nature of the animal, by our neurological and physio
logical condition - beyond which innovations! energies will
bring more sorrow than joy.

And the reason this question

escapes answer for the time being is that any good data on
subject is not to be had.

Societies have done such a

marvelous job of incarc©rating their members into unthinking
boredom that the data on the effects of tedium is relatively

good:

people don’t like it for long.

Although there may

well be some naturally defined limitations to radical behavior
until a culture of innovators becomes a reality, there will
be no definitive' answer to the problem except for supposition
based for the most part on the way noninnovating man thinks
he might react to a hyperfluid life-style.

And as many

"social science prophets'1 have pointed out, thinking about
tomorrow .,with only.slightly modified mental constructs of
today is folkish and comforting, but in all likelihood,
utterly unreliable.

(Another possibility of course is to

rearrange the physiological capabilities of men to suit a
s|#re demanding existence, but that transcends somewhat the
scope of this thesis.)
Another*problem is that of resources.

This entire

'^^osition uses as an a priori an, unremitting affluence for
.stlrre and more people, along with other necessities for
ifenovatiixg performances.

The current misuse of the ecology,

if continued, as described by the more pessimistic (realistic?
writers, will not only disallow wide-spread affluence in the
fixture, but will* also- deplete the earth's supplies of neces
sary ingredients to the point that subsistence, will be in.
question.

The more scientistic prophets foresee in techno

logical development a certain cure for the problem.

Every

thing I have read on the subject seems to be overwhelmingly
in favor of the pessimists, especially when added to the
ecological difficulties is the spector of phenomenal popula
tion growth in those areas most dependent for survival on

post-modern donors.

As one critic was overheard to say, "My

vote for the most evil man in the world today goes to the
Pope**, obviously because of his medieval appreciation of the
intimately

connected problem, population growth.

Again,'

because of the inconclusive data - and its manipulation,
either by the Club of Home or. Standard Oil - I do not know
where to stand, except to say that without the creation of
an anti-eonsumer ethic (as outlined above) growing concomi
tantly'with scientific advances, the power of this thesis
to predict change in the future will diminish at the same
ratfe* that affluence declines.

The theory is predicated upon

.•the^possibilityof tremendous human freedom growing out of
advanced technology;

obviously, without the latter we are

back:'-to-neo-modem or premodem times, and the days of milk
•ardpioney are no more (Galbraith notwithstanding).
I mentioned before, were the culture of innovators
and*is3t>ci&l •-actors to exist (for. more than one generation),
then provision must be made for the handling of children.
Their nurturing, according to authorities like Piaget, Sul
livan and Erikson, is an extremely sensitive "skill” which
most "mothering ones" develop only partially.

That our

current mode of childbearing is less than might be desired
requires little debate*

We expect a young, often Immature

and uneducated female with almost no qualifications, either
formally ox* informally garnered, to act as child psychologist,
nutritionist, educator, to the degree necessary, sociologist,
to mention only the most elevated of her responsibilities.

When her relationship with the offspring begins to interfere
substantially with the antecedent "romantic" involvement
with the progenitor, the situation for the child becomes
entirely dysfunctional to its development,

Much more inform

ative and terrifying in its Implications than Spock is
Sullivan's treatment of the child in the very earliest stages,
the focus being on the. relationship between its consciousness
of well-being and not-weil-b eing as a function of the mothering
zone's behavior, overt or covert.

Many writers since Sullivan

,have found empirical validation for his hunches that tension
in the child is quickly converted to anxiety of varying
HUgpees if the mothering one does not.behave in ways which
jciquld curtail or alleviate somewhat the initial tension,.
Jpalle a certain/amount of physiological tension is normal
necessary in the young human, the amount sustained by
infant is very ;>often excessive resulting in long-term
$@jfeotional problems*

New developments in transactional

analysis owe a lot to Sullivan, but in their undisguised
optimism over the rapidly changeable self-concepts of adults,
they have closed the b a m door many years after the horse's
departure*

This is not to say that later resocializatibh

cannot be of extreme use (cf course, it happens every day
and is not regarded as noteworthy), but my concern is that
whatever methods or agencies are devised to handle the early
socialization of children which the parents wish not to
bother with, have to be very sound.

The reports of Bethel™

heim and others on the kibbutz are not encouraging.

Apparently,

•placidity and complacence mark the kibbutz "product", and
there would be no sense whatever in constructing an excitingly
innovational social structure, only to1people it with persons
unable to use it, or unde sir ous" of anything but the ordinary.
I do not want this reservation to be construed as an
addendum to all sorts of conservative arguments about the
efficacy of severe, tension-filled upbringing.

In more cases

than not; one who is brought up by excessively parent-centered
-adults,-generates an I ‘xn-not-OK that distorts and destroys
;most of what is good in life ad infiniturn.
/public image is such a "person".)

(Our president's

But there must be consi-

'iflqred the other, end of the continuum:

just how much tension

J$fl sufficient to produce a rebellious, innovative individual.
if'determined, could this degree of attention and restrici*$§§'on be administered to the millions of progeny which will
to agencies In the wake of the final destruction of the4(6ted±t±onal family.

Obviously, the home as now understood

does a first rate job of almost nothing, but it does a
•barely sufficient job of a lot.

One way or another, -substi-

tutues must be found so that those social actors who do not
care for parental shackles may feel

personally at ease in

transferring their children to professionally-run agencies.
Of course, I am not suggesting an enforced abduction of
children from the parents by the state or any such related
plan.

But apparent in my own generation of college-educated

innovators is a marked distaste for "doing the family thing"
as it was done for, to and '(somewhat) by them.

Whether they

.are, as their parents hint, egotistic and self-centered to
the point of being unable to care for children, or if they
have assessed the problem of childrearing, material and
emotional, and found the entire 20-year experience not to
their liking, is beside the point.

The fact is that right

now -many would-be parents won't be, because of an enormously
complex, demanding, and anxiety-producing package, promulgated
incessantly by the culture as the ultimate good which they
■cam imagine to be nothing but trouble*

If the role of parent

could be -redefined towards a looser model - that is being
parent, and also freedom-seeking adult - the first step of
liberation -would involve a restructuring of property
Hf^ds and relationships, then perhaps this generation would
not religiously eschew parenthood*

It is sadly ironic that

tfefe/generation of students is by far the best informed in so
ways, childrearing included, and it is the most reluctant
jm^history to discover whether there is any congruence between
theory and practice.

Moreover it is of small comfort to know

that/recently the U.S., following- Japan, attained zero-growth
in population while premodern societies reproduce as if there
were no tomorrow.
The final question as to the relationship between
population, affluence and innovation- on a cultural basis
comes to.thiss

just how many bodies can the world sustain in

a post-modern cultural condition?

That becomes a function of

improved technology, deccnsumerised values and less children*
But those variables may succumb to the detestable nationalism
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.which still appeals to some of the less m o d e m political
minds of. the era*

Yet it would seem that a finite "n" would

be determinable and my guess is that world population will
have to stabilize at a smaller figure than now obtains if
culture-wide innovational opportunities are to be extended
to the international realm.

That could be done humanely and

otherwise, and If history is any guide, the latter course
would almost certainly be followed if an optimum world popula
tion; were deemed internationally desirable by the controlling
elites*
‘f*?*

Moving now from the macro to the micro-cosmic level,

J|$s§e in the theory the easy possibility of misinterpretation
.as- "ultimate” human values are concerned*

Recently

Raymond Aron studied Sartre9s Critique of Dialectical Reason
extreme care - not of the disciple but of the critic apdqf ound that if Sartre9s doctrine were adhered to strictly
■^d^ithout-regard for the. writer's larger intentions (domain
assumptions), then Stalinist terrorism could be defended by
it (1 1 5 ).

If the spirit of the current theory is misinter

preted, or assumed to be other than it is, the theory can be
construed as a defence of hedonistic epicureanism and little
more.

Although a concern for maximum pleasure from life is

central to the theory, there is as important to it the
assumption that cultural innovation will provide looselystructured opportunities for learning; that this learning
should sometimes prove displeasing fox' all concerned is an
accepted part of the package.

What should not be thought

16&
‘however, is that the theory is so utterly atomistic in
intention that "significant others" and less important people
are to he utilized in a. radical instrumentalism by the innova
tor, and "discarded when empty".

Although some of this is

only wise - and much practiced now - this would not be the
hallmark of the culture*

Rather, Instead of forced, fraudu

lent "duty" binding people together long ..after they would
prefer separation, the glue of the culture would be composed
of mutual interest and affection stemming from a variety of
*sources, perhaps in the very dissimilarity of backgrounds,
personalities and aspirations.
..mms

Put anecdotally, the uneasi-

professor feels, when in the elevator-with the

it^-peeked and destroyed middle-aged janitor, that the white
-fraternity boy feels when in the forced or unexpected company
alluring black gird, -and so on, would dissolve into a
^^eralized and refreshing curiosity*

There may be too much

4§^IkJllyanna in this vision, but given the status.quo vis a
•vis interpersonal "communication" - if it can be even be
called that - some positive hyperbole will not harm.
As to the underlying values of the innovator:

he

itfould regale in the diversity of culture and the inevitable
relativism which grows from ouch knowledge; he v/ould, to put
it very briefly, be adamant and absolutistic in only one
sense - in his strictest avoidance of narrow and life-diminish
ing definitions of what is "suitable for consumption" and
otherwise "fitting and proper" in the social world.

Lest

visions of the Marquis de Bade immediately arise, it is also

assumed that the innovator during socialization would somehow
come to embrace the standard liberal definition of freedom
for alls

that one's action does not destroy the possibility

that another may be able to behave in a chosen manner, given
the limitations of resources.

(The ability of societies to

inculcate into their young "charges" practically anything
they want is well documented* - Thus the spector of "Clockwork
Orange15 morality is less than worthy of consideration.)
However the role of judge ideally conceived does not consider
the^ •possibility of graft, and likewise those who so wish could•e^j^Lly bastardize the preferred situation of mutual respect
Hisd* the kind- usage of -people*

Yet the joy of deceit when

teicen out of Sits typically financial setting would become
another historically defunct behavior pattern, much less
relevant/within post-modern culture*
■'%; .•

1 am all too aware that this vagueness lends itself

^misunderstanding, but for me to posit a series of absolute
"goods", and by implication, their opposites, would be to say
more about the future than I know.

I think the theory can

explain a gx'eat deal of future social change, but X am aware
that our current cynosures do not in most instances satisfy
the qualifications of the innovator*

In spite of his enormous

contribution to sociology, Mannheim has been repeatedly
attacked because of his use of Alfred Weber* s unfortunate
phrase, "the socially unattached intelligentsia", more often
expressed as "free-floating elite".

His critics attach to

his thinking the-same fallacies common to all Utopians from

wPlato to Harringtons

the belief that some men will scrupu

lously adhere to the "good” and remain mentally and emotion
ally incapable of abusing their ruling authority.

The conser

vatives are right in laughing at this position* since histori
cally, such abuse has been the rule.

But in as much as my

presentation is “beyond M a r x % concerning itself with post
scarcity existence and the. relative paradise which becomes
possible (when compared to the scenario Marx described), many
of .the motives for past abuses are no more*

Mannheim was in

•many things ahead of his tinis and perhaj>s his desire to invest
with tremendous power a select group of intellectuals was more
^ h s n his period could take; but today it is obvious that most
-|gf the best minds, in the culture rigorously avoid public
office (Kissinger notwithstanding).

They would far rather

.'•-impend vtheir life in personally meaningful activities and leave
/
crass tedium of governing to others. Times have changed*,
the fears of men gone wild with power are as anachronistic
in some areas of the world as a Nazi flag.

As outlined in the

historical chapter, the opportunity for strong-men and tyranny
*1 'was extremely gratified to find Barrington Moore (in his
latest work, Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery...)
supporting several of my "central’contentions connected with
the realization that “the times have changed1*, and the related
impact on modes of social change. More elaborate treatment of
his book (in some ways incompatible with my views) was not
possible due to practical limitations. However, concerning
the preeminence of individual vs. collective change in the
future, see pp. 14-6, 178-9, 189. Regarding the limitations of
traditional revolution and its likelihood in this country, see
pp. 168-1 ?4-.

* came at an earlier stage of civilisation, the move from
feudal to m o d e m social organisation.

A Hitler arising in

the United States or Germany at this time - at least in any
thing like the method used by the Fuehrer - is-out of the
question, for the same kinds of reasons that social movements
no longer work.
My point then is this:,

in times when there was much -

to be gained (j.n terms of personal enrichment of life) from
-amoral and abusive behavior, of course that type of interac—
.tion prevailed.

But the post-modern situation makes explcdb-

vtation of other people much less profitable and in many
dilfetances extremely costly, so that the need for a strict
©iiLe of '"goods” and “bads” is not as necessary to the operation of an innovating populace.

However, the most basic

i^mmandments” would still be matters for socialization of
s$6®trse, not to kill, steal, willfully harm, and so on.

But

nature of situational ethics is so much tied to. particu
lar sets of circumstances and particular groups of social
actors that immutable statements about the morals of the
future make little sense.

Any such attempt is another

example of projecting today®s understanding of social reality
into a future which will be more unlike the present than like
it*

That there will be personal and social disorganization

because of overly ambitious or otherwise unrealistic attempts
at social innovation seems assured, but the damage inflicted
will not be of the sort traditionally imposed upon people by
others more powerful than they.

It will be the pain of

This leads to my final consideration of the theory
as problem.

I have dispensed with any extended comment about

the morality of -innovation to this point for reasons already
stated-

But there is in fact a basic a priori which would

1 think dominate a culture of change, experimentation and
.rationality:

that is, a quest for the accurate, for what is

true as far as we can know it®

We now know that the Biblical

explanation of the earth *s development is untrue; we also
.know that the monogamous relationship is not "natural, good
true" any more or less than poiyandrous or polygyncus
%#nship arrangements«

We know a great many more things to be

either in accord with or net in accord with empirically
■understandable reality, physical and/or social*

But to date

of our major institutions remain in their original state,
“fphat is built around and for the sake of quasi-mythological
aments of faith which have no more connection, with what
is*real than did the Biblical explanations of physical
phenomena.

The sloppiness of primitive social organization

is no longer feasible or sensible in a world too fast and
complicated for positively sanctioned incompetence to be
protected.

We know that x'acial prejudice and the attendant

authoritarian personality are based on inaccurate appraisal:s
of reality, so moves have slowly been made in the direction
of its eradication*

The same type of institutional house-

cleaning is now consistently in evidence throughout the
culture for a myriad of reasons, all the way from simple

I^

-sentiment for the traditional to the iron-hand of financial
interests maintaining an. irrational social order to maximize
profits*

But as subsistence becomes less and less an issue,

then the innovator is left with considerable resources in
both time and money, and his targets for institutional change
will probably focus on those areas of life which can be most
personally constricting and .irritating::

kinship, the super-

natural, .education, recreation and to some degree the aesthetic.,
Tqe economic, governmental and stratificational systems are
-the most firmly protected by social control devices and there
fore least subject to.outright personal modification, although
ll^ey undergo -'change yearly as more and more people seek alter
a t i v e positions in relation to these hierarchies*

Change as

chronicled by historical and sociological writers has usually
depicted as interesting and significant only those manifests^ons. which occurred in the last three mentioned institutions*
again, while -this was a defensible scholarly position at
one time, such limited foci are insufficient for an adequate
understanding of post-modern change*

The cultural revolution

of the 1960*s had and will continue to have long-term effects
on all institutions although its most dramatic successes came
in the- educational, kinship and recreational.

The Today8s

Army, campaign, along with other major alterations of the
status quo, can be interpreted as a product of the liberating
climate of the 60*s and the adverse effects upon the tradition
al military.

Whether a redi.stribu.tion of goods took place or

a radical rearxiangement of power relations for the most part

j

remains to be seen*

But to limit to these criteria an

assessment of the cultural revolution and the part of the
innovators within it is to miss the point*

There was a

great deal more going throughout that decade of turmoil than
analysis of the vulgar Marxist variety is capable of analyzing,
Whether men in society will be able to handle accuracy
and rationality in their lives, or rather to what degree they
will be able to include more of it, is a Question,'; I am not
prepared to answer**

But the fact that more realistic and

volnntaristie attitudes are producing an increasingly rational,
spci al oxder means that in the future the joys and sorrows of
mythology will give way to more calculated innovation*
Values will move in the direction of empirically established
truth (the rapid change in kinship today reflect increasing
awareness of the failure of the standard models), and "regu
larised11 innovation throughout the culture will as much become
ihe;%iorra then as emotional!stic conformity is today*

♦My doctoral dissertation will deal with that issue*

APPENDIX

’
This addition to the text is offered as a response to
Professor Kemer* s reservations about the thesis*

The form

of an appendix is used for purely technical reasons so that
typing could be carried on in the main body while these
answers to Prof. K e m e r were formulated*

Time was of the

essence®
The first objection has to do with lines on page 27,
''f
^pec5,fically, "it has begun in some minor ways to correlate
jwith reality", referring to Parsons® system theory and m o d e m
-society*. Dr* K e m e r rightly observes that this remark con%
■yffcredicts one made earlier to the effect that "the nature of
■

!§hange is itself changing", thus leading me into a hypothet
ically confusing position*
forwards

The explanation is rather straight-

the phrase "in some minor ways" refers not to the

culture broadly, but mors specifically to the inordinate
growth of complex organization in the West, culminating in
the production of "organisation and conglomerate men", and
the well-documented conformity rampant in some of the more
affluent sectors of the society.

Thus in contrast to the

socio-economic chaos of the thirties, when Parsons began
dreaming up the system theory under L.J* Henderson, the
post-war era (even given the putatively disruptive late 609s)
is better approximated system!cally, again, "in some minor

ways", than earlier eras*

As for the relationship with socia

change, the innovators do not operate pro but rather contra
the status quo, so that change is changing, but the culture
in some of its manifestations - like organization - continues
to churn out the relatively predictable and uninspired societ
member.

Whereas Parsons looked ridiculous in 1969, he's

beginning to seem less so the more repressive the political
situation becomes.
Secondly, Prof. K e m e r is concerned that my "presen
tation is overly simplified15 and "a vast array of phenomena
is.*included in a relatively brief space", which "leads the
xkea^er to question how logically interrelated the material
re©|b!y is".

This methodological-stylistic problem faced me

from the.beginning and was never satisfactorily resolved*
trying to say something "new" about social change a subject which, as I note in the first paragraphs, can be
practically' equated with sociology - the emphasis must shift
from tight, logical, puncture-proof arguments, to highly
generalized formulations which support the thesis.

The most

trying section to compose was the historical chapter.

The

nature of.historiography itself, the very bulk of data
available, and the limits of time and talent on my part made
a seemingly
haphazard selection inevitable.
mu
■i

m i i i * i m * ' h i■ *

**•

Before doing

the thesis, I studied some major works In the philosophy of
inquiry, and came to the conclusion that my "argument" was
not destined to be a debater's dream.

Everything that went

into the thesis seemed absolutely necessary to its author and

the many items and paths of thought omitted simply "seemed"
less crucial!..

Obviously, I have no defense, if one is required,

for the fact that it is a sprawling effort.

It was a sprawling

subject.
More personally disturbing. Prof. Keraer objects to
my "categorical casting aside of numerous works with often
glib comments as opposed to sound logical justifications".
X frankly do not find In the thesis the source of this remark.
X do lambast, for various reasons, Popper, Hirsch, Martindale,
'JBoskoff (the latter three for negative reviews of LaPiere's
^jpeok), but I also praise and exploit dozens of other authors
.$fcforoughout the thesis for 'their learning, sociologically and
•^Historically.

Also "sound, logical justifications" are not

^always necessary or sufficient reasons for criticising an
raurhor. : Some works fall short of serious consideration
before the level of logic:

they simply are not well

conceived or executed.
The most important and serious of Prof. 'Kemer’s
notes is this:

"there must be something going on out there

that has been documented in a more empirical manner.

Any

evidence to that effect would only confirm your thesis"*

My

approach to this issue has been two-fold: first, an examina
tion of journals and books in the hope of finding good infor
mation about innovation as a process of cultural change, and
second, a philosophical-methodological inquiry as to the
likelihood of finding good supporting analyses.

As for the

first, the amount and quality of material is amazingly sparse

and poor®

Most innovation studied has to do with moderniza

tion processes and other economic topics (see, e.g., Fritz
Redlieh, "Innovation in Business" and "The Bole of Innova
tion in a Quasi-Static World", both reprinted in Steeped in
Two .Cultures (Harper Torchbooks, 197"0 and Galbraith,
Economics and the Public Purpose, pp. 146-54. ), "which though
interesting, do not usually have much application to the
thesis.

Also, I felt in'some sense justified in not seeking

out ‘every, possible fragment of data since both LaPiere and
Barnett surveyed the field with care, and my work depends on
theirs®

As for the logic of the situation, It is completely

ufspurprising that the processes of innovations! change as I
psf^j-ect them have not been studied, first because the study
of/sIndividual behavior is extraordinarily difficult and
always post facto in the case of the true innovator, and
secondly, because this form of post-modern behavior is so
xapr^ in its current manifestation - that it has had insuffi
cient time to enter the reluctantly accepting arms of academe.
Prof . Kerner was also bothered by my "weak" economic
analysis, appropriately I believe.

As a partial remedy I

have studied Galbraith more carefully, and am now’ of the
belief that the footnote on page 144 of the thesis is more
accurate as economics than the relatively conservative
arguments incorporated into the text.

But for lack of time,

an entire rewriting would be performed cn the section®
However, in keeping with my essentially Marxist orientation
to the problem, I still feel that Galbraith’s plan for

'!>'p

'reform as expressed in his latest writing, is marvelous to
contemplate and unlikely to be implemented*

The relations

of power and financial strength are such that the individual
innovator may be able to feather his own nest (see Harry
Browne on this issue, any of his books), but an essential
alteration of economic arratigement s will remain problematic *
Remember that when a recent president sought to make
Galbraith a ranking government economic advisor, Wall Street
erupted in fury and made it plain that his- -"iconoclastic"
view of economic reality was completely indigestible®
Connected with this, Prof® Kerner recognizes that

.'4

Inhere are all kinds of international economic issues that
be raised", which I assiduously did not raise due to
their horrible complexity and also since the thesis was
■^signed* to explain change in the most advanced sectors of
itfle wor3„d only.
X hope these responses have clarified somewhat the
■muddier sections Prof* Kerner was good enough to elucidate
for me*

NOOSES

*1.

There has existed for nearly two decades within

the discipline a publicised debate between the remnants of the
old functionalists versus conflict theorists and the newer
Mradical caucus” adherents (not to mention the even more
recent '‘radical functionalists”)*

Their basic disagreements

intern from ma^or methodological differences, resulting of course
fin.-equally major substantive battles*

The old problems of

.'Sir

|*bjactivity, social, causation, values and the researcher, etc.
have come to the fore in books like Yidich and Stein* s Socio'
ffipgy on .Trial* Friedrichs* Sociology of Sociology, Reynolds
ipud Reynolds9 Sociology of Sociology and Myrdal *s Objectivity
:1S3 Social Research.* among dozens of others*

It seems at

times that American sociologists, perhaps due to pressure from
Fretich, British and German colleagues, publish as many self-
conscious, self-critical articles and books as original
research or theory pieces.

While ■there may be great utility

in-professional ”soul-searching”, my attention to the debate
remains small, for another thesis or two on the subject itself
would be. entirely possible*

However, within my scope there

immediately arise the same problems with which these authors
concern themselves, well-summarised for example in Norman
B i m b a u m 9s Toward a Critical Sociology*

I have taken cogni

zance of our self-appraising colleagues and wish this to be
1?6

1y7
(Notes to pages I - 3)
under stood s 1 write with the knowledge that my methodology
is anything but airtight vis a vis questions of history and
sociology, valuation and research, the efficacy of grand
theory, that is, theory treating great spans of. time and huge
groupings of variables in "untanglcable plethoras”*

But since

much valuable x*esearch of this type has been done in the past,
I write, also with the conviction that protracted theorising,
if based on a careful reading of history with socioloiogical
insight,, is not only advisable but indispensable to a discispline overloaded with unrelated print-outs*
At one point in my research, I compiled a bibliography
iggnd made notes toward a methodological statement (akin to those
,Iaa -all of Myrdal •s works) the focus of which centered around
.f^jjstorical/social causation and its "detection”, value pro•Jesses versus structural manif©stations regarding the phenom.jglsfn of social change, the value-free motif in current research,
and key epistemological problems growing out of t h e .Kant-Marx~
Mimnheim-Kaberinas tradition and its many offshoots*

But

after toying with the problems of authoritative writing in
this uncharted field, I.-carefully retreated, not with the
admission that I was thereby forced to produce less sound
research, •but simply to get on. with the actual project at
hand.

I began to feel like an airplane at the end of the

runway, r e w i n g the engines for six hours prepax^ing for a
ten minute flight!

Thus, all the fascinating, sometimes

momentous, often trivial ramifications of the sociology of
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sociology will have to wait for proper attention.

(Bee brief

bibliography of works consulted at the end of this note.)
I have relied on several major theoretical texts in
this study of social and cultural change, those of LaPiere,
Barnett, Toffler and to a less noticeable degree, Brecht and
Etsioni (see general bibliography)*

These books were selected

from a large field due to their intensity, originality and
usefulness to rny method*

Within social psychology I have

'Used to some advantage Mills and Garth*s classic for like
^reasons*

Of even more use however has been the synthetic,

^far-reaching, thought of.-Marion Vanfossen whose probing into
jgjthe future of post-modern culture is as sophisticated and
^original as any being done by so clad scientists at this time.
Partial bibliography of the sociology of sociology:
ilfpixmfeaum, Norman. Toward a Critical Sociology.
y
Oxford U. Phess” 1971 •

New York:

fYBlaekburn, Robin, ed. Ideology in Social Science.
•Random House, 1^7bT~Vrntage Book*
Branson, Leon* The Political Context of Sociology,
Princeton U* Press, 1961*

New York:
Princeton:

Brecht, Arnold* Political Theory: The Poundations of 20th
Century Political Thought* Princeton paperbacks.
Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1939.
Douglas, Jack* The Relevance of Sociology.
Century-Croft s, 7T970.

N.Y.: Appleton-

Durkheim,- Emile. The Rules of Sociological Method. Translated
by Sarah A* Solovay and John H. Mueller. Tree Press
Paperback. N.Y.: Free- Press, 1964.
.Friedrichs, Robert W. A Sociology of Sociology. Free Press
Paperback. N.YTsTE^eST^ssT
Gouldner, Alvin W. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology.
Avon Equinox Books* N.Y.: Avon, "iW^.
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Horowitz, Irvin L.-J ed* The New Sociology. Galaxy Books,
N.Y.: Oxford U. Press”, l90f«
Lynd, Robert S .
&iOwled£e for What? Princeton Paperbacks*
Princeton: Prlhce'tonTu* Press, 1970..
Myrdal, Gunn-ar. Objectivity in Social Research. .N.Y. i Pan
theon Books, 1^599*
O'Neill, John. Sociology as a Skin Trade: Essays Towards a
Reflexive Sociology. ~N.Y.T Harper and Row,’ T972.
Reynolds, Larry T# and Janice M., eds. The Sociology of
Sociology. N.Y*: MacKay Co., 1970.
Vidich* Arthur J. and Stein, Maurice, eds. Sociology on Trial,
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice H a l l 7 ^ % ? T "
;Weber, Max* On the Methodology of the Social Sciences. Trans^
lated’ by Edward ShiTiand Henry Elnch. Glencoe, 111.:
■fsfc
Free Press, 1949.
2.

Gouldner, qjj. cit., p. 29 ff.

3.

Blackburn, op. cit., passim.

I'
i:>

-2P« fitt, pp. ix - 4 8 .
'3*

Ibid., p. xii.

6. Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemie CJ
(Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1962 J7"3th”edition, revised,
pp. 3 -4 8 .
?. Richard P. Appelbaum, Thecud.es of Social Change
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Co.,~T97dJT^
8. Pitirim A* Sorokin, (N.Y.: Dover Publications,
1963), originally entitled Social Philosophies of an Age of
Crisis (1950).
9*

New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 196$.

10. Homer G. Barnett, Innovation: The Basis of Cultural
Change (N.Y*: McGraw-Hill Book,': Co., 1*953)•
11.

LaPiere, Social Change. p. vi. (Here aft ex*, SC* )

12.

Relying heavily in research of an extended nature

upon a single major work would seem at best optimistic, at
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worst disastrous, depending of course upon the quality of
the source and the use made of it®

Therefore, it seems

advisable to defend such a technique.
The study of social change has been intermittently
popular with professionals for decades, and theories of
change at both micro and macro levels abound.,

I have

examined many of these theories, either directly or through
comprehensive studies*

After having discerned in most of

them debilitating weaknesses which render them only somewhat
useful, it was with great delight and relief that LaPiere's
wo^: came to.my attention*

Characterized in social-psycho-

lcip|eal terms, he seems to be an old wizened liberal whose
desire for heightened-human, freedom pervades his work, yet
•through many years of study has found that standard
c h ^ g e theories come up short for reasons he makes clear*
However, in a book of $42 pages, it is not possible to offer
lengthy refutations of other theoretical positions simply for
the glorification of one’s own thoughts*

It is more important

to delineate carefully and document as much as possible the
theory being offered.

This LaPiere has done, end this is

what I shall seek to do in the following.
Out of academic curiosity I studied reviews of
Social Change in the major journals.

Lon Martindale (AJB,?1:

203-4, Sept. *6$), Walter Hirsc-h (Social Forces, xliv, #1 s
136-7, Aug. 16$) and Alvin Boskoff (ASR, XXX: 639-40, Aug. 96$)
all. made slightly differing but equally imperceptive, inade-

(Note to page 12)
quate and imprecise attacks on the book.

It is amazing and

depressing that particularly Mart indale and Hirsch, two
important men in the discipline, should so unslo.llfully
handle LaPiere *s achievement.

After reading very carefully

their reviews, it would be easy to construct a point by
point contradictory statement, but aside from psychological,
vindication of LaPiere such an exercise would serve no purpo
and would consume valuable hour’s.

Their attacks, finally,

for this reader are unworthy of the book.
By way of sample illustration, both Mart indale and
•SUflpsch extract one line from LaPiere1s Preface ("The theory
Sgpjbn,.which the following is based, and which fox' reasons of
.personal preference is kept mox»e implicit than explicit,
-c^istitutes a sharp break with the traditional theories
■^§1.,..) - although both reviewers succeed in misquoting him
~of--contexting the line beyond recognition - neither
writer understood the point of the sentence,;

LaPiere wanted

simply to acknowledge his use of Barnett's theory, but was
not going to footnote every instance.

Both reviewers seised

upon the sentence, claiming for it meanings which were clear
not intended.

It seems neither gave their reading the same

dedication and care LaPiere gave his writing, which upon
reflection is not surprising.
Also of interest is LaPiere*s treatment of both
Martindale and Hirsch in an extended footnote to page $4* of
Social Change in which he writes:

111)on Mart indale® s Social

iO c

(Note to page 12)
Life and Cultural Change (1962) is only an elaboration of
certain aspects of Max Weber* s theory of the role of religion
in the determination of social stability and change*..".
Regarding Hirsch, "Of the hundreds of books that were pub
lished over the past decade by American sociologists about
sociological matters, only nine are specifically on social
change.

Of these, two (...Explorations in Social Change,

1964, ea.Br, Walter Hirsch and George Zollschan) are collections
of discrete essays and articles".

Martindale wrote the intro

duction to Hirsch*s bock so we realize that the negative
rbpiews were another example of sociology-fratemity black
balling:*
Hirsch®s reader,• Explorations...,
in spite of its
mmi*
iw ia. i

if

m

■■ n m n . t i» M im . g iii« u —

m k c

•

■**

8^g;,vpages is predominantly pompous and protracted mediocrity.
T h » f e w articles which rise above the trivial or bombastic
MiS?-

€Q|gpem such old standards as Sorokin's work.

Sorokin's

piece in the book is by far the most readable and sociologi
cally sensitive.

That the antiseptic Purdue "thinkers" would

eschew LaPiere*s vision of reality does not come as a shock*
Finally., Zollschan wrote an article on Freud's
"reality principle", and the book in toto Is supposedly
constructed around that marvelously chic term, "the dialectic".
Naturally, LaPiere regards Freud as the world's worst socio
logist, and he frowns on elevating a simple cognitive tool to
the position of "school"-ishness.
Boskoff's review is only slightly less Inadequate in

(Notes to pages 12 - 28)
this realm of proto-scholarship.

He attacks LaPierees polemics

as “out of place” i.e. in poor taste, etc*, without discussing
the possible validity of the author’s arguments*

The book

.for him is a ”disquieting "mixture” of elements, “not text
nor reference nor tract”.
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